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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
PURPOSE
The purposes of this study were to:
1. Examine the state of the art of mission-oriented simu-
lation (MOS) and its use in human factors research,
2. Discuss the issues involved in determining the level of
fidelity that is appropriate for the conduct of behaviorally
oriented human factors research in civil multicrew transport
operations,
3. Develop guidelines for the conduct of behavioraUy
oriented human factors research in civil multicrew transport
operations that require fulbmission simulation (FMS), and
4. Develop recommendations for future research which
might fill gaps in present knowledge regarding the validity of
simulation research and suggest alternative methods which
might improve tile productivity of such research.
Although many of the principles we discuss have wide
application this study was concerned only with the simula-
tion of civil air transport operations. In this context, FMS
includes simulation of all of tile stimuli presented to the
flight crew. It includes the aircraft cockpit, visual and motion
cues, aircraft flight dynamics, all of the aircraft subsystems,
the flight environment (including air traffic control (ATC),
weather, and other air or ground vehicular traffic), the cabin
crew, and all ancillary flight services (such as dispatch, ramp
passenger services, and maintenance). Full-mission simu-
lation lies at tile high end of the range of fidelity associated
with MOS. The more restrictive term 'qine-oriented simula-
tion" (LOS) refers to tile MOS of a civil airline operation.
PROBLEM STATEMENT
Tile problem addressed was the identification of effective
methods for developing and using MOS and scenarios that
represent the operationally complex environment required
for human factors research in civil air transport operations.
A primary goal for the human factors researcher is to pro-
duce experimental conditions that elicit behavior that would
occur under similar circumstances in the real world. The ulti-
mate consideration is performance in the real world. The
importance of this concept in the practice of human factors
was stressed by David Meister (1985, p. viii) when he wrote:
...the purpose of ergonomics/human factors is to
describe, analyze, measure, predict, and control
the real world of systems functioning operation-
ally (i.e., not under experimental control).
The obvious implications of this statement for human
tors researchers, again in Meister's words (1985, p. viii)
...in consequence, the ideal environment in which
to gather data is the operational environment. It
may be necessary for various reasons to measure
in some environment other than the real world,
such as a laboratory or a simulator, but in such
cases the conclusions derived from the data must
be vcrified in the operational environment.
fac-
are:
PROCEDURAL APROACH
Our first step was to review the approach and the relevant
literature, and to conduct field interviews with recognized
experts. Next, we analyzed the information we had obtained
and discussed it with authorities in the use of mission-
oriented behavioral research. Our final step was to write tilis
report.
LITERATURE REVIEW
The existing literature was screened for information
related to MOS and the development of scenarios for behav-
ioral research. Although NASA has used MOS for training
since the beginning of the space program and major airlines
began exploring the training potential of FMS in the late
1970s, little has been reported on its use for human factors
research.
Few FMS studies have involved civil aviation operations.
One of the few was the pioneering study conducted by the
NASA Ames Research Center in the mid-1970s (Ruffell-
Smith, 1979). Two more FMS studies were being done by
researctLers at NASA Ames while this study was being con-
ducted (Foushee, appendix A, and Murphy, appendix B).
There also was a paucity of studies dealing with the pre-
dictive validity of results achieved using MOS for research.
Most o: the reported studies were concerned with the perfor-
mance in a simulator alone, or with the transfer of training.
The transfer-of-training studies were not particularly helpful
because, while they can predict the amount of simulator
training that will contribute to real-world task performance,
they do not necessarily reveal the real.world validity of the
behavior that occurred.
Unquestionably, there are common elements among simu-
lation requirements for training and for research. However,
there are important differences. These differences arise not
only because research objectives and training objectives are
different, but also because behavioral research imposes more
stringent research requirements for the control, measure-
ment, and generalization of results. With the exception of the
publications of Lauber and Foushee (1981) dealing with the
use of FMS in flight crew training, we found that the impor-
tant issues of scenario development for FMS have been given
only cursory attention in the literature.
Despite these difficulties, the literature search was helpful.
While training was the purpose of most of the reported MOS
and LOS work, the training literature addressed many
scenario issues that are relevant for the design, development,
and execution of simulation scenarios for research.
For example, the training literature stressed the impor-
tance of a multidimensional concept of fidelity. "Fidelity"
has been described in many ways. It defies simple description
or measurement and, unfortunately, there are no easy
answers to questions of fidelity requirements for research
(see appendix C). It also is clear that there are controversial
issues regarding the role of physical fidelity in simulation -
considering such areas as the importance of platform motion,
low-amplitude vibration, realistic control loading, and visual
system fidelity. Here again most studies have dealt with the
effects of these variables on performance in the simulator or
on transfer of training. The predictive validity of a simulator
perflmnance on real-world flight operations is far from clear.
FIELD INTERVIEWS
Field interviews with experts in the use of MOS were
particularly helpfid. Time and budget constraints prevented
our contacting all knowledgeable people in each area of inter-
est; and in some cases we were restricted to telephone inter-
views. However, because we were able to selectively interview
recognized leaders who were well informed regarding activi-
ties in their respective fields, we were able to take advantage
of the insight and practical knowledge of many of their
fellow researchers.
REPORT SCOPE AND ORGANIZATION
This report is concerned solely with the use of MOS for
human factors research in civil air transport. Its intended
audience ranges from qualified researchers who may not be
fully familiar with the FMS of the air transport enviromnent
to corporate or institutional research managers who have to
make difficult judgments regarding which research programs
to support.
The areas discussed range from the myriad of conceptual
issues which have to be considered and evaluated when plan-
ning to the pragmatic lessons learned from past FMS studies.
At the onset of the study, we were asked to concentrate on
the appropriate use of FMS, on considerations of scenario
design, and on their implementation for research purposes.
We were asked to avoid such other issues as requirements for
motion and visual systems.
While this report assumes basic training in behavioral
research, including familiarity with experimental design and
statistical methods, more than traditional training is required
for MOS research. A critical domain of information lies
between the lessons learned in basic behavioral research train-
ing and the requirements for effective FMS research in
aviation. It is information that has been learned on the job
by those researchers who have had to perform applied
research in complex simulation environments.
As expected, clear answers to the critical issues were not
always available because often there was a conflicting inter-
dependence among considerations that outwardly seemed to
be well-defined and separate. Resolution of pragmatic prob-
lems which were created by the desire to study behavior in a
simulated environment usually required reasoned trade-offs
and judgments by highly skilled researchers. It was not
always possible to reduce such judgments to a firm set of
principles and procedures. Moreover, in many cases, time and
budgetary limitations dictated the boundaries of what could
be considered in a simulation study. Despite these difficul-
ties, our goal was to identify the basic issues involved in plan-
ning applied behavioral research utilizing FMS, discuss the
wide gamut of considerations that must be evaluated, and
provide guidelines for the use of FMS.
Chapter 2 discusses the fundamental issues and require-
ments of applied behavioral research for which MOS is the
research vehicle. These issues include problem dei'inition,
study-plan development, experimental strategy, test preparal
tion, data collection, data analysis, and interpretation of
results. Each is important, and each requires specific consid-
eration in all behavioral simulation studies, whether they
involve part-task or FMS.
Chapter 3 then narrows the scope of discussion to the
development of guidelines for doing full-mission LOS
research. Topics include the foundations of LOS, when it
should be used for research, research team composition,
research subject selection and training, scenario development,
scenario script writing, operating team training, scenario test-
ing and running, subject debriefing, and lead-time considera-
tions. A preimplementation checklist as a summary of the
chapter is included.
Chapter 4 contains research recommendations to fill gaps
in knowledge regarding the validity of simulation research
and considers alternative methods which might improve the
productivity of such research. The recommendations discuss
testing full-mission.research validity, studying alternative
forms of simulation, optimizing mission-oriented research,
developing human-performance models, identifying subjec-
tive measures of fidelity, and integrating research efforts.
Theappendicesareparticularlyimportant.AppendixC
discussesthefundamentalissuesandrequirementsofapplied
behavioralresearch.It discussesthegeneralissuesthatinflu-
encehowandwhyappliedbehavioralresearchisconducted,
thebasicresponsibilitiesof theresearcher,thethreegeneral
purposesof appliedbehavioralresearch,theapplicationcon-
textof theresearchasit changeswithadvancesin technol-
ogy,thechoiceof researchvehicles,andthefidelityand
validityof"researchsimulations.All of thesefactorsare
involvedin therationaldeterminationf theresearchvehicle
and environmentrequiredfor effective,behaviorally
oriented,humanfactorsresearchandis trueregardlessof
whethertherequirementis for relativelysimplelaboratory
apparatus,part-tasksimulation,orasophisticatedFMS.
Thefieldinterviews,documentedastrip reports,were
convertedinto theeight"casestudies"inappendicesA,B,
andD through1. ThesecasestudiesrangefromConrad
Kraft'snarrowlyfocusedandclassicstudyof visuali lusions
duringnightapproaches,throughstudiesinvolvingmarine
shiphandling,anda varietyof civilandmilitaryaviation
applications.Thesestudiesoffertheinsightsofexperienced
andsuccessfulinvestigatorswhohavehadto resolvethe
issuesdiscussedintheremainderofthisreport.
Theauthorsaregratefulforthetimeandinsightsprovided
bytheinvestigatorsweinterviewedduringthisstudy.Note-
worthycontributionsweremadebyDr.it. ClaytonFoushee
of NASAAmesResearchCenter;D_.ThomasJ. ttammell
andDr.MvriamW.Smithof theEclectechAssociatesDivi-
sionof Sl_q)Analytics,lnc.:Dr. DavidD. Woodsof the
WestinghouseR&D Center;Mr. ThomasC. Wayof the
BoeingAerospaceCompany',Dr. RichardE. Edwardsof
BoeingCotnputerServices;Dr.ConradL.KraftoftheBoeing
Company(Retired);Mr. DavidShroyerof UnitedAirlines
Training(enter;andDr. WilliamJ. Codyof McDonnell-
DouglasCorporation,St.Louis.
Weals(,appreciatedtheguidanceprovidedin meetings
withDr.DavidC.Nagel,Dr.CharlesE.Billings,Dr.JohnK.
Lauber)andDr. H. ClaytonFousheeof NASAAmes
ResearchCenter.Andwe thankDr. AlfredT. Leeand
Mr.RobertT. Shinerof NASAAmesResearchCenterand
Dr.RichardM.Frankelof WayneStateUniversityfor their
thoughtfulreviewofthedraftmanuscript,
iNowafull-timememberNationalTransportationSafetyBoard.

CHAPTER2
PLANNING AND CONDUCT OF SIMULATION-BASED RESEARCH
INTRODUCTION
This chapter discusses the basic issues involved in applied
human factors research, including the application of funda-
mental methods and the requirements for doing applied
behavioral research in a MOS environment. It covers the
range of researcher tasks from study planning to data inter-
pretation, and in it the assumption is made that applied MOS
research is to be conducted to solve an operational or system-
design problem.
Williges and Mills (1982) compiled a catalog of methodo-
logical considerations for human factors research in systems.
As part of their work, they derived a seven-stage classifica-
tion for drawing together the methods and procedures appli-
cable to conducting simulation-based research to answer
specific system-design questions. The seven stages of planning
and execution for hunaan factors research are: 1) Problem
Definition, 2) Study Plan, 3) Experimental Strategy, 4)Test
Preparation, 5) Data Collection, 6) Data Analysis, and
7) Interpretation.
PROBLEM DEFINITION
The first step in any research program is to fully under-
stand the practical problems to be investigated and the infor-
mation that will be needed for the user of the research results
to make an intelligent decision regarding them. The problem
statement must be defined in terms of researchable and test-
able questions that are operationally meaningful. At this
stage, a subject matter expert (SME), although not necessar-
ily working for the researcher, is a critically important
resource for developing or negotiating the definition of
the problem statement. The SME can also be of considerable
help in establishing the form of the interpreted results that
will be most meaningful to the ultimate user.
Establishing the Operational Need
Frequently the operational user of the research results will
frame the research question in practical terms. This can
create a very real problem for the researcher because, if the
basic problem is not carefully examined, the research ques-
tion nray be framed in terms that provide incomplete or erro-
neous answers. The research question may be framed in
terms that do not include all of the important issues, or in
terms that presuppose the approach necessary to answer the
practical problem. For example, the user may ask whether
pilot fatigHe in a given situation will affect ability to perform
normal flight tasks. The issue behind the question can be
crew scheduling and duty hours involving not only basic
safety isst',es, but also questions such as the number of crews
necessary to sustain flight operations. It is difficult to frame
the right question without fully understanding tire opera-
tional problem; thus, the researcher nrust learn the nature of
the operational problem that led to the practical question to
be sure tlat the research question reflects real-world needs.
Establishing the Research Objective
Once all aspects of the problem are understood, the prac-
tical question must be translated into an answerable form.
The firsl step is to determine what relevant information is
available. At this point the researcher's job is to secure
information - not to do empirical research. Research may bc
required to answer the operational question, but this should
not be an automatic assumption. Frequently the required
informa'ion can be obtained by a literature review and dis-
cussions with others who are knowledgeable in the problem
area.
If it is established that additional research is necessary to
answer all or part of the practical question, the question
must 1hen be translated into testable form. The practical
question must be stated as a research question and framed in
terms of specific relationships among measurable variables
(Cody. 1984). If the factors of interest are not directly mea-
surable_ they must be defined in terms of other variables that
are. Tt_is definition process may again require the use of
SMEs r.o be sure that answering the research question will
answer the practical operational question.
Ofu:n the practical problem is stated in terms that are
undefinable from a research standpoint. The earlier example
of a _:uestion about the relationship between fatigue and
n°rma flight tasks illustrates the difficulty. Despite a great
many attempts, there is neither a widely accepted definition
of fatigue (Bartley, 1976), nor an industry concensus on the
defini:ion of such basic concepts as cockpit workload.
If 1he users are not likely to see the relationship between
the planned research and the operational problem, a user
education program will be needed. This need is important if
the operational problem, which has been raised by the user,
is noL directly answerable. Good communication with the
user at this stage of development is the only way to minimize
problems of this nature.
_[_INO P_,Glg BL&NK NOt t_bMl_
In summary, the researcher's main task in the problem
definition stage is to collect and organize the relevant facts in
order to explicitly determine what information is needed to
state the practical question in answerable form. A study plan
draft should be prepared that clearly states "what is to be
accomplished." At the same time the researcher should be
establishing at least a general understanding of the form of
the end product, and thinking of ways to state it in terms
that are meaningful to tile user population.
STUDY PLAN
Developing a study plan includes the following four tasks:
1) frame the general approach, 2) describe the operational
conditions, 3) define tile variables and develop the prelimi-
nary scenario, and 4) perform a sensitivity analysis.
Framing the General Approach
At this stage, particularly if the research involves explora-
tory or hypothesis testing, the research project should be dis-
cussed with others who have different interests and expertise.
There can be wide differences of opinion on the optimum
approach. Other investigators may see the research problem
and approach differently. On the other hand, in the case of
evaluative research, fundamental differences of opinion
about tile approach are less likely. For a discussion of the dif.
ferences between exploratory, hypothesis-testing, and evalu-
ative research, see appendix C.
The researcher also should be cautious not to let knowl-
edge of the availability of particular research vehicles, espe-
cially large simulators, be an overriding influence on what is
required to support the research. There always is the tempta-
tion for the equipment available to determine what the
research vehicle will be.
It is worth remembering that the nature of the research
problem may offer an opportunity to structure the research
to gain information which has applications beyond the imme.
diate practical problem and contributes to general scientific
knowledge. Moreover, a research project that solves a practi-
cal problem by developing a general principle almost invaria-
b_y provides a better answer than research which does not.
It has another advantage, If either the characteristics of the
system being investigated or the operational problem changes
slightly, tire results of a study of general principles should
remain valid, whereas the results of a study framed in too
restrictive a manner may no longer be applicable,
A good example of research that both solved a practical
problem and made a substantial general contribution is the
series of experiments performed by Kraft (see appendix G)
to determine whether characteristics of the B-727 aircraft
were contributing to a series of landing-short accidents
during night-landing approaches under visual conditions. His
early analysis found commonalities among the external visual
scene associated with the incidents. Kraft went on to prove
that the underlying reason for the low approaches was not a
characteristic of tlle airplane. The basic cause was a visual
illusion of height produced by the combination of lighted
and tilted terrain behind the airport and the lack of any
lights in the foreground a condition freqt, ently found dur-
ing night approaches over large bodies of water.
The practical solution for the problems associated with
these night approaches was an educational program for pilots
and a revision of cockpit procedures. If a less skillful
researcher tlad undertaken the research, however, and
focused solely on the practical question (i.e., did tile charac-
teristics of the aircraft contribute to the accidents?), the
answer might well have been equivocal. And even if tile prac-
tical problem had been solved, the more important general
contribution would have been lost.
Kraft's discovery of the underlying cause of this series of
accidents led to a better understanding of a fundamental
problem. It was a major contribution to aviation safety, and
an outstanding example of applied behavioral research.
Wickens' (1984) work on a multiple-resources model of
human performance and aircraft-design display is another
excellent example of theoretically guided research performed
at the same time a specific problem was being addressed.
The researcher's conception of the research problem as
either narrow and specific, or as an example of a broad and
general problem determines whether the study may have a
potential value beyond the immediate solution of the prob-
lem. This does not suggest that every applied research prqiec t
carl be expected to contribute to fundamental scientific
knowledge. We do suggest, however, that whenever possible
it behooves the researcher to choose a research setting and
conditions that permit the examination of underlying causes,
rather than to focus solely on the solution to an immediate
practical problem.
Describing the Operational Conditions
Once a decision about the general research approach has
been made, the study plan should be developed. The first
step is to develop a detailed description of the operational
conditions of interest. Describing the plan can be a simple or
complicated task, depending on the researcher's familiarity
with the operational environment, the scope of the problem,
and its complexity. Describing the operational conditions of
interest with precision is an important step and it should be
done with considerable care.
The researcher should make every effort to gain first-hand
experience in the operational setting. In many cases, an SME
may he needed to help develop a description of the opera-
tiona] conditions, determine the equipment to be used, and
select appropriate operational tasks. Tile value of SMEs
shouldnotbediscounted,regardlessof theresearcher'sgen-
eral familiarity with the problem domain. It is obviously
important to be sure that the SME is indeed an expert in the
critical areas.
An operational description of the study is necessary to
identify the factors that must be present to produce the
desired behavior. It should include all factors that may mod-
ify or otherwise influence that behavior. The operational
description should include the measurable manifestations of
the desired behavior as well as the operator skills involved.
Operational descriptions provide the basis for selecting the
independent and dependent variables to be examined, as well
as determining subject selection criteria and training require-
ments if training will be needed.
Quantitative information on the operational f_ictors
should be included in the operational description to the
degree this is possible. It is important to know the range of
values that an operational factor may have. While it is rela-
tively easy to set values for system variables such as aircraft
operating characteristics, this is not true for task-
performance variables, it is very difficult to develop meaning-
ful, measurable criteria for such task-performance variables as
the sequence, timing, and duration of communications or
display viewing - or for the interpersonal skills and attitudi-
nal concepts involved in measuring performance in areas such
as leadership, judgment, cockpit-crew coordination, and
resource managenrent.
Defining the Variables and Developing the
Preliminary Scenario
Armed with a general approach and description of the
operational conditions, the third step in the development of
the study plan is to structure the research project in concep-
tual terms. This requires the development of a first approxi-
mation of the number and values of the independent varia-
bles, the conditions to be held constant, and the data needed
to derive the desired performance measures. Also at this
point, the researcher should start to consider the tasks to be
performed, the sequence of events, and when data are to be
taken. The performance of this step should result in a con-
ceptual synthesis of the research variables and operational
factors that will be manifest in the simulation.
The researcher must determine whether the operational
factors and anticipated crew behavior can be expected to
produce the variables that he or she wishes to manipulate,
control, and measure. For example, the researcher may wish
to study decision-making as a function of workload. An oper-
ationally relevant task that can be manipulated for this pur-
pose should be a better choice than a task that has no opera-
tional relevance. The decisions of the researcher at this stage
start the formulation of the preliminary research scenario.
The process of developing the prelfininary scenario begins
by defining tire general mission in concrete operational terms
and then by blocking out its major segments on a sequential
or time-line basis. The scenario may be a mission-oriented
segment _e.g., take-off or landing), or a full-mission, gate-to-
gate flight. The researcher then must define the initial system
conditions, environmental conditions, and the effects pro-
duced by external agents such as ATC, other traffic, and nor-
real operating events. The special conditions or events repre-
senting the test variables also must be inchtded.
The preliminary scenario should then be used to identify
subject task and simulator operational requirements. It is
important to identify subject task requirements at an early
stage so that scenario timing requirements and subject train-
ing neecis can be established.
The simulator requirements should be defined in terms of
required capabilities. These capabilities include the opera-
tional and communication subsystems that must be simu-
lated and the environmental effects to be produced. The
operational subsystems can include any that are present in
the simulated airplane. The environnrental effects can encom-
pass such atmospheric phenomena as specific visibility condi-
tions i!" a visual system is to be used, weather conditions that
require weather radar simulation, and cockpit motion to pro-
duce -_urbulence effects. Communications subsystems that
may be needed include those for ATC and company com-
munications, cabin and ground crew intercommunication,
and a passenger address system.
Scenario development is an iterative process. At this stage
of the study plan, the preliminary scenario should be devel-
oped only to the extent necessary to define how the indepen-
dent variables will be controlled in the context of operation-
ally _elevant tasks: and to determine subject, task, simula-
tion, and data collection requirements. Further development
of th-" scenario should continue during test preparation.
Performing the Sensitivity Analysis
After developing the preliminary scenario, the researcher
should do a sensitivity analysis (Cody, 1984) by thinking
throL_gh how the conditions, events, and tasks are likely to
influence the behavior of interest. A sensitivity analysis
requires reconsideration of each operational factor to deter-
mine if it is relevant and necessary to include in the sinmla-
tion, and to estimate the magnitude of the factor's effect on
the desired behavior. In some cases the effect inay be too
littl:_ to reliably measure, or so great as to be disruptive. In
either case, the study plan may have to be changed.
_fhe researcher must exanaine the preliminary scenario to
discover possible deviations from the expected sequence of
belLavior that would complicate data analysis and interpreta-
tion. Consideration of this issue is crucial in line-oriented
FMS because of the decision flexibility that line flight crews
have in their day-to-day operations.
Much of the information derived from the sensitivity
andysis will be useful in constructing the formal design of
the study, including estimates of the number of runs
required, the number of subjects needed, and the amount of
data to be accumulated. All of these issues have practical, as
well as scientific implications, for they directly affect study
costs.
Researchers who have received a traditional education in
full-factorial designs will find both of the referenced reports
to be useful overviews of the range of design alternatives
available, and of their scientific and practical implications for
applied behavioral research.
EXPERIMENTAL STRATEGY
Performance Measurement
Experimental strategy includes selection of an experimen-
tal design, assignment of subjects to treatment conditions to
control variability between subjects, and also includes the
development of performance measures. Here we are depart-
ing slightly from the order suggested by Williges and Mills
(1982). In their seven stages of research, they placed experi-
mental strategy after test preparation. Because experimental
strategy, experimental design, and the development of per-
formance measures affect the planning and execution of the
research, we believe experimental strategy should be consid-
ered at this stage of the process.
Experimental Design
In most human factors research studies there is a conflict
between the real-world complexity of the operational tasks
and the need for economy of the research effort. Neither
time nor money are unlimited. There is also a conflict
between the need to elicit behavior that is equivalent to the
behavior that would occur in the real world (and therefore
the behavior necessary to produce meaningful data), and the
need to exercise control to minimize variability, therefore
maximizing the opportunity to discover reliable and statisti-
cally significant effects. A good experimental design strikes
an appropriate balance between these conflicting demands.
Williges and Mills' (1982) Catalog of Methodological Con-
siderations for Systems Experimentation discusses the advan-
tages and disadvantages of several experimental-design alter-
natives for applied behavioral research. Their discussion
focuses on the kinds of situations that arise in simulation-
based systems research, and the trade-offs among design
alternatives in terms of the data collection effort and the
amount (and reliability) of the information that can be
obtained when rigorous standards are applied.
Cody (1984), Recommendations for Conducting Manned
Flight Simulation Research, reviews the major issues raised
by Williges and Mills and then goes on to discuss the practical
implications of choosing certain design alternatives. For
example, a sequence of small studies, whether combined in a
full or fractional factorial design, requires more calendar time
to complete than a larger study that combines them. There-
fore it creates more opportunities for nuisance factors such
as subject drop-outs or simulator failures to interfere with
the research project.
Performance measurement of the human and of the sys-
tem being simulated is needed to answer research questions.
In this case, measurement implies more than simple data col.
lection. In cases in which there is a standard or criteria to
allow interpretation of a measure in terms of real-world per-
formance implications, it is usually in the form of a summary
index (or several indexes), as a result of the aggregation of
data from the same or multiple sources. If there are no estab-
lished criteria for performance, the lack of criteria will
greatly affect the conditions of the research, the types of
data collected, and the number of measures developed. The
prudent course is to maximize differences in conditions and
to have enough measures to be reasonably sure that some
measures of performance will show significant differences.
The development of performance measures begins with a
definition of the behavior of interest in terms of detectable
events. Frequently, the performance itself may be the focus
of concern. Studies to determine what a person, crew, or
system can do are usually interested in observable, overt per-
formance. For example, the question may be, "bow long
does it take a pilot to respond to a warning indicator and
begin corrective action?" In this case the performance mea-
sure is defined by the question.
If the behavior of interest is covert - as it is in a decision
process -- developing a measure is much more difficult
because overt manifestations of the decision process may be
no more than pressing a button, or taking no overt action at
all. This type of measurement problem is becoming common
with the shift in research interest from what operators can
do, to what supervisors do in existing systems, and what they
will do in new systems.
The magnitude of the performance measurement problem
is proportional to the complexity of the simulation. This is
because all of the factors that influence the behavior of inter-
est must be included in the sinmlation to elicit realistic
behavior. The less the researcher knows about the relevant
behavioral processes and the operational factors that affect
it, the more likely it is that he or she will use a complex and
comprehensive simulation. There is less certainty of what to
measure if the researcher is plowing new ground.
Unfortunately, if a large-scale simulation is required for
the study, a difficult and complex effort will be required for
developing methods of measuring performance. There is
some guidance in the literature on crew/system performance
measurement (c.f. Vreuls et al., 1977, 1985a, 1985b), but it
is not complete. There are substantial criterion issues and,
in many cases, there is not a theoretical basis for
measurement.
The best course of action is to examine what has been
measured in previous studies, listen carefully to SMEs and, if
possible, discuss measurement issues with other investigators
who have dealt with this problem for similar tasks. These
activities should define candidate measures, which should
then be tested empirically to determine if they produce per-
formance differences which are detectable by other means,
such as (but not limited to) ratings by expert observers.
TEST PREPARATION
At this stage, the researcher should have a well-developed
study plan and can now start thinking seriously about the
many practical matters that will need attention prior to the
actual conduct of the research. The practical matters include
determining simulator capabilities, resolving any conflicts
between simulator capabilities and research requirements,
coordinating with simulator support personnel, developing
the detailed scenario, establishing procedures for the conduct
of the experiment, recruiting subjects, training subjects, and
pretesting all equipment and procedures.
Simulator Capabilities
In most cases, simulator facilities are constructed to sup-
port flight crew training, engineering studies, or broad, long-
range programs of research. One of the researcher's first tasks
is to discover the specific simulation capabilities that are
available, and to determine whether or not modifications can
be made if they are necessary for the proposed research.
An early visit to the simulator facility may be sufficient
to discover if there are conflicts between the research
requirements and the simulator's capabilities. This initial visit
should be a prelude to several meetings with facility person-
nel to gain a thorough understanding of the simulator fea-
tures, its operation, and the duties of each member of the
simulator support staff. It is important to establish a sched-
ule of meetings to work out the details of preparing for the
study and a schedule for preparing the simulator. Individual
responsibilities of tile personnel involved should be deter-
mined at this time.
Conflicts Between Simulator Capabilities and
Research Requirements
Conflicts between simulator capabilities and research
requirements usually involve details rather than gross discrep-
ancies when modern simulators are being used. For example,
the researcher may want a particular event to occur contin-
gent upon the occurrence of one or more other events. While
the simulator may be capable of producing the event desired,
it may no: be able to produce the event at the desired time
or under tile desired conditions. This sort of conflict may not
be discowred until the final scenario is established, and the
programming and other work is under way.
It is impossible to list all of the possible problems asso-
ciated wi'h the capabilities of the simulator that may be
encountmed. Many will be discovered during preliminary
testing; odmrs may not be discovered until the actual data
collection. To discover as many problems as possible, the
researchel should become familiar with the operating details
of the simulator early, and should plan upon spending con-
siderable time with the simulator support personnel review-
ing detail_ of the research requirements.
A very common problem is whether to modify the
research program or the simulator. At the conceptual level,
the research program is normally within the control of the
researcher. However, the simulator can be under the control
of a higl_er level of management, or another division of the
organization. While it is usually easier to modify the research
plan, in some cases modification of the simulator may be
necessary. Unless the silnulator characteristics are known
well in advance, and the need for the modification antici-
pated, lhe cost and time required to modify the simulator
can be substantial. An additional complication may be that
the simulator is also being used for other research or training,
tire needs of which are not compatible with the proposed
modific_tion.
Coordination with Simulator Support Personnel
Experience has shown that the researcher cannot always
assume that a single person will be the key simulator facility
contacl to coordinate all aspects of the preparation, schedul-
ing, and operation of the sinmlator. Usually several people
will be involved and the researcher must be prepared to coor-
dinate ,heir activities. The simulator support personnel will
not know what is important to the research project or what
must bc done, unless it is spelled out for them. (See Way and
Edwards in appendix F.)
The researcher may have to work with several specialized
support people, and should make every effort to understand
their responsibilities - the things they can and cannot be
expected to do. If physical equipment needs modification,
equipment engineers and technicians will be involved.
At this stage, it may be necessary to consult as many as
three :_rogrammers regarding varying aspects of computer
contro:. Normally, a real-time programmer will be responsi-
ble for the software controlling the simulation, the sequence
of events, and the control that can be exercised at the con-
sole. 11"a computer-generated-image visual system is used, a
visual-:,cene data-base programmer will be needed to perform
any changes or additions to the visual scene. Changes in
visual scenes are described easily in terms of objects to be
portrayed, visibility characteristics, and visual events, but
even simple sounding modifications can take days or weeks
to program.
A third type of programmer may be needed for data
acquisition, if there will be event- or time-contingent san>
pling, or processing of data between capturing the data and
recording it. A special programmer for data analyses may also
be needed subsequent to the test runs. The researcher and
the last two types of data programmers should jointly plan
the data collection and analysis methods. Ease of data analy-
sis can be enhanced greatly by the way data are labeled and
organized when collected.
The researcher should know enough about the console to
operate the simulator if necessary. This means that he or
she will have to become acquainted with the operation of the
control console, and will be able to set initial conditions and
invoke certain options. This is particularly important for
checking that the right conditions have been set for different
trials. It is very easy to set the wrong sequence of trials if
mt.ltiple sequences with different conditions are involved in
the simulator runs.
Various technicians will be responsible for operation of
major subsystems, such as the motion base and the visual
system. The researcher should have at least a general famil-
iarity with the duties these people perform, because should a
fault occur, he or she would know who to turn to for help.
Cody's flightpath involved several waypoints and multiple
targets. He constructed a template of the full flight route and
rotated it several degrees for each variation of the scenario.
In effect, all of the relative values of flight-segment length
and turns remained the same, but the absolute values of all
headings changed. The flight legs were long enough that the
pilots did not see the constant pattern in the various mis-
sions, therefore each scenario appeared to be unique.
Woods (1984) suggests that if the class of behavior of
interest is well defined, inany specific instances of members
of that class can then be regarded as equivalent. For example,
it is possible to create a variety of decision problems as long
as they meet the criteria defined for a class of decision prob-
lems. If this rationale is to be applied successfully, the
researcher must have a valid theoretical basis for defining the
behavioral class, and the simulated examples of the behav-
ioral class must have operational relevance.
This line of reasoning again argues for the importance of
translating practical problems into a more theoretical context
to seek generally useful solutions. However, if the nature of
the practical problem excludes any basis for establishing
equivalence between expected behaviors, the researcher has
no choice but to use new subjects for each variation in the
scenario.
Procedures
Scenario Development
The scenario creates a simulated real world for the flight
crew, and creates the events of the flight to be observed and
measured for the research purposes. The scenario establishes
the mission objectives, tasks, environmental conditions, event
timing, and rules of operation.
As we have discussed earlier, scenario preparation should
begin while the study plan is being developed. Because simu-
lator capabilities are critical, some modification of the
scenario may be necessary. At this stage the researcher
should be concentrating on refining the scenario to be sure
that it is consistent with actual operations. Specific identi-
ties, values, and occurrences need to be assigned to the pre-
vious, more generally defined characteristics of the scenario.
One or more SMEs (e.g., an experienced crew member for
the fype of aircraft sinmlated, or an experienced controller
for the ATC areas) will be needed to establish these details.
If the same subjects are expected to participate in more
than one test run, the researcher may need to develop varia-
tions on the scenario to create apparently differing test con-
ditions. The problem is to maintain scenario equivalence at
some level of conception for all conditions considered to be
constant, even though those conditions may appear to the
subjects as different. Cody (1984) was able to overcome
this problem in a study of lowqevel navigation and attack
missions of military aircraft.
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The execution of any MOS is complex. Extensive research
and support team coordination, teamwork, and practice are
required to execute the simulation properly. In this context,
"procedures" are the organizational, management, and oper-
ational plans and schedules for the data collection.
The procedures should outline the responsibilities for each
of the members of the research team and support crew, and
should include contingency plans for potential problems,
such as a simulator failure. Logistic needs, such as preflight
briefing materials and training rooms and equipment, should
also be addressed in the procedural plans. A checklist for the
initial state of all simulator switches and control settings is a
key procedural document.
The subject testing schedule, the training subjects are to
receive, and the amount of practice to be permitted are an
important part of the procedures (Williges and Mills, 1982).
The training programs and the performance criteria to be met
at the end of training nmst be developed, and the supporting
documentation (e.g., questionnaires and forms for keeping a
log of the test runs and for recording observational and sub-
ject biographical data) should be prepared as part of the pro-
cedures. If collateral testing of the subjects is part of the
research program, the protocol to accomplish it should also
be developed at this stage.
An overall schedule for the pretesting and data collection
phases will need to be prepared. Time allowances in the
schedule should also be made to include the daily checking
of the simulator, the potential time loss caused by equipment
failures, rest periods, and additional, perhaps unplanned,
trials to be performed.
Finally, external requirements should be considered in the
master schedule. If a research project is the subject of high-
level management attention within, or external to, the orga-
nization or, if the research vehicle is inherently interesting
(e.g., a full-mission simulator), there will be a requirement
for demonstrations and tours. Unless these visits are con-
trolled, they will be scheduled to fit the availability of the
visitor rather than the convenience of the research.
Unexpected interruptions can occur and often have a
disruptive effect, particularly if experienced operators are
used as subjects and may not be available at another time.
The best course is to fix specific days or times of day for
tours and request support from management in arranging
tours or visits at those times. This must be done well in
advance of data collection periods. Managers should be kept
informed of the research schedule to provide them with an
opportunity to diplomatically arrange the schedule of impor-
tant visitors so as not to inconvenience the visitor or the
progress of the research.
Data Collection System
Throughout this chapter, the research project has been
discussed as if there was only one behavior of interest. This
was done for the convenience of discourse, but is unrealistic.
In most cases the researcher will be interested in several
behaviors. Invariably, a large array of system performance
data will be collected and both physiological and behavioral
data may be taken. There will usually be several different
methods of data collection.
Some data will be recorded automatically using the simu-
lator, other data may be derived from observers, or through
video and audio tape recordings. Still other data may be
obtained by questionnaires and interviews. All of this creates
a data management problem. A good rule is to automate as
much of the data collection as possible. The researcher
should be aware of the advantages of automated data as well
as of its inherent limitations, particularly for behaviorally
related research.
At least two actions can be taken to minimize the data
management problem. The first is to carefully evaluate what
data are required to answer the research and practical ques-
tions, and reject any data collection that is unlikely to be
helpful. This applies not onty to particular kinds of data, but
also to the sampling rate. For example, there is no point in
collecting control-movement data at a rate of 100 Hz since it
is more than a full log unit above a human's response
bandwidth.
The second action the researcher can take is to devise a
system consisting of procedures, facilities, and computer
programs for processing and organizing the data from the
time of coilection to final analysis. Cody (1984) describes
the structure for one such system that involves five phases:
1) data collection, 2) initial data reduction, 3) single-run
result summaries, 4) data base accumulation, and 5) statisti-
cal analyses. The development of such a system is well worth
the consid,:,'rable effort it requires. A researcher can be over-
whelmed with data from a simulation and it is nearly impos-
sine to a,,semble the data in a meaningful way after it has
been collected if the data analysis methods are not given spe-
cial attention at each stage of data reduction and analysis.
Typical problems include determining how the data are
related to the problem and how the data will be structured.
Subject Recruitment
Subject requirements for applied behavioral research in
nonmilitary settings usually fall into two major classes -
totally tmive or highly experienced. In the military environ-
ment, personnel with a range of training and experience are
often available. This is not always true in the civilian world.
Subject experience or skill requirements depend largely upon
the scope of the tasks to be performed, the requirements of
the ultimate user, and whether the simulated system exists or
is a ne,x concept.
In most cases, experienced subjects will be required for
simulation studies of aircraft operations. Naive subjects can
be appt-opriate for laboratory studies if the tasks are simple
and training requirements are minimal.
A dilemma occurs if the simulation inw_lves rather dra-
matic changes from a conventional system. There may be
enough similarity to the conventional system that experi-
enced subjects would appear to be a natural choice. However,
in this case old habits and preferences may unduly affect the
subject's behavior (Sheridan and Hennessy, 1984). On the
other hand, naive subjects may require extensive training.
. e,_
Finally, it is always possible that "seasoned experlenc ,
whic} is missing in naive subjects, is desirable because there is
the real-world probability that experienced airmen will be
the ultimate users of new technology and if there is a con-
flict with existing procedures or habits, or negative transfer
effects, it would be advantageous to know this at the
research stage of the new technology. There is no good gen-
eral answer as to which type of subject would be most appro-
priate. The choice can be made only on a case-by-case basis.
1t experienced subjects are necessary, the researcher
should start recruiting well in advance of the scheduled test-
ing. It is always difficult to find experienced subjects. In
addition, because the researcher cannot expect to have expe-
rienced subjects available for extended periods, it is impor-
tan_ to minimize the amount of time that is required per
individual subi ect.
Delivering materials to the subjects in advance is one way
to minimize both the drop-out rate and the anrount of time
for which both naive and experienced subjects are required.
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Theadvancematerialsshouldincludeacomprehensivebri f-
ingon theprojecta descriptionof whatwill beexpected
fromthe participant, and training materials to prepare the
individual to the extent possible. Questionnaires or other
forms that can be filled out in advance should be included
(Cody, 1984). The introductory package can motivate the
person to continue to participate, and can reduce the use of
valuable on-site time for briefings, training and administra-
tive matters.
Subject Training
It is necessary, to provide subject training or familiariza-
tion prior to the test runs in most studies. Obviously, this
training will vary in scope, depending upon the background
of the subject and the nature of the research tasks. Once the
training needs and procedures have been established, a prin-
cipal remaining task is to establish a criterion for training
completion.
Intersubject variability is desirable in behavioral research
that requires subjects with a range of skills and knowledge,
e.g., when individual or crew differences are the object of
the study. However, such variability unduly complicates
other kinds of research. In many cases, it will be highly
desirable to reduce normal intersubject variability to mini-
mize its confounding effect upon the analysis of the data
collected. In these cases, all subjects should be equally pre-
pared to perform the research tasks. The criterion may be
either a performance test or the completion of training. If
completion of training is defined as a certain amount of prac-
tice time, invariably it will be accompanied by varying levels
of competency. A practical criterion is having one or more
successful completions of the same (or nearly the same)
scenarios that will be tested. If the training is a practical exer-
cise, data taken during or at the end of the training can be
used as collateral data.
Pretesting
The formal pretest is a dress rehearsal for actual data col.
lection and is an absolutely essential step for either a part-
task MOS or a full-mission LOS. The pretest involves a com-
plete check of all equipment and procedures. The testing of
individual scenario elements should occur throughout the
development period as each one is completed. The individual
elements must then be combined in a smooth and operation.
ally logical fashion. The research team should step through
the whole process several times before the formal pretesting.
This is the time to discover any obvious shortcomings in the
procedure, and also to develop skill in performing individual
tasks. When the scenario can be run smoothly and reliably,
individuals with the experience and skills equivalent to the
test subjects should be used for the pretest.
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The pretest should cover the entire period from subject
arrival to exit from the premises. Pretest will be the first
opportunity for the research team to test the procedures
they expect to use in data collection. The experiences of the
research team, and the solicited comments of the pretest sub-
jects should be used to identify any residual scenario prob-
lems because pretests rarely go perfectly. The amount of
research team practice required to run a perfect scenario is
often underestimated because there is a tendency to believe
that everything will be in order the next time through, so no
additional pretesting is considered necessary. Experienced
researchers do not make this assumption, and will pretest
until at least one successful run has been completed.
In addition to its verification and training value, pretesting
gives the researcher a first look at the effects of the manipu-
lated variables and other test conditions on the behavior of
the subjects. The appropriateness of the levels of the varia-
bles can be assessed at a time when it is possible to make
changes. Pretesting also reveals the characteristics of the
behavioral data and tells the researcher whether any measura-
ble effects will be produced.
The pretest also provides an opportunity to check the
integrity of the data collection system and the quality of the
data. More than one simulator study has been compromised
by not verifying that the data can be collected, reduced, and
analyzed before the actual test had begun.
For example, Hennessy et al. (1981) conducted a study to
determine whether unconventional displays could be used to
support training of basic, visually guided flying skills. The
study involved the teaching of naive subjects to perform two
tasks. The first task was to maintain heading, altitude, and
course during 90 sec of straight and level flight. The second
task was to perform a 360 ° roll without changing heading,
altitude, or course. This task was initiated by the subjects,
usually within 2 or 3 sec after the simulator was activated.
The simulator was stopped a few seconds after the roll was
completed. The roll maneuver itself took about 2.5 sec.
A suitable, automated data collection program adopted
from a previous study was used, but was not pretested for
this particular application. Later, it turned out that no data
for the roll maneuver was collected. It was discovered (after
the fact) that the data collection program (because of a
requirement in the previous study) did not activate until
7 sec after the simulator was started and the roll maneuver
was over before that time. The lesson was clear: real-data col-
lection should never begin until at least one set of data has
been collected and run through the entire data-handling
system.
DATA COLLECTION
Theoretically, the actual data collection should be routine
if the planning and pretesting were done optimally, but this
is rarelythecaseevenwiththebestof planning.Simulator
faults,unanticipatedsubjectbehavior,thewrongsettingofa
condition,orahostof other"gremlins"canupseteventhe
bestplans.Additionaltimeandsubjectsshouldbeallowedto
takecareoftest-runproblems.
Themostseriousproblemthatcanariseiseitheranundis-
coverederrorin thesettingof acondition,orafaultinone
of theautomateddata-collectionsystems.A mandatorypre-
cautionis to runthedatathrougha"quick-look"program
o11thesameor thenextdayafterit iscollectedtobecertain
of its integrityandreliability.Otherwise,it maybedaysor
weeksbeforetheproblemisdiscovered.Dependinguponthe
variablesmanipulated,thischeckof thedatacanalsocon-
firmthatthescheduledconditionsactuallyoccurred.
It ismosthelpfulif thesimulatorhastheabilityto get
hard-copy"snapshots"of selectedCRTdisplays.Asnapshot
of a formattedisplay,takenatthebeginningof eachmis-
siontrial,showingthestatusof conditionsthatareprepro-
grammed,or setatthesimulatorconsole,isareliablerecord
oftheconditionsettings.
Individualsubjectdifferences,i.e.,thoseunaccountedfor
bystudyfactors,ahnostalwayscontributemoretothevari-
anceof thedatathananyothersource.Datafromatesthat
measuresanabilityorcharacteristicthoughttoberelatedto
thebehaviorof interestin thesimulationtestcanbeusedas
a covariatethatmayaccountfor someof the individual
differences.Forexample,a visiontestmightbeavaluable
sourceof collateraldataif thebehaviorof interestisvisual
searchor thereadingof adisplay.Asanotherexample,sub-
jectagewasfoundto bethelnajorsourceof varianceman
automatedtrainingstudy(Vreulset al.,1975).If agedata
hadnotbeentakenandusedasacovariate,theindependent
variableswouldnothaveproducedastatisticallysignificant
performancehange.Questionnairedataonexperienceand
otherbiographicalf ctorscouldalsoprovidecollateralinfor-
mationthatcanoftenbehelpfulinsortingoutthetestdata.
DATA ANALYSIS
The data reduction and analysis procedures should be
planned ahead of time to minimize the time and effort
required during data collection, and to assure their relevance
to the research and practical questions. While most research-
ers will be familiar with basic data-analysis concepts, if he or
she does not have a high level of data-analysis competence,
an expert should be used during the planning and analysis of
this critical function. The researcher also should be prepared
to do additional, unplanned analyses. Frequently, an
unexpected facet of the data will suggest additional analyses
and may lead to a better understanding of the research
problem.
If the research is directed toward system development or
improvement, the data are usually analyzed in terms of indi-
vidual, crew, and system performance. Inferential statistical
tests can be used to establish the reliability of effects found,
and confidence limits on the data. If it is appropriate to the
study design, the percentage of variance accounted for is a
useful ildicator of the relative effects of the manipulated or
measur(d variables and their interactions, and of other ana-
lytic concepts.
A recent review by Rouse and Rouse (1984) of almost
200 ewduative studies of complex human-machine systems
was pe_ formed to analyze the degree to which definitive eval-
uative _esults were produced as a function of factors such as
the res,.'arch vehicle used, the type of study, the type of mea-
surement, and the domain of the study (vehicle control, pro-
cess ccntrol, maintenance, and so forth). The authors con-
concluded with this general principle: "One is more likely to
obtain definitive experimental results if the method chosen
allows a reasonable degree of control, and the measures
chosen allow fine-grained analysis of performance."
INTERPRETATION OF DATA
Once the analysis of the research data is complete, a
remaining and vital step is to conrmunicate the results to the
customer or user community in a form that is likely to
resolve the problem that was the reason for the research. If
the data are to be used for systems design, the results should
be in a form that permits engineering trade-off comparisons.
Other applications may call for general, or composite presen-
tatim_s (Williges and Mills, 1982).
It the study was able to produce findings that can be gen-
eralized to a class of problems, or is a contribution to a body
of scientific knowledge, the researcher should publish the
results. Regardless of the outcome, if the study involved a
largescale simulation, the researcher should describe the
plamfing and execution of the study, the resolution of any
problems encountered, and the lessons learned. The lessons
learned should include both the things that went particularly
well and the things that didn't - i.e., those things that the
researcher will do differently next time.
CONCLUSION
1his chapter has discussed the process of applied behav-
ioral research in MOS. The research process has been well
orD_nized by Williges and Mills (1982), and the issues dis-
cussed are familiar. Researchers or research managers who are
ne,* to FMS research should consult the source documents
for a more thorough presentation of these issues than could
be .xesented m this overview. A more fundamental founda-
tim_ for why and how applied behavioral research is con-
ducted is presented in appendix C for the interested reader.
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CHAPTER3
GUIDELINES FOR LINE-ORIENTED SIMULATION RESEARCH
INTRODUCTION
Performing LOS research, wltich satisfies both the scien-
tific and operational communities, is a complex and difficult
task. Fortunately, many of the difficulties can be alleviated
by following the basic principles discussed in chapter 2 and
in appendix C.a The purpose of this chapter is to combine
those principles with the lessons learned from LOS training
and research experience, and present them as guidelines for
the use of LOS in applied behavioral research.
Line-oriented simulation is a specialized type of MOS. Tile
mission is a civil air.transport operation. Line-oriented simu-
lation uses sophisticated flight simulators and a detailed and
faithful simulation of specific operational segments to pro-
vide an environment that has many of tile attributes of the
real world of civil air transport. When LOS is used for human
factors research, the objective of this high level of simulator
fidelity is to produce performances equivalent to the per-
formances similar individuals would produce after receiving
similar stimuli in real-world operating conditions.
A basic assumption of LOS is that the more faithful the
simulation of real-world stimuli, the interfaces between indi-
vidual crew membeTs, the systems they control, and the sys-
tems that influence and regulate their behavior (e.g., ATC,
Federal Air Regulations, and company regulations and pro-
cedures), the more likely it is that the behavior achieved in
the experiment will be the behavior that would be produced
under similar circumstances in actual line operations.
A high level of fidelity has a further and practical advan-
tage. It increases the "face validity" of the experiment in the
eyes of both the participants in the experiment and in the
potential users of the research. This is important because the
more face validity the simulation has, the more confidence
the ultimate users in the aviation community are likely to
have in the experimental results.
A basic difficulty for researchers and users alike, however,
is that regardless of the level of fidelity achieved, one cannot
be certain that tile behavior observed during the experiment
is anything more than the behavior in the simulator of that
particular individual or flight crew at that particular time.
Individual performance varies even under similar conditions
in the real-world, and there can be even greater differences
2Appendix C contains an overview of the more fundamental prin-
ciples of applied behavioral research that have particular relevance to
civil aviation research. It includes a general discussion of the purposes
of research, the use of research vehicles, and the central issues involv-
ing the fidelity and validity of research simulalors.
among individuals. As we noted in chapter 2, "individual sub-
ject differences...almost always contribute more to the vari-
ance of ti_e data than any other source."
A further complication is that, despite significant
advances in simulation technology and LOS scenario develop-
ment. real-world operations cannot be reproduced exactly.
The researcher, therefore, can never be certain that the sce-
nario produces all of the cues that might influence tile pre-
dictive _alidity of tile experimental results. Today, there is
little ha:d evidence to either support or refute the belief that
contemporary state-of-the-art LOS produces the same flight
crew behavior that would result if the simulated situation
occurred in real flight. Significant improvements in all phases
of LOS, however, have resulted in an important consensus
within the aviation community. The consensus is that not
only does modern LOS simulate real-world flight effectively
but, more importantly, it produces the equivalent of real-
world behavior. The balance of this discussion assumes that
the indastry consensus is correct.
FOUNDATIONS OF LOS RESEARCH
De:;pite more than 30 years of Government-sponsored
resear,'h using flight simulators, and the long history of the
milita-y and commercial airlines using simulators for flight
training and checking, line-oriented FMS is a relatively new
concept. It began with Northwest Airlines' pioneering
attempts at what is now known as line-oriented flight train-
ins (LOFT), and with Ruffell-Smith's simultaneous use of
FMS for research in his landmark study (Ruffell-Smith,
1979/ at NASA Ames Research Center. Since then, much
material has been published regarding the use of LOS for
train ng. Unfortunately, very little documentation is available
regarding its use for research.
Commonality of LOS for Training and for Research
l_ine-oriented simulation used in research and LOS used in
trail_ing have much in common. Both share the same general
rule_ for scenario construction and execut:'Jn. Both stress a
high degree of realism and meticulous attention to details to
sim_late all of the important elements and interactions of an
airline operation. Much of this material is derived from
LOFT experience.
p_WDING PAGE BLANK NfVr F_[LMI_)
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Without question, the foundation for this chapter is the
Lauber and Foushee (1981) Guidelines for Line-Oriented
Flight Training, Volume I. It is the original and basic text for
LOFT. The LOS principles they delineated remain valid
today. Tile LOS principles outlined in this chapter differ
somewhat because of their orientation to research rather
than to training. They also reflect the results of our literature
search, LOS studies which have been conducted since the
Lauber-Foushee report was written, the case studies reported
in the appendixes, persona] communications with recognized
FMS experts, and our own experience.
becomes uncomfortable, or if their performance becomes
unsatisfactory.
When pilots are being trained, they have a high personal
interest in the training outcome and can be expected to do
everything they can to achieve a successful result. There is
not/ring approaching this personal identification for a volun-
teer pilot in a research simulation.
WHEN TO USE LOS
Differences Between LOS for Training and
LOS for Research
Line-oriented simulation is concerned with the use of
FMS for flight training. Here we are concerned with FMS for
research. In training, the objective is to change behavior. In
research, the objective is to observe behavior. While good
training scenarios and good research scenarios have much in
common, research needs are more rigorous. Frequently, LOS
research requires higher fidelity. For example:
A central issue in simulation, whether it be used
for research or training applications, is that of
fidelity. For training applications, the require-
ments for fidelity are straightforward in con-
cept.., a high degree of fidelity is only useful if
it provides an effective training environment.
There is no a priori requirement for a given
degree of fidelity, only for that which will pro-
duce the most rapid and long lasting training
benefit.
For simulators used for research, the require-
ments are somewhat different....Here the a priori
requirements for fidelity are more stringent
because, by nature, research is used to explore
the unknown .... (Nagel and Shiner, 1983)
Research scenarios also require greater control of crew
performance. Deviations from the expected outcome of a
training scenario can provide a valuable learning experience.
Similar deviations from a research scenario, particularly when
accompanied by deviations from the specific outcome or
behavior being studied, provide unwanted variance.
Unwanted variance can both confound analysis and, in some
cases, require a larger number of trials.
A final difference is that when pilots are being trained,
they have an understandably closer identification with the
outcome of a simulator training session than they can be
expected to have with what can be for them a one-shot
research project. The result can be a tendency for pilots to
be more tolerant of fidelity slips in training than in research.
This is particularly true if any aspect of tile research exercise
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The first steps in any applied research are problem defini-
tion, study plan development, selection of experimental
strategy, and test preparation. The choice of research vehicle
and the decision of whether or not to use LOS methods are
inherent parts of this early process. It is worth repeating that
simulation fidelity at a higher level than is required can both
complicate the study unnecessarily, and make it more diffi-
cult to critically examine a narrow research issue.
Some part-task research requires modest real-world fidel-
ity, virtually no scenario, and limited, but highly specialized
expertise. Other kinds of part-task research might require a
modest scenario of sorts to test a fundamental decision pro-
cess, or a subsystem's operability or controllability, but little
in the way of a real cockpit, or a visual or motion system.
Kraft, whose study of visual illusions associated with night
landings is one of the classics in the literature, made an
important point when he said, "Had a full-mission simulator
been made available for the study ...they probably would
have not discovered the basic problem." (appendix G)
At the other end of the scale, research involving inter-
action of multiple subsystems that are parts of the aviation
system can require detailed and carefully scripted scenarios,
skilled participants, a multidisciplinary investigative team,
and the full resources of today's simulators (Ruffell-Smith
1979).
All civil aviation systems include a man-machine system
which operates aircraft and an ATC system which controls
them. While each is a complete and complex system in its
own right, they must be viewed as a coordinated operation in
the total system. This report is concerned with the man-
machine system, which operates the aircraft, and its interface
with a realistic simulation of the ATC system. For our pur-
poses, the simulation must be realistic only from the cockpit
viewpoint. We are not concerned with simulation of the
internal operation of the ATC system.
ADVANTAGES OF LINE-ORIENTED FMS RESEARCH
Line-oriented simulation provides a relatively economical
method to observe the performance of people and equipment
within tile aviation system. It permits observation of the
system'selements(hardware,software,liveware,andenviron-
ment)underconditionsthatallowreasonablecontrolofthe
variablesineachelement.Withoutcontrolofthosevariables,
it isdifficulto identifythefactorsresponsibleforobserved
performance.
A principalstrengthof line-orientedFMSresearchisits
uniqueabilityto studythesubtleinteractionsinvolvedin
suchareasascrewcoordination,vigilance,judgment,and
resourcemanagement.3LOScanberequiredif theresearch
involvesconditionssuchasperformanced gradation,long-
durationor infrequentevents,or responsetoemergenciesor
irregularitiesa afunctionoftimeon-duty.Instudiesofper-
formancedegradation,asmightoccurinsomefatiguestates,
thedesiredsubject-stateoftencanbeachievedconveniently
outsidethesimulatorbeforethesimulatedmissionbegins.
Theconditionedperformancemustthenbeevaluatedin a
fullLOScontext.
Another advantage of LOS research is that it permits eval-
uation of the performance of people and equipment as it
occurs during transitions from one flight phase or operational
mode to another. In some cases, the simulation of a complete
flight may not be necessary to accomplish the research objec-
tive. It is necessary, however, to faithfully simulate all of the
flight phases or operational modes being examined, and to
simulate adjacent phases or modes to ensure that any inter-
action effects that occur can be examined.
LOS also can be used to study a related series of problems
involving hardware, software, and behavior in whicb there are
clean breaks between the individual elements being evalu-
ated. An example is a series of related part-task studies
involving the evaluation of specific instruments, displays,
operational procedures, or controls (appendix F).
When newly developed hardware or software are intro-
duced into the system, its real-world performance can be
quite different from the performance that was predicted by
its creators, or was observed during part-task studies during
development. Performance in real flight, however, is the ulti-
mate criteria -- for that is where the performance of hard-
ware, software, and liveware have critical importance. Today,
LOS provides the best available vehicle for predicting real-
world performance.
In summary, LOS is useful for studying individual or
group behavior when the study addresses the following kinds
of research:
1. Validation of the results of smaller studies or behav-
ioral hypotheses by observing behavior in a total system
context.
3,,Cockpit resource management refers to the utilization of all
available resources - information, equipment, and people to
achieve safe and efficient flight operations (Lauber, 1981)." Murphy
el al. (1984) define it as: "The application of specialized skills to
achieve a crew organization and process that effectually and effi-
ciently utilizes available resources in attaining system objectives."
2. E,Jaluation of new or modified hardware, software, or
procedures in a systems context before they are introduced
into the aviation systeln.
3. P-oblem exploration, such as the identification of sys-
tem problems that occur when individual subsystems are
combined into the total system, or observation of the perfor-
mance and interactions of individual and other elements
within the aviation system under the wide range of operating
conditions to which they are exposed.
COMPOSITION OF THE RESEARCH TEAM
Once the operational problem and research question have
been determined and a decision has been made to use LOS,
the researcher's next task is to select a research team. The
team'_ principal tasks will be to develop the scenario and to
run the experiment. The following sections discuss the
varlet/of skills and knowledge that will be required.
DEVELOPING THE SCENARIO
Tt'e research problem always drives the scenario require-
merit;. This is because the scenario must produce behavior of
interest to the researcher and the ultimate user. Because the
resea-ch must be done in a simulated aircraft and airline envi-
ronment, the first needs are for expertise in the aircraft and
type of operation that will be simulated. Long-haul, short-
haul, charter, air taxi, and commuter are examples of type of
oper ltion. Equally important is expertise in the geographical
area involved and in local meteorological and environmental
pherLomena such as ice, snow and the slippery runways of
winter operations, thunderstorms, valley fogs, wind shears,
and the special problems associated with high-altitude flying.
Air traffic control plays a major role in air carrier operations
and a high level of familiarity with ATC operations, including
its vernacular and jargon, is another important requirement
for tt least one member of the research teanr.
Meteorological expertise is stressed because weather is an
inevitable part of LOS scenarios. The simulated weather nmst
be consistent with the weather encountered in the season and
geographical area selected. Most areas of the country have
local weather characteristics which have considerable opera-
tional significance. Understandably, pilots can be acutely
aw ire of, and sensitive to, them. Considerably more than a
gei:eral familiarity with aviation weather phenomena is
needed to be sure that scenario fidelity is not degraded
because of obviously implausible simulated weather.
Even the best simulators have limitations, and specific
knowledge of those limitations is required. If the researcher
is not intimately familiar with the simulator to be used, and
its current status, a person with that knowledge will be
needed.
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Finally, a scrupulously detailed script has to be written.
There are substantial advantages in having a team member
who has had previous experience in writing full-mission sce-
nario scripts. If this is not possible, having at least reasonable
access to a person who has written successful simulation
scenario scripts can be most helpful.
RUNNING THE EXPERIMENT
Much of the knowledge required to develop a good LOS
scenario is also required to run one. Again, it is of prime
importance to have people who are familiar with the opera-
tion being simulated and its ancillary services. Ancillary ser-
vices can include cargo, maintenance, weight and balance,
ramp service, passenger service, fueling, dispatch, flight oper-
ations, and any others that might be involved in the simu-
lated operation. Pilot behavior will be an important part of
virtually all studies, and a pilot familiar with the aircraft and
its operation will be required. He or she will be needed to
deal realistically with the/lost of minor and largely unfore-
seen operational problems that will occur, and to provide the
researcher with a pilot's perspective regarding them.
A protE'ssional air traffic controller, or someone with oral
and operational skills very close to one, is a requirement for
any scenarios that involve more than an absolute minimum
of ATC interactions. This is particularly, important because
of the virtual impossibility of" always closely following
scripted ATC communications when one side of the con>
munications loop is entirely unscripted. Of course, there is
no way to script the pilot side of the communications, and
realistically simulate a real-world operation.
The objection to the presence of observers in the simula-
tor cab is that few real-world airline operations have cockpit
observers. There is simply no way that the presence of even
silent and unobstrusive observers ca,] enhance realism. How-
ever, a very practical reason for the presence of at least one
non-crew member in the cab is that in all but the most
advanced research models, the simulator's operating console
is located there.
There are other advantages to having cab observers. They
can record important behavioral and performance data that
is otherwise difficult to obtain, and can monitor both the
performance of the simulator and the general progress of the
scenario. Cab observers can be particularly helpful when the
reasons for unexpected pilot reactions or deviations from the
scenario are not entirely clear to team members observing
from a remote location. Such conditions are bound to occur.
The cab observers are therefore in an optimum position to
clarit}, the situation by communicating directly with the
team members outside.
Cab observers (and simulator operators) have also served
effectively as scenario directors in both training and research
simulations when the simulated operational situation
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required a flight crew member to leave the cockpit. In these
cases, the observer can control the time when the crew
member "returns to the cockpit" and can give the returning
crew member an appropriate operational message regarding
the main cabin or external conditions required by the sce-
nario. This technique assures that the pilot receives an opera-
tional message from the returning crew member that facili-
tates the scripted scenario.
Other important members of the operating team are a
simulator operator and a simulator-maintenance technician.
The maintenance technician is required because occasional
simulator malfunctions are inevitable. Many malfunctions
can be repaired rapidly, but this takes specialized expertise.
If this expertise is not available, frustrating and expensive
delays can occur. Such delays can mean the loss of the entire
simulator exercise and, for purposes of the experiment, the
loss of a trained and carefully selected flight crew.
Complete and accurate data collection is essential.
Depending on the nature of the study, designated individuals
may be required for specific data collecting tasks. (Data col-
lection was discussed in some detail in chapter 2.) If such
people are required, it is important not to burden them with
other tasks which can interfere with their primary responsi-
bility. Even automatic data collecting devices need monitor-
ing. Unfortunately, critical data lost is lost forever.
Finally, there has to be a "wagon boss" - an individual
who is usually, but not always, the principal investigator -
whose job at this point is simply to coordinate and run the
experiment. Prior LOS experience is an obvious help. A LOS
is a complex undertaking because regardless of the planning
and the preliminary testing, the flight crew may take actions
which are unanticipated, the simulator may fail partially or
completely, or tl_e research team may make a mistake in
controlling the scenario. Any of these problems will require
. real-time decisions that will affect the outcome of the study
and the validity of the results. Planning, training, and leader-
ship are all required to develop a well-coordinated operating
team.
In summary, the research team will need positive leader-
ship from the principal investigator and individuals with the
following kinds of skills or experience:
1. For developing the scenario:
a. An expert in the type of operation simulated and its
ancillary services
b. An aircraft specialist
c. An ATC expert
d. A weather expert
e. A scenario script writer
2. For running the experiment:
a. A person familiar with the operation being simu-
lated and its ancillary services
b. A pilot familiar with the aircraft and its operation
c. Data collector(s)
d. An observer {researcher) in the simulator cockpit
e. A simulator operator and technician
f. Allairtrafficcontroller(s)
g.A "wagonboss"
Theprecedingdiscussiondoesnotimplythataseparate
individualis requiredto performeachof therequiredfunc-
tions.Forexample,atleastonemajorairlinerunsasuccess-
ful LOFTprogramwithasingleindividualperformingallof
therolesdiscussedtinder"RunningtheExpenmen, except
thatof thesimulatormaintenancetechnician.Theseindivid-
uals,however,arehighlyexperiencedpilotsandsimulator
instructorswhowerecarefullyselectedandtrained.It would
bea greatmistaketo expectequivalentperformancefrom
peoplewhohavenothadsimilarexperience.
RESEARCHSUBJECTS
SubjectSelection
MajorU.S.air carrierpilotsareidealsubjectsfor LOS
research.Theyarefalniliarwiththecivilaviationsystem,and
area significantpopulationof interest.Theirtraining ives
thema highlevelof simulatorfamiliarizationa d,particu-
larlywiththeveryrapidincreasein theuseof LOFT,most
of themreadilyacceptthesimulatorasameaningfulreplica
of theiroperatingworld.Thesamecanbetrueofcorporate
andregionalircarrierpilots,manyof whomhaveconsider-
ablesimulatorexperienceeventhoughit maynot include
LOFT.
Littlehardevidenceisavailabler gardingtherelationship
betweensimulatorexperienceandacceptanceof thesimu-
latedworldastherealworld.Therefore.if aresearcherplans
to usepilotswithlittleornoprevioussinmlatorexperience,
andif theresearchgoalis to producetheequivalentof real-
worldbehavior,it wouldbewisetoscheduleadditionalpre-
experimenttrainingto ensurea highlevelof simulator
acceptance.Theresearchermustalwaysrememberthatpilotperfor-
mancewillbeinfluencedmarkedlybytheoperationalprac-
ticesof theairlinethatemploysthem.Althoughtherearc
nearlyuniversalprinciplesof goodoperatingpractice,there
arealsosubstantialdifferencesin airlinepoliciesandproce-
dures.Thesedifferencesincludecritical items such as
required call outs, the assigmnent of duties, and a sometimes
undefined expectation of what to expect from other crew
membe rs.
If the performance of regular line crews is a research
requirement, there are significant advantages in using flight
crews from the same airline for the entire study. If that is
not possible or desirable, every attempt should be made to
schedule pilots from the same airline in the same crew.
There is an obvious caveat. If pilots from the same airline
are used for an entire study, the data collected may be repre-
sentative of pilot performance on that specific airline only,
and not representative of airline pilots generally. Although
the jet er_ has produced more standardization among airlines
than was present in the piston era, it would be a gross error
to assure,," that the remaining differences in type of opera-
tions, operating philosophy, and procedures among airlines
are not substantial.
Performance can be influenced by the type of trips the
pilots regularly flY. For example, if short-haul operations
were stulied with long-haul pilots, the results could be quite
different from the same studies conducted with pilots inti-
mately _'amiliar with the intricacies and pace of short-haul
operations. The converse is equally true. Wide variations in
pilot familiarization with the operation being studied can
provide unwanted variability that can be difficult to recog-
nize, m_mage, or evaluate.
Designers of LOFT scenarios consider these differences,
but view them from a training rather than from a research
point cf view. Their task is to develop scenarios that deal
with the operational problems of a specific pilot population,
aircraft, procedures, and route structure. As noted by Lauber
and Foashee (1981):
The design and development of scenarios for
LOFT programs requires considerable attention
_o the needs of the particular carrier. Different
air carriers, different operations within a carrier,
md different pilots within an operation all have
various types of training needs. It is essential
that considerable flexibility be permitted in
order to meet these various training
requirements.
Smailarly, the design and development of scenarios for
resez<ch will require considerable attention to researc h objec-
tives and to the impact of subject pilot experience. Differing
air cz_rriers, differing operations within a carrier, and differing
pilot_ within an operation can bring a variety of skills, per-
spec_ives, and behavior into the experiment. It is essential
tha_ these factors be recognized in the selection of the pilots
to be used.
If individual perfornrance is of interest, other considera-
tion_ are total experience, time in type, and proximity to
scheduled proficiency training and proficiency checks. The
lattvr is even more important if seldom used flight planning
and performance considerations, or abnormal or emergency
procedures will be a part of the research scenario. Scheduled
training and checking sessions include procedures, calcula-
tions, and operational considerations that are not routinely
encountered in day-to-day flying and, therefore, need to be
periodically reviewed.
Understandably, performance in these areas usually is
belter just after review than just before the review has
started. If the research objective is to study typical perfor-
ms;nee in routine operations, proximity to training or check-
in[_, is simply a variable that should be measured and treated
as a covariate to understand and account for variations in
pilot performance levels that might be related to this factor.
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A basicprinciplein LOS is to minimize the number of
things that remind flight crews that they are in the simulator
and not in a routine line operation. When pilots are asked to
modify or to forget well-established operating procedures, or
are asked to fly with crew members who use dissimilar proce-
dures and ca/louts it can only serve to periodica/ly remind
them that they are not involved in a real-world operation.
The simulator should be configured as closely as possible
to the equipment the subject pilots are currently flying. If it
is not, a substantial effort for "differences training" may be
needed. Such training is always undesirable, but may be
unavoidable. In many cases changing critical flight instru-
ments (such as flight directors or course or attitude indica-
tors) to duplicate a specific airline cockpit configuration can
produce more realistic and, therefore, better performance
data than the best differences training. Changing the simu-
lator configuration might be less expensive than the time and
materials required for differences training even if the flight
crews are carefully selected and scheduled.
There is another difficulty with training for substantial
"differences." Although pilot performance may appear to
be adequate under benign training conditions, the basic ten-
dency in all individuals to revert to old and well-established
habit patterns under high workload conditions or stress levels
is difficult to overcome. Pilots in an unfami/iar cockpit, using
unfamiliar procedures, may spend time (and mental capacity)
trying to remember how to do something rather than concen-
trating on what to do. Such reactions during a LOS research
exercise might, depending on the study's objectives, produce
less than optimum (or even misleading) performance data.
Manuals and forms are equally important. There are wide
variations in the design of operating manuals, operational
forms, and in other printed material among airlines, manufac-
turers, and corporate operators. Familiar software of this sort
adds realism. Unfamiliar software, especially if it will be used
in stressful situations, degrades realism. More importantly,
unfamiliar software can also be an unrealistic source of con-
fusion that would not be representative of operations in a
familiar environment. It can degrade information-seeking and
possibly subsequent decision performance.
Unfortunately, it is virtually impossible to avoid the
classic problems associated with sole dependence on volun-
teer subjects. However, most seasoned researchers who have
worked with airline pilots believe this is a relatively minor
problem, particularly if the experiment is planned with a
generous number of subjects.
Subject Training
Subject training needs, subject training procedures, and
the criterion for training completion need to be established
if they have not already been determined. Each was discussed
in the general discussion of subject training in chapter 2.
Here, the additional issues of operational currency and
simulator familiarization will be considered.
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The importance of operational currency is reflected in
FAA recurrent training requirements and in individual
airline policies requiring extra training for pilots who have
been away from the cockpit for even relatively short periods.
Ruffell-Smith (1979) speculated that even the number of
days since the last flight was important to older pilots. While
this appears to be a little extreme without additional confir-
mation, there is little question that pilots who have not
flown for long periods do not immediately perform to their
usual standard.
If routine operations are being studied, research subjects
also need to be current. While retired pilots or naive subjects
can be acceptable or even desired in some instances, extra
training will usually be required for pilots who are not cur-
rent. The importance of this step should not be underesti-
mated because pilots cannot be expected to display routine
day-to-day performance if that training does not produce the
equivalent of full line-oriented familiarization. On the other
hand, naive subjects - or experienced pilots who are not cur-
rent - can be acceptable or even desired in some instances.
What is important is that the researcher clearly identifies the
research needs and utilizes subjects with the needed
characteristics.
Despite impressive technological advances, simulators still
do not fly like airplanes. This increasingly minor (but very
real) issue is recognized in appendix H of Part 121 of the
Federal Air Regulations, which requires recency of experi-
ence in simulators if they are to be used in pilot training or
checking. Part 121, appendix H, also provides specific proce-
dures for reestablishing simulator currency if it has been lost.
There is an even greater need for simulator currency if the
simulator will be used for line-oriented research.
Currency in both piloting skills and in the equipment
being simulated is needed because of the complexity of the
flying task and the individual characteristics of modern trans-
port aircraft. One session of differences training cannot turn
a DC-9 pilot into a B-737 pilot with equivalent skill. The
necessary degree of familiarization with the simulator and
the manuals, forms, and trip paperwork required for the
study can vary, but should be sufficient to minimize learning
behavior once the experiment is under way unless learning
behavior is an objective of, or will not unduly confound the
study.
Useful guidance on the amount of training needed can be
derived by examining the transition training syllabus of a
representative airline for the type of operation and equip-
ment used. The researcher, however, should recognize that
these are minimum requirements and that in only a few cases
will they produce the equivalent of an experienced pilot
operating in familiar conditions.
The timing and coordination of cockpit procedures is a
particularly important component of flight crew operations.
The required skill appears to decay rapidly with disuse, and
minor procedural hesitations can have an adverse effect on an
otherwise smooth and professional performance. This can be
an important consideration in LOS research that is
dependent on good crew interaction and coordination, espe-
cially if the research includes high workload periods.
Recency and currency may not be an issue when new
hardware, software, or procedures are being studied. In these
cases, a degree of learning behavior is inevitable, as it is dur-
ing the "shakedown period" that occurs when new hardware
or software is introduced into a line operation. Some training
and familiarization will be needed. The scope of such training
will depend on tile research objectives, experimental strategy,
and design.
Although periodic testing is a large part of a professional
pilot's life, very few pilots enjoy it, and, regardless of protes-
tations to the contrary, pilot subjects are bound to perceive
an element of testing in any situation that requires a demon-
stration of their professional skill. Therefore, it is essential
that high-quality training be given, and that high standards of
confidentiality and anonymity be maintained. It is equally
important that these factors are perceived as such by the
pilot participants. Subject egos are important.
THE SCENARIO
"All LOFT scenarios and flight segments should be
designed on the basis of a formal and detailed statement of
specific ob/ectives and desired end products" (Lauber and
Foushee, 1981). This principle is even more important in
LOS research because of the number of performance options
which can arise from a realistic LOS scenario. Performance
options are not a comparable problem in training because
they can still have a significant training potential. At worst, if
the pilot does not follow tile expected procedure, it can
result simply in a need to repeat the training exercise. If,
however, undesired performance options are exercised in
research, it will complicate analysis by adding unwanted and
confounding performance.
The scenario can be developed as soon as the research
objectives have been defined. Scenario development is a sur-
prisingly long and painstaking process which can take consid-
erably more time than it does to actually run the experiment.
Subject matter experts in the airline operation and the air-
craft being simulated are required. Also, SMEs in areas such
as local meteorology, dispatch, passenger handling, and main-
tenance policies and procedures should be consulted if these
areas are, or could become, a part of the scenario.
Details are critical. For example, the weather situation
should be consistent with real-world weather patterns that
nomrally occur in that geographical area at the time of the
simulation. Pilots will recognize it if the weather is not realis-
tic and judge the scenario accordingly. When elements that
will satisfy the basic research objectives have been deter-
mined, a time-event-line description of the operational tasks
that are required should be one of the first assignments.
A Basic Limitation
It should be recognized at the outset that full simulation
of an airline environment is simply not possible. There is no
way that an airline flight crew can be expected to drive out
to a rese:_rch institution or training center, climb into a large
box-like roonr which is supported by intricately configured
hydraulic cylinders that are surrounded by masses of elec-
tronic cables, and not be acutely' aware of the fact that they
are not about to fly, a routine passenger flight.
Fortunately, most airline flight crews are familiar with
simulators and have learned to "play the simulator game."
They can be expected to become very much involved in the
simulate r exercise. If they are given a well-designed scenario,
they also can be expected to make a good faith effort to
react in the same way they would if they were faced with
similar stimuli under real-world conditions because this is the
way that most of them have been trained and are routinely
checke(.
Elements of Successful Research Scenarios
Successful research scenarios have included such items as:
1. Sufficient workload to discriminate measurable varia-
bles in the performance of interest. (Cockpit workload is a
complex and difficult subject which has been defined or con-
sidered in a great many ways. It includes decision making;
time-st aring and prioritizing concepts: physical and mental
tasks; _nd the control of a wide variety of system-relevant,
but not always operationally critical, considerations.)
2. Sufficient time to permit meaningful decision pro-
cesses and crew interactions. (It is a considerable oversimpli-
fication to note that there are at least two kinds of opera-
tional decisions. In the first type, there usually is sufficient
time o consider the available operational variables. In the
second type, critical operational decisions must be made very
rapidly, with little, if any, time for evaluation. Scenario
desigeers should be sensitive to the importance of the time-
availa)le variable in tile decision process.)
3. Assurance that fuel available is a meaningful factor by
careful selection of weather, route, and payload. (Varying
the time of preplanned holding periods is one effective
meth.)d of controlling the "remaining fuel" variable. It is
worth noting that fuel management has become an increas-
ingly important consideration in contemporary cost-
conscious airline operations.)
4. Use of both scenario events and the environment as
driving factors in the scenario. (Deteriorating weather, icing,
thunderstorms, cross- or tailwinds, wind shear, and wet and
slippery runways are examples of environmental elements
thai have been used successfully for this purpose.)
5 Provision for a number of decision choice points,
inclt, ding the provision of some during flight planning. (Pro-
vidil_g decision points during flight planning is a good way to
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get the flight crew involved in the simulated action at an
early stage. Decisions made during flight planning regarding
items such as fuel, nlininmm equipment list (MEL) items,
and other inoperative equipment can affect events and deci-
sion making for the entire flight and often will determine the
number and kinds of operational variables that are realisti-
cally available.)
6. Selection of operational anomalies that will best pro-
duce the behavior of interest. (This clearly requires opera-
tional expertise in all aspects of the operation being simu-
lated. If the operational experts are to be maximally useful,
the researcher nmst be sure that the experts have a good
understanding of the research objectives.)
7. Provision of more than one viable course of action for
the crew to facilitate emergent behavior, rather than behavior
which is controlled rigidly by the constraints of the scenario.
(If the study includes observation of flight-crew decision pro-
cesses and the researcher is interested in emergent behavior
the scenario should include reasonable operational options.
Otherwise the only behavior that will emerge will already
have been determined by the logical constraints of the see.
nario. Conversely, if the researcher is interested only in a spe-
cific kind of behavior, the number of reasonable operational
variables should be restricted. To do this without destroying
operational realism requires considerable skill in scenario
development.)
8. hlclusion of cabin crew and other ancillary services
when they are appropriate. (In many real-flight situations,
the cabin crew and ancillary services are, or should be,
involved in some cases only by being kept advised of the
progress or events of the flight. Appropriate flight crew/cabin
crew dialogue adds a great deal of realism to the simulation.)
9. Selection of performance requirements that are within
the ordinary skills of individual pilots and within the skills
of an integrated coordinated crew. (The capability of modern
sinlulators to simulate a wide variety of operational irregu-
larities and emergencies can create a temptation for the
researcher to complicate the simulated operation beyond
reason. This can cause resentment and is an ahnost certain
way to destroy the flight crew's "illusion of reality.")
The Operational Problem
There are virtually no limits to the kinds of operational
problcms that can be simulated. Problems in hardware, soft-
ware, liveware, environment, and their interactions can all be
studied. Each category can originate from within the cockpit
or outside of it. Operational problems can range from rela-
tively simple problems which have no further impact on the
flight once they have been diagnosed and corrected, to com.
plex problems which cannot be corrected in flight and have
continuing operational ramifications.
Engine starting problems are a good example of a simple
problem. After a "hung," or a potential "I "lot start has been
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diagnosed and properly handled, the engine can be restarted
and considered a normal engine for the remainder of the
flight. At the other end of the complexity scale, malfunction-
ing landing- or training-edge flaps, or the loss of one or more
generators, electrical buses, or hydraulic systems can affect
virtually all aspects of the flight until the airplane is parked
at the gate.
Within these extremes, there are many variations and
opportunities for a host of imaginative modifications. For
example, a loss of pressurization at high altitude can cause an
emergency descent which in turn can produce a period of
high workload and serious internal and external communica-
tions problems. Once the lower altitude is reached, however,
the airplane becomes essentially normal except for the pres-
sure loss and a significant increase in fuel consumption. In
most cases this will require alteration of the flight plan and a
landing short of the destination or planned alternate. It can
be a very good way to minimize the number of available air-
port options.
In one imaginative LOFT scenario, a simulated bomb
explosion in a baggage compartment was used to considera-
bly complicate a loss-of-pressurization problem. The simu-
lated explosion resulted in the loss of pressurization. How-
ever, the explosion also caused aircraft subsystem problems
and unverifiable structural damage. Cabin crew, ATC, dis-
patch, and emergency services were all involved in the
scenario.
Real-World Performance
it is sometimes difficult for the researcher to evaluate
pilot behavior m terms of its real-world significance if the
level of performance is less than expected, or when there has
been an obvious error, including an error in judgment. Under-
standably, pilots are sensitive about their professional perfor-
mance. A frequent response, and it can be simply a normal
defense mechanism, is to say: "Of course I knew we were in
a simulator. If it had been an actual line operation 1 would
have done things differently." It will be virtually impossible
for the researcher to know the truth of such statements.
Occasional/y, some extraordinary behaviors have been
involved in air transport accidents.
Evaluating the real-world equivalent performance of sub-
ordinate crew members or of the monitoring pilot (the pilot
not flying) is another problem. Pilots can also he sensitive to
the professional egos of fellow crew members. They, there-
fore, may be more reluctant to question judgments or to
point out errors in a simulated environment than they would
m the relative privacy of an airline cockpit. The current
emphasis on total crew performance, including recognition of
the need for resource management and incapacitation train-
ing (which, anrong other things, stresses the importance of
monitoring and full participation of all crew members), helps
minimize this problem in line flight operations. A specific
referenceto theimportanceof theseoperationalconcepts
during preflight briefing (in the context of wanting all
aspects of real-world behavior) can help mitigate a reluctance
to fully participate during the si,nulator exercise.
Despite these inherent difficulties, there is a clear consen-
sus among line pilots, instructors, and researchers that some-
thing very close to a total litre environment can be created.
Even more important, they believe that in a realistic simula-
tor exercise pilots become so engrossed in their operating
problem that they respond as they would in real flight. There
is little question that it is important for the researcher to
make all aspects of tile simulated exercise as realistic as pos-
sible, and to avoid lninor intermittent stimuli that jar tile
pilots back into tile world of the simulator with even small
cues that are unrealistic.
A Final Comment on the Importance of Scenario Realism
As noted in Cody's McDonnell-Douglas simulation studies
(appendix I), tile main concern of pilot subjects is nrission or
scenario fidelity. Pilots do not readily accept deviations from
operational practice unless the purpose of the study is clearly
to try out new equipment or procedures. Part of their con-
cern with fidelity stems from the fact that a simulation
(which is essentially a duplication of an actual mission) is a
iest of their own capabilities. If pilots arc to submit to such
testing, they understandably want high levels of fidelity to
nlaximize their opportunity to perform properly. They do
not want a shortcoming in the simulation to be interpreted
as a lack of personal ability.
THE SCENARIO SCRIPT
Line-oriented flight training experience has demonstrated
the importance of detailed scenario scripts. Creating the
illusion of the real world requires great attention to detail.
To an even greater extent than ill training, behavioral
researchers need maxinlum control of performance. It is
virtually impossible to achieve an acceptable level of control
using a generalized script. The problem is even greater if tile
researcher is also part of the scenario control team. The
additional workload and concentration required by an invari-
ably futile attenrpt to achieve a realistic scenario from a
generalized script leaves the researcher little time to observe
the performance being studied.
It is nrandatory to script all communications and to use
them verbatim. Airline mechanics, dispatchers, cabin crew,
passenger agents and other aviation personnel all have their
particular communication styles. Virtually any of them can
be involved in realistic scenarios. Air traffic control colnmun-
ications are most important. If it is at all possible, a working
air traffic controller should be used to provide these
communications. Even then, messages should be scripted
meticul,)usly to minimize spontaneous renovations. Sponta-
neous innovations, while occasionally necessary, are ahnost
always mdesirable.
The script should specify tile timing of all communica-
tions and other elements of tile scenario. Each event should
be pla_ed on a time/event line which must be scrupulously
followed. The script should indicate probable crew responses
as well as alternative responses to the extent that they can be
predicted. Because tile researcher can expect considerable
variation in individual and crew performance, it may be desir-
able to script some kinds of simulated problems by aircraft
status or position rather than chronological time. Examples
might be when the aircraft reaches a given fuel state (see
Murphy, appendix B) or is a specified number of miles or
minuL,:s from a geographica fix.
A host difficult problem is to realistically control tile
number of options that are available to the flight crew with-
out reducing them to tile point that tile researcher can have
no omfidence that the scenario is producing tile equivalent
of real-world emergent behavior. Even when emergent behav-
ior is not required or desired, it is essential that scenario con-
trol devices be operationally realistic and tightly scripted.
Contlol nlechanisms that have been used successfully in
LOFT exercises include tile following:
l. Sudden weather deterioration below landing
lninJl llUUlS.
2. Passenger service considerations and in-flight passenger
emergencies.
3. Runways closed for maintenance, snow plowing, or
disabled vehicles on the runway.
4 Bomb tlrreats, or hijack attempts.
5 Subsystem status uncertainties or failures.
(_ Traffic delays.
"7 Obvious or subtle crew member incapacitations.
The_,e and similar kinds of events can be effective. They also
happen in real flight operations.
Scenario control devices should be used with considerable
discetion. There is always the possibility that the real mes-
sage tile crew gets when control mechanisms are used is not
the scripted message, but tile reality-destroying message that
in this contrived and make-believe world, the researcher does
not want the crew to do something that they would have
do1 e in a line operation. If that happens, the inevitable reac-
tion is, "Well we're back in the simulator again." From the
crew's viewpoint, losing a viable alternate for an aircraft
operational reason, such as tile redticed range available
betause of an engine or pressurization loss, has much more
realism than a sudden "truck on tile runway." Meteorologi-
cally sound weather changes, including changes in winds
aloft, have inherent plausibility because of the uncertainty of
p_.,cise weather forecasts.
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SPECIFICONSIDERATIONS
Route Selection and Scenario Reality
Communications associated with ATe services are complex
and will be discussed in the next section.
The illusion of reality is enhanced for the flight crews if
the route selected for the experiment is one with which they
are familiar (or at least could encounter in their day-to-day
flying). Familiar intersectk)ns, radio navigation aids, and air-
ways reinforce the validity of the simulation and help main-
tain the illusion of a line operation. Reality is also enhanced
through tire use of realistic call signs, including airline names
and appropriate flight numbers. Today, airline charter opera-
tions are widespread enough to accommodate virtually an),,
research scenario needs, as long as the route segments are
chosen carefully and imaginatively.
Most airline pilots are familiar with the routes they fly.
Ahhough there are variations among airlines, pilots normally
have advance notice of their flights. This permits prior
review of approach and departure procedures, special terrain
or other geographic considerations, likely routing, general
weather patterns, and other relevant factors. If a routine line
operation is desired, these are important preliminary consid-
erations in the selection of the routes to be used and the
pilots who will fly them. Unless it is contra-indicated by the
research objectives, tire pih)ts should know the flight that
has been planned/'or them.
Weather, including turbulence, which is typical of the
geographical area and the season, adds a great deal of realism
to a line-oriented scenario. Conversely, simulated weather
whicll is not inherently plausible, and this includes all ele-
ments of weather, significantly degrades it.
Navigational Aids and Communications Services
All of the navigational aids (NAVAIDS) that are normally
on the selected route should be simulated faithfully. This
includes providing their proper identifications. If any
NAVAIDS will not be available, their absence should be
stated in tile Notice To Airmen (NOTAMS) which should be
available as part of the preflight papers. Any radio-aid identi-
fications which cannot be simulated should be properly
NOTAMed. Pilot use of NAVA1DS not required but nor-
mally available on the route can be operationally sound (e.g.,
for double-checking position) and, for the pilot, is an indirect
method of checking the validity of the simulation.
Communications to at least three outside sources - corn-
parry, cabin crew, and ATC will be required. Company com-
munications can involve dispatch, weight and balance, pas-
senger service, maintenance, ramp service, cargo, fuel, gate
information, and so forth. These communications vary con-
siderably among airlines, and require careful scripting and
familiarity with the operation being simulated. Cabin crew/
cockpit crew communications are equally important.
ATC Communications
Today's airline operations revolve an ATC communica-
tions contact with a minimum of I1 different controller
functions on each flight (e.g., clearance delivery, gate hold,
ground, tower, departure, low-altitude enroute, high-altitude
enroute, low-altitude arrival, approach, final approach,
tower, and finally ground again at the destination). In many
cases pilots will communicate with at least that many individ-
ual controllers. It can be a nice touch if pilots do not hear
tile same voice performing each controller function.
This by no means suggests that it would be feasible, or
even desirable, to have 11 individuals for ATe communica-
tions, but it does enhance realism if the same individual does
not simulate all of them. Also, it reduces the possibility of
potential, momentary confusion during a hand-off from one
controller to tile next. The first reaction of a pilot who hears
tile same voice after changing frequencies to the next con-
troller might be to think that he forgot to change frequen-
cies. This is particularly true in a period of high workload
where several actions might be time-shared. Thus, if there are
at least two people available to simulate ATC communica-
tions, they should alternate, so there is a voice change for
each hand-off. To deal with this problem, the NASA Ames
Man-Vehicle Systems Research Facility (MVSRF) utilizes an
electronic voice disguiser that provides 12 different voices
from a single controller to enhance the realisnl of its
simulations.
At some point, background materials such as ATC tapes
must be secured, or appropriate scripts developed. They must
be typical of the airways and terminals selected, the time of
the simulated flight, and the simulated operation. An ATC
tape giving visual approaches during simulated CAT 11
weather, conflicting wind information, or inappropriate
clearances to other airplanes can destroy the realism of an
otherwise effective scenario. It is important to be sure that
all background communications are consistent with the oper-
ation being simulated.
There is little "open" ATC communication time during
peak operations at busy airports such as ORD, LAX, ATL.
LGA, DCA, or SFO. Scripting and then simulating realistic
ATC communications at such airports during their peak traf-
fic periods is very difficult. Foushee (see appendix A) has
reported considerable success by using taped recordings of
actual communications to provide a realistic ATC communi-
cations background for busy airports. This is also an effective
way to increase scenario realism with the introduction of
additional ATC communication voices.
There is a great tendency among pilots to short-cut ATC
and other connnunications protocols in simulator operations.
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It iswellworthmakinga specialefforttomaintainproper
conrmunicationsprocedures.
FlightPlanning,Dispatch,andPreflight
A continuing task of the scenario manager is to create and
maintain an illusion of reality. This requires meticulous
attention to the smallest details. As in real flight operations,
the scenario should start with flight planning and dispatch.
Preflight duties, the cockpit setup, engine start, pushback,
and taxi are equally important because these are the items
that set the stage. All of them should be carefully scripted.
Interaction with Cabin Crew and Passengers
Simulation of the interaction between the flight crew and
its cabin crew and passengers should be a part of virtually all
line-oriented scenarios. This is because two-way communica-
tions with ttre cabin crew and public address (PA) announce-
merits to the passengers are an important part of routine
operations and an integral part of many abnormal and emer-
gency procedures. If these interactions are not sinmlated
effectively, it breaks the flight crew's "reality chain" any
time these connnunications are appropriate. It is particularly
important not to break the reality chain during critical
portions of the scenario.
While a basic limitation of modern simulators is that their
motion systenrs require the cockpit to remain sealed through-
out the flight, this limitation does not prevent effective simu-
lation of flight crew interactions with tire cabin crew and
passengers. The effective simulation of these critical elements
of good scenarios requires only that the interactions are
scripted carefully and imaginatively, and that an operative
cockpit-cabin interphone and passenger address system are
provided.
The growing number of m',de flight attendants has made it
possible to use either a male or female voice for communica-
tions from the passenger cabin. Operationally critical com-
munications, such as those involving emergency evacuations,
the whole gamut of cabin emergencies, or problem passenger
behavior, can be scripted and add considerably to the realism
of the scenario.
If it is appropriate to send a cockpit crew nrenrber back to
the cabin for a first-hand evaluation of a problenr, even this
can be simulated effectively by requiring that crew menrber
to get up and leave Iris or her seat. The apparent return of the
crew member to the cockpit should be carefully controlled.
The real-world operational effect of the cabin visit can be
realistically substituted with a scripted briefing to the return-
ing crew member from the LOS coordinator or other
observer in the simulator cab.
When this happens, the illusion of flight is preserved for
the crew remaining in the cockpit. The other crew member is
doing wlmt he or she would be doing in real flight (i.e., get
out of the seat, leave the cockpit, evaluate a situation, and
report hack). The overt behavior is consistent with reality
and is operationally relevant. Under these conditions, the
cockpit workload is usually high, so the obvious physical
inconsisl encies may pass unnoticed by the remaining cockpit
crew. If the scripting has been done well, a positive impres-
sion will also have been made on the crew member who left
the cockpit.
Pacing, Tempo, and Quiet Periods
The 9acing and tempo of scenario elements can play a
large role in creating an illusion of actual line operations.
While Here are occasional high-workload periods, routine air-
line flights are generally low keyed and relaxed. Emergencies
and abtormal situations do occur, but tire), are rare. it is
importa _t that tire scenario designer create this general atmo-
sphere i: an airline environment is being studied.
The iempo should be consistent with the operation being
simulated. Periods of relative inactivity (or quiet periods)
should be scheduled as they occur in the real world. Even if
this is explained in the preflight briefing, it will be impossible
to eliminate the pilot's strong suspicion that the research
scenark will involve considerably more than just a routine
flight l1om A to B, and that any quiet period is simply a pre-
lude to an ingeniously contrived flight problem. Usually, of
course, this will be true.
Mosl airline training simulator sessions consist of two 2-hr
sessions and are limited to a total of 4 hr. It will be difficult
to mail:rain an illusion of reality for longer periods, particu-
larly those that inw)lve prolonged cruise segments. Long
periods at cruise require little pilot activity. These periods
can be boring in an airplane, and very boring in a sinrulator.
it is particularly difficult to realistically simulate the cockpit
enviror ment of long distance flights. If it is a night flight, the
problmn is exacerbated.
TRAINING OF THE OPERATING TEAM AND
SCENARIO TESTING
The amount of training and indoctrination required for
the operating team will depend upon the complexity of the
expermlent, the skills of the individual team members, and
their I.OS experience. In addition to being experts in their
field, all team members should know the research objectives
and the simulator's strengths and limitations. They should
have a general understanding of the aMine operation being
simulated and a detailed knowledge of the scenario and the
script.
Special training in flight operations, observer techniques,
and tl_e making of value judgments may be required if any of
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tilespecialistsareto beusedasobservers.Dualqualification
of theoperatingteammemberswhichpermitsthemtofunc-
tionasbackupsfor otherteammembersishelpfulbecause
schedule conflicts and availability issues can be expected
during tile course of any reasonably long study.
Regardless of tile care with which a research scenario has
been designed and scripted, it is mandatory to plan a series
of test runs or "shakedown flights" to ensure that:
1. The scenario produces the desired test situations,
2. Performance measuring devices produce the required
data,
3. Recorders record,
4. Microphones transmit without feedback,
5. All of tile myriad details involved are polished and
fine-tuned, and
6. The scenario cast demonstrates that they can perform
their assigned roles smoothly and realistically.
This is the final step in LOS scenario development and it
is critically important: it will take considerably more time
than expected. Any but tile simplest scenarios will require
several iterations, and tire researcher should not be satisfied
until the entire scenario has been run without any "hitches."
PREFLIGHT BRIEFING FOR PARTICIPATING CREWS
After tile scenario has been fine-tuned and the subjects
have been selected, a preflight briefing by the researcher is
needed to ensure that the pilot subjects understand their role
and the purpose of any special training that may be required.
This is an ideal time to furnish general operational details
such as the flight origin and destination, copies of typical
flight plans, weight manifests, and loading forms.
It is important to give subjects only general information
that will not reveal parts of the scenario. For example, if a
flight that normally takes 1 hr is planned, but the pilots
have been told to plan for 2 hr in the simulator, there is
obviously additional time to be accounted for. Tile alter-
nates available under these conditions, with or without an
ATC hold, will be apparent immediately to flight crews
familiar with tile geographical area. In addition, their behav-
ior in the simulator can be influenced by their own specula-
tive assumptions regarding the reasons for tile inclusion of
the additional time.
Pilots should fully understand the "game plan." Inade-
quate briefings have created problems in LOFT, and can
create greater problems for LOS research. Unless contra-
indicated by the research objectives, some familiarization
with the study objectives is desirable. The crew will certainly
know that they are involved in some sort of research. Not
only will a briefing of objectives help them bridge the gap
between the real and tile simulated world, but if they are
left in tire dark, at least some of them will try to deduce the
desired behavior, and modify their normal performance. This
point is crucial and should be stressed when routine line
behavior is desired. Even with an ideal prestudy briefing, it is
difficult to avoid a certain amount of "Hawthorne Effect."
An unfortunate by-product of subject anonymity or con-
fidentiality, which is a requirement for most research proj-
ects. is a diminished personal identification with the outcome
of the simulator exercise. Fortunately, this may be a minor
consideration. Pilot egos are strong. Under nearly all condi-
tions, they will try to produce a professional performance. In
the preflight briefing it is important to stress the point that
the pilots were selected because they are professionals, and
that the research is dependent upon their professional perfor-
mance. The research studies that are probably most sensitive
to this issue are those that can produce degraded perfor-
mance (e.g., because of severe fatigue, or for any other
reason).
It is critically important to point out that all supporting
aspects of a regular line flight will be available. There are sub-
stantial differences among airlines, and tile only reliable
source regarding a specific airline's procedures is someone
who knows that airline well.
Once the simulation becomes airborne, the same rules
apply. Full company radio facilities should be available at all
times. Pilots not flying should perform their functions
exactly as they do on the line. Required operational report
forms, including log book and emergency or irregularity
forms, should be provided and used as is appropriate.
The crew should be asked to role-play exactly as if they
were on a regular line flight. It should be stressed that if any
events which are not a part of the scenario (including simula-
tor malfunctions) occur, the flight crew will be informed
imlnediately. If this is not done, there is always the possibil-
ity that the flight crew may mistake a scenario-induced prob-
lem for a simulator malflmction. It also can help save a
research run m which a simulator malfunction does occur.
RUNNING THE SCENARIO
The schedule must allow plenty of time to get started
because there can be many last minute details that require
attention by the researcher or the flight crew. As in LOFT,
there should be no interruptions of the scenario once an FMS
has begun. There should be no observer or researcher inter-
face with the flight crew other than in a simulated crew
member exit from the cockpit, or in a simulated visit from a
cabin crew member.
The only exception is the case where the scenario must be
interrupted to change simulator configuration or collect data
that can be gathered in no other way. In these cases, one has
to create plausible events (see appendix B for a visual system
changeover), or interrupt the scenario at natural break
points. We emphasize, however, that scenario interruptions
should be made only as a last resort and that the researcher
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will haveto takespecialprecautionsto avoidany"cascad-
ing"effects(appendix E).
Deviations from the Scenario
There is a high probability that there will be deviations
from the scenario, and that the scenario operating team will
have to cope with them. Deviations can come from straight-
forward operational decisions, such as the time when deci-
sions are made to divert to an alternate or the alnount of
time a crew is willing to hold with a given amount of fuel.
Many deviations are predictable, and should be includ.ed in
the scenario as scripted alternatives. In some cases, subsce-
narios may be needed to get the flight back on the track.
Captains always have a final "emergency authority,"
which permits them to take any action which in their judg-
ment is necessary to preserve the safety of flight. This can
include actions such as landing below lnininmms, proceeding
without or refusing an ATC clearance, and diversion to an
unauthorized airport. This authority is not used often in real-
world flight operations both because "emergencies" are rare
and also because most pilots have an antipathy to writing
reports of any sort especially reports which automatically
trigger an official investigation.
The researcher should be aware of the captain's emer-
gency attthority and should know that it can and has been
used in silnulator exercises, ttere traditionally, there has not
been (but in research there should probably be) a require-
ment to complete an emergency report after landing and
defend the action taken. Regardless of the research protocol,
the area of "declared emergencies" (whether realistic or not)
can be one of the most difficult areas in which to achieve the
equivalent of real-world performance.
Unexpected Poor Performance
One rare occasions, an obviously poor performance, which
can include classically poor judgment or even simply poor
role-playing, can create a problem for the researcher. Fail-
ures do occur during the routine training and checking of
experienced crew members in regular airline operations, and
although the failure rate is very low, one has to be prepared
for this possibility in LOS research.
The data secured in any instance of unexpectedly poor
performance may or may not be useful. Although this is a
judgment call for the researcher, the more important scenario
issue is that such failures create a situation that must be
handled with a great deal of tact during the rest of the simu-
lator run, and during debriefing. Appropriate contingency
plans should be made during scenario construction.
Simulator Crashes
Simulator crashes, including landing sho,t during low-
visibilit\ approaches and overruns on short and slippery run-
ways, Cm be in the same category as poor performance and
need cireful, reasoned consideration. Some researchers,
believina the simulator should not be allowed to crash, will
stop th,_ simulator to prevent a crash, and then blame the
inciden, on a simulator problem. Whether or not this proce-
dure is desirable, it is not always possible, particularly in a
low apl,roach, aborted takeoff, or landing overrun situation.
Fortunately, many incidents can be treated as minor, but
contrmersy remains on the issue of whether or not tolet the
sinmlator crash.
One of the characteristics of LOFT is the lack of any
intervention or interaction by the instructor or observer.
LOFT flights are not interrupted for any reason, and con-
tinue 1o their completion up to and including realistically
simulated crashes, if that would be the operational outcome
from similar performance in the real world. FAA require-
ments for Phase I1 and Phase Ill training in simulators
include "...the sound of a crash when the simulator is landed
in excess of landing gear limitations."
Lauber and Foushee (1981) have cautioned that "an 'acci-
dent' should never be the inevitable outcome of a (LOFT)
scenario, although it is always possible that one will occur."
They _lso have noted the observation of airline training man-
agers lhat "If an accident does occur during a LOFT session,
it may provide the crew with a vivid learning experience." In
the i_ltlitary, simulators are used for combat training and
gettin_ shot down or crashing is not an uncommon experi-
ence: however, military combat pilots know the risks and are
prepared for them. The civilian pilot population does not
have the same attitudes, values, or mission.
Except on rare occasions, a crash should never be the
planned outcome of a research scenario. Unfortunately, an
unwazted crash can occur in LOS research, as it can in
LOFT. If it does happen, the simulated crash can create an
additi,mal problem for the researcher who is interested in
creating as close to a real-world environment and reaction as
is po> ible.
In the real world, "postaccident anxiety syndromes" have
resul>'d from the acute situational anxiety which sometimes
arises when a flight crew member survives an accident, and
particularly one in which there were fatalities. The results
can be severe. There are cases (see Popplow. 1984, "After
the l:,ire-Ball") in which postcrash anxiety became so dis-
ablin_ that pilot careers were forced to be terminated despite
psychiatric counseling and acceptable postcrash demonstra-
tions of pilot proficiency.
_c found only one reference to a potential psychological
or Dychiatric problem associated with simulator crashes
(Lager, 1965). but the increase in simulator realism, strong
ego inw)lvement of professional pilots in their performance,
and 1he LOS practice of not interfering even if the simulator
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isabouto crash,suggeststhatpostcrashanxietycouldarise
in susceptiblesubjects.Tile possibility of a postcrash anxiety
syndrome raises ethical and legal questions about the respon-
sibilities of both researchers and research sponsors to protect
tile well being of human subjects.
Legal opinion is beyond the scope of this report or the
competence of tile authors. The researcher should review
Federal Regulations oll tile use of human subjects for
research, and obtain legal counsel. In general, tile regulations
require that all human subjects must be volunteers: that the
risks must be defined and made known to them in advance:
that volunteer subjects may withdraw from the experiment
at any time; that adequate safeguards and facilities must be
provided to protect the subjects; and that tile research must
be conducted so as to avoid all unnecessary physical or
mental discomfort, suffering or injury.
The important point is that each researcher should be
aware of this issue, and must decide whether or not a poten-
tial crash is to be allowed to continue to its conclusion. Each
case will have to be decided on its merits with something
very close to an instantaneous decision. If a crash is to be
permitted, the subjects should be prepared for it during their
indoctrination, and the organization performing the research
should be prepared to handle a postcrash anxiety syndrome
if the crash cannot be prevented. If crashes are to be
diverted, then all possible conditions which might lead to a
crash will have to be known, procedures and scripting devel-
oped to handle the problems, and the scenario team will have
to be trained to recognize the situation quickly and execute
tile recovery procedures.
Simulator Problems
Simulator problems, including those induced by the
research team or a simulator failure, are much more likely
than a crash. One major reason for operator team training
and sinmlator shakedown runs before the experiment is
started is to minimize these kinds of occurrences. Simulator
maintenance records should be reviewed to determine tile
most likely failures. The recovery procedures should be part
of the scenario, which may have to be altered as unexpected
problems surface during the shakedown runs. Providing for a
greater number of trials than the absolute minimum required
for the study is one way of coping with these issues after all
methods of circumventing them have been exhausted during
study preparation.
DEBRIEFING
Debriefing of the flight crew is an important part of LOS
research. It is important to the crews who are understandably
curious about their contribution and performance, and it is
important for the researcher because this is the optimum
time to get reasonably uncontaminated subjective data from
the study participants. Debriefing is the best time to discover
the covert thought processes behind the operational decisions
made.
Although debriefings can include structured or unstruc-
tured interviews, postflight questionnaires, video tapes of
crew interactions, and so forth, they should start with an
open-ended review of the flight by the flight crew itself. It is
important to get their first impressions and overall reactions
before specific research areas or audio or visual playbacks are
discussed. Although it is impossible to avoid a certain
amount of trying to "please the researcher" (who may be
viewed by many of the participants as a prestigious authority
figure), this tendency can be minimized if it is made clear to
the flight crew that the researcher considers them tile opera-
tional experts and wants and needs their expert opinion.
Researchers should remember always that the flight crew
participants usually are, in fact, bona fide SMEs who have
had an opportunity to view the simulator exercise from an
important vantage point. The postflight debriefing is the
ideal time to get crew reactions to the simulation and the
scenario, and to explore the reasoning they used in reaching
tile decisions made during their flight. Audio and visual play-
backs of the exercise are an effective method of providing
"base points" and "reminders" for this part of the
debriefing.
There are advantages in having a full crew debriefing, so
that crew interactions can be observed and consensus can be
achieved, in many cases each crew member will have a
slightly different view of the events. On the other hand, there
are also advantages to individual debriefing tile principal
advantage being that the results will not be dominated by
the strongest personality. Both practices have been used
effectively.
A disadvantage with the isolated interviews is the addi-
tional research personnel that may be required to interview
two or three crew members without forcing some pilots to
simply wait their turn until a preceding interview has been
completed. It is not easy to do this without adversely affect-
ing the quality of the succeeding interviews. In some cases, it
may be possible to mitigate this problem by having the pilot
waiting to be interviewed fill out a postexperiment question-
naire on the scenario which has just been completed.
Finally, and the point is worth reemphasizing, airline
pilots are professionals who have understandable sensitivity
regarding their reputation, Positive aspects of their perfor-
mance should be reinforced. They should be thanked for
their contribution. It is particularly important not to infer to
any crew member that they have performed poorly, or that
they had more problems than others have had.
Poor or below average performance may need a rational-
ized explanation. "Simulator problems," or an allegedly
"unrealistic scenario," sometimes can be used to help explain
this very sensitive area. If possible, subjects should be
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promised that tile results of the study will be mailed to them
when they are published. They should leave the facility with
a positive reaction to the research project and a feeling that
they have made a positive and professional contribution to
research in aviation.
LEAD-TIME CONSIDERATIONS
An unfortunate fact, well known to those who have done
LOS research, is that the lead time required to prepare for
the study almost always will be underestimated because of
the number of potentially critical considerations that are
beyond tile researcher's direct control. Preparation for the
study can take much more time than it takes to run the
experiment. The following list, and it is not a complete list,
shows the kinds of items which should be considered. Each
of them can take a substantial amount of time.
1. Develop,nent of the scenario and the training and coor-
dination of the scenario developlnent team. (See appendix G
for an exalnple of the time that can be required, even with
highly experienced personnel.)
2. Interface with the employer and the pilot representing
organization of the selected pilot population, if required.
3. Production of the scenario script.
4. Development and procurement of background environ-
mental materials.
5. Procurement of manuals, forms, and trip paperwork.
6. Simulator scheduling.
7. Procurement and installation of any hardware or simu-
lator software changes required.
8. Procurement and installation of data collecting devices.
9. Development and testing of data collection and evalua-
tion materials.
10. Training of the experiment support team.
11. Scenario testing and revision (includes data
collection).
12. Scheduling of pilots and outside support personnel.
The actual amount of time that should be allocated to
accomplish each of the foregoing tasks can vary tremen-
dously depending upon the study requirements, the facilities
available, the make-up of the research team, and the familiar-
ity of its members with line-oriented, full-mission behavioral
research. There is a very high probability that tire prepara-
tory steps will take considerably more time than was initially
allocated.
PREIMPLEMENTATION CHECKLIST FOR LOS
RESEARCH
This chapter has discussed many of tile practical issues
inw)lved in conducting LOS research, particularly scenario
and scripting requirements. The following is a checklist of
items that should be considered in LOS research studies:
Conceptual Stage
1. Clari'y the operational (or practical) problem.
2. Define tile research objectives.
3. State the research question in researchable terms.
4. Determine tile data needed.
5. Select methods that will obtain the data needed.
6. Determine tile level of fidelity required. (Do you really
need LOS?)
Development Stage
l. Delcrnline scenario elelnents.
2. Procure scenario development team. Supplemental
expertise may be needed in:
a. Operation to be simulated (type and location).
b. Aircraft characteristics.
c. Air traffic control.
d. Simulator characteristics.
e. Writing scenario scripts.
3. Develop and test data collection and evaluative
materials.
4. Select research operating team. Individuals/skills
needed:
a. Experiment coordinator ("wagon boss").
b. Pilot familiar with the aircraft and its operations.
c. Operational expert familiar with operation simu-
iated and its ancillary services.
d. Data collectors.
e. Observer (researcher) in cab may also have to
operate simulator.
f. Air traffic controller.
g. Simulator operator.
h. Simulator technician.
5. Develop scenario: Select operational problems that can
be expected to produce the desired behavior.
6. _ite scenario script.
7. Administrative tasks:
a. Determine simulator availability.
b. Procure relevant software.
c. Procure and install necessary hardware.
d. Procure background environmental materials.
e. Procure and install data collecting devices.
f. Interface with employer and pilot representing
organization if required.
8. Tain research operating team.
9. Determine subject pilot requirements (qualifications
and numbers).
10. !)etermine training (including differences training)
and indoctrination requirements for pilot population selected.
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l 1. Testandrevise the scenario.
12. Develop preflight briefing material and protocol.
13. Develop postflight debriefing material and protocol.
14. Determine performance measurement requirements.
15. Determine data reduction and analysis procedures.
16. Develop data reduction and analysis software,
1 7. Perform sensitivity analysis of measures.
18, Schedule pilots.
A FINAL COMMENT
Past experience demonstrates that once a decision is made
to conduct LOS research, few short-cuts can be taken. Line.
oriented simt, lation research is both equipment and labor
intensive, and takes several months of calendar time. A com-
plex LOS study easily could take more than a year from
inception to completion. More often than not, the require-
ments of time and resources will be underestimated by all
but the most seasoned LOS researchers. LOS is an exercise in
details, all of which are important, and many of which can
compromise the results of the study if they are not attended
to with accuracy and precision.
However, good LOS research is well worth the efforts
required. It is providing new insights into critical areas that
many believed were not researchable, including many behav-
iorally related issues that have been called the "last frontier"
in air transport safety. Conducting such research is a chal-
lenging task and there are substantial rewards for doing it
well. The challenge to the researcher is limited only by his or
her imagination.
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CHAPTER4
RESEARCH RECOMMEN DATIONS
INTRODUCTION
FULL-MISS10N RESEARCH VALIDITY TESTING
The purpose of this chapter is to recommend research to
improve full-mission LOS research, and not to address the
broad issues of sinaulation and training. A thorough review of
simulation issues from the perspective of the behavioral
sciences was conducted by the National Research Council,
Committee on Human Factors, Working Group on Simula-
tion (Nones et al., 1985). A study of simulator training
requirements and effectiveness was conducted by Semple
et al. (1981). These reports address major issues in sinrulation
and, especially in aircrew training, should be consulted for
broad issues and research recommendations.
After exanrining the techniques of LOS research discussed
in the previous chapters and in appendix C, it became evident
that we need to know more about the use of LOS in behav-
ioral research. Increasing the available knowledge can lead to
increased confidence in conclusions drawn from LOS
research, as well as to increased research productivity. The
following key issues have not been answered well to date.
1. Full-mission research validity. Does LOS that is con-
ducted in accordance with the guidelines presented in this
report produce an environment in which the exhibited behav-
ior is the same as would be exhibited in the real world?
2. Alternative forms of valid simulation. Can tire behavior
currently studied with LOS research be produced with
abstract or part-task sinrulations? Stated another way: What
are the research criteria for using LOS, and are there ways of
obtaining valid behavioral measurements at less expense,
with greater efficiency and control?
3. Optimization of full-mission research. Can LOS
research nrethods be optimized? Are there alternate methods
to achieve greater realism?
4. Human performance development. Can current ana-
lytic tools be improved, or new ones be created for assessing
LOS features for a given application through the develop-
ment of models of human behavior?
5. Subjective measures of fidelity. Can the elusive quali-
ties of fidelity and validity in LOS research be measured by a
simple, direct, and efficient method of subjective measures
derived from expert personnel who serve as LOS research
subjects?
6. Integration of research efforts. Can several of the
above areas of research be studied together?
Problem
In :_pite of extensive efforts to achieve high fidelity, the
possibility remains that the behavior exhibited in tire sinrula-
tor is nol the same as the behavior that would have occurred
in actaal flight. In fact, line pilots serving as subjects occa-
sionally indicate that they would have behaved differently in
the airplane. Although there is a suspicion that this some-
tinres may be a rationalization for poor perfornrance, it
might NOT be. Expert pilot comments may be indicating a
simple truth and a simulation deficiency, whether or not that
defici:mcy can be articulated clearly. Whatever the case,
resea_ chers should know the limits of their tools.
Even with oplimunr fidelity, a subject flight crew can
never be expected to think they are about to fly a line flight
while they are climbing the stairs to enter a research simu-
lator. It is not clear at what nroment (if ever) tire crew mem-
bers become so engrossed in the simulated problem that they
have totally forgotten that they are in a simulator. Complete
preoccupation with a challenging sinrulator task does not
guar_mtee that all aspects of tire preliminary steps, including
the drive to the simulator location instead of to an airport,
will _tay obliterated in the pilot's menrory. The behavioral
implications, if any, of these questions are not known.
Approach
One ambitious approach to answer these questions is quite
clea_: Fly identical full-mission scenarios in both the aircraft
and the sinrulator, collect a batter}' of measurements, and
tesl the degree of correlation between the nreasures taken in
fire two environments. A nrajor problem, aside from the
enormous expense involved, is tlrat of collecting in-flight and
simulator measurements under identical scenarios.
Since it is not possible to specify in advance all the details
of an actual flight to correspond with a scenario designed for
the simulator, one must first measure, and record during
flight, all basic parameters including conrmunications,
we_ther, and so forth, and then attempt to fly an identical
scenario in the simulator. This process can be continued until
a representative and sufficient sample of flights are recorded,
providing a set of scenarios for duplication in the simulator.
This would provide a paradignr similar to that of a backward
transfer of training study (table 4-1 ).
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There are a number of practical and methodological prob-
lems associated with such an undertaking. One is the diffi-
culty of recording data during actual flights, and of achieving
combinations of malfunctions, weather, traffic, and so forth
that produce a wide range of behaviors. The task of data
recording for a broad range of behavior could be impossible
without using a special instrumented aircraft (or an elaborate
video tape and matmal data reduction effort). A large nunl-
ber of flights might be required to achieve data collection for
a desired range of behaviors.
TABLE 4-1. COMPARISONS TO VALIDATE FMS
RESULTS
Aircraft Simulator
Scenario
Crew I * Crew 1 * Crew 2 Crew N
1 X X X X
2 X X X X
3 X X X X
*Same Crew
A methodological problem is created if the same crew is
used for both flight and simulator because the simulator per.
formance will be contaminated by the previous flight experi-
ence. For example, would the same decision making have
occurred without knowing what had happened during the
prior actual flight, or would different decision making occur
because of "lessons learned" about what had happened
previously?
Once the simulator scenario is established, data can be
collected with a number of simulator crews. However. since
people arc unique, one would again expect a wide range of
behavioral outcomes because of intersubject variability.
Expected Results
Data would be produced which should reflect on the
validity of FMS research. Serendipitous information on how
to improve FMS research also may be secured. The magni-
tude of the reqtiired effort is unquestionably large. This
recommendation is made only because of the potential
importance of the results: we may never know the validity
of simulation-study results until such an effort is undertaken.
Alternative Approaches
Because the recommended effort is so potentially expen-
sive and might never be done for that reason, research should
be conducted to find ways to approximate such a study. As
an example, there are many aviation incidents every year, as
well as accidents; these events are documented m data bases
such as those maintained by the NASA Aviation Safety
Reporting System (ASRS) and the National -fransportation
Safety Board (NTSB). These sources could be screened for
types of events that have occurred several times, and those
types of events could be placed in scenarios in simulators. If
the response to the realworld events were replicated m a
simulator with new crews (using similar equipment, operating
procedures, crew experience, duty time, schedule constraints,
and ATC and meteorological environments), there would be
some evidence that performance in the simulator was repre-
sentative of real-world performance for that type of event.
This alternative approach would require a substantial
amount of work. The circumstances surrounding highly pub-
licized incidents and accidents might be recognized by the
crews, and their behavior might be altered by their prior
knowledge. The unpublicized incidents (or published back-
ground data) might provide the most fertile source. One
would need to enrich the database information with details
which would be sufficient to construct a scenario event: a
call-back to the crews involved (or a follow-up questionnaire)
would be needed to derive such data. Also, incidents would
be a better source of data because the flight crew members
are still around to help recreate the scenario. Then a scenario
might be constructed to include the circumstances which led
up to the event in much the same way as LOFT scenarios,
which are often derived from events that really happen in
airline operations.
There are methodological issues that would have to be
addressed, such as (but not limited to) how many occur-
rences of similar (to real-world) behavio,- would be needed to
conclude that the behavior didn't occur by chance alone?
Conversely, what conclusions would be reached if none of
the simulator crews replicated the reabworld performance?
It is not our purpose to fully develop such a method. We
suggest that there might be some practical ways, short of the
scientifically best way we have recommended, to demon-
strate that performance in the simulator is representative of
real-world performance for specific classes of events.
ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF VALID SIMULATION
Problem
There is an informed (but unproven) consensus that
high-fidelity FMS techniques provide insurance against the
possibility of conducting research on behavior that is sub-
stantially different from that which would occur in the real
world. It is believed that this approach ensures that the
hunmn operator collects and processes information in the
same way as in the real world. Its substantial advantage is
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that it avoids the difficulty and ahnost prohibitively expen-
sive task of perfornfing complex behavioral research in the
real world.
Unfortunately, research productivity' can be quite low
since high-fidelity, full-mission research is time-consuming
and costly. It is also always possible that the full-mission
approach will include a host of extraneous factors that may
mask the results of interest. Finally, at some time the interac-
tion of effects must be studied, not just results embedded in
a typical situation. In this case, there may be a need for
simple and trnncated enviromncnts for comparison with full-
mission results. In short, there nray be types of studies which
can be accomplished better and more efficiently using other
research methods, including less than FMS. The problem is
that researchers today are on uncertain ground m many cases
and. understandably, elect the safer route - maximum fidel-
ity in a full-mission context.
Approach
When using less than FMS, it is NOT necessary (although
it might be desirable) to compare results to real-world
in-flight performance, since performance in the high-fidelity,
full-mission simulator can be used as a baseline or criterion.
The a priori assumption is that the high-fidelity, full-mission
simulator does produce the equivalent of real-world behavior.
Therefore, the approach is to perform a high-fidelity, full-
mission study, and then use a number of levels of simulation
with the same purpose or subpurposes.
The final step would be to correlate the results to see if
equally valid data was obtained using simpler devices. The
degree of comparability, of course, will depend on the nature
of the behavior involved. While control behavior may not be
measurable with all abstract simulations, it is conceivable
that all forms of decision behavior may be measurable using
significantly lower levels of abstraction.
This approach is a variant of the approach used success-
fully by the Visual Technology Research Simulator (VTRS)
behavioral research program at the Naval Training Equipment
Center (cf. Lintern, Wightman, and Westra, 1984). In the
VTRS program, transfer effects of reduced visual system,
simulator, and motion system fidelity are estimated by a
"quasi-transfer" study which measures the transfer of train-
ing within the simulator from the reduced simulation to the
highest-fidelity simulation. The approach permits many fac-
tors to be screened in the simulator environment, and both
transfer of training and performance effects can be measured.
It is recommended that a matrix of alternative simula-
tions be used, as shown in table 4-2, with levels of abstrac-
tion as one dhnension of the matrix, and part/full-mission
simulation as the other dimension. A large number of levels
of abstraction are possible, including high-fidelity simulation,
simulation without visual and motion general aviation simu-
lator (e.g., GAT-1 class), microcomputer with CRT display,
keyboard, and joysticks (with approximate aircraft dynam-
ics). mi-rocomputer with CRT pages and keyboard {no
dynamics), and pencil and paper. It is believed that full-
mission and part-mission simulations are possible with each
of these devices. The part-mission sinrulation would treat
only ke'¢ portions of the mission, within or out of the con-
text of: n entire mission.
The highly abstracted simulations require some amplifying
descripton. The CRT/JOYSTICK simulation assumes a
rough model of aircraft dynamics: a display of instruments:
joysticks to control pitch, roll, and thrust" and a keyboard to
control avionics, aircraft configuration {gear, flaps, and
spoilers_ and subsystems (electrical. hydraulic, pressurization.
and so i'orth). An improvement of the popular "'flight simu-
lator'" s,,flware for microcomputers is envisioned.
TA_.LE 4-2.-COMPARISONS OF ALTERNATIVE
LEVELS OF SIMULATION
Isolated Connected Full
segments segments mission
Full-n fission X X X
Fixed _no vis X X X
General aviation X X X
CRT/j oysticks X X X
CRT/keyboard X X X
Pencil/paper X X X
Eact_ member of the crew could have a microcomputer
system or terminal, and a flight or flight segment could be
flown by a single pilot or a crew using the devices and what-
ever ATC conrmunications and ancillary services are needed.
State-of-the-art microcomputers, networked where necessary.
could provide all the capability needed for airports, radio
navigation aids. scenario control, and performance measure-
ment ',it a fraction of the cost of an FMS.
The envisioned CRT/KEYBOARD simulation would pre-
sent a page of text and/or graphic information. The user
would be present with various options, including decisions to
take action or requests for more or specific information.
Based :on the user's action, another page of information and
option_ would be presented. The experience would be analo-
gous 1o reading the script for a play, but with the possibility
of the play branching out in many directions depending on
the actions of the reader.
Either booklet or interactive computer media could be
used, with the user being directed to turn to a designated
page aith the booklet, or a new display being generated auto-
matically with the use of a computer. The computer imple-
mentation would have the advantage of allowing complex
algorithms for determining the next display, and also would
allow automated measurement of user selections.
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Fullcrew participation with mMti-termmal configurations
are possible with a computer implementation. The users
could be "'walked through" an entire flight, step by step, in
the context of an FMS. For part-mission simulation, tile
users could have a similar treatment, but for only a portion
of the mission beginning with a display of the initial condi-
tions for that segment.
Expected Results
It is expected that this avenue of research would show
that some forms of study can be conducted more economi-
cally with little disadvantage compared to high-fidelity, full-
mission research. This could result in greater research produc-
tivity. On the other hand, if the results indicate the necessity
fl)r full-mission research, that level of research productivity
must be accepted, and any extrapolation of laboratory
research in those areas must be suspected.
OPTIMIZATION OF FULL-MISSION RESEARCH
Problem
Two additional problems can be addressed as corollary
activities m any study of alternative forms of simulation.
The first of these three problems, which are actually a set of
problems, occurs because of the multitude of decisions
required in the design of LOS, full-mission research. For
example:
1. Is a day-night visual system required, or will a night-
only visual system suffice?
2. Should there be multiple air traffic controllers (and
different voices), or will one professional air traffic control-
ler suffice?
3. Is anything really gained by beginning the mission with
a king low-activity (i.e., normal) segment, or can one go
directly into high-activity segments which will provide the
primary research data? If so, should an initial portion of the
high-activity segment be considered a warm-up?
4. Will broad classes of malfunctions provide essentially
the same decision and crew coordination tasks?
5. Arc there scenario-independent measures of behavior
which would be valid and meaningful for research?
These kinds of questions raise the possibility of general-
ized scenarios and measures. The questions arise because, in
cockpit resource management training, the specific system
failures and scenario events arc not as important as the fact
that the scenario produces a complex problem for crews to
solve. The flight crews have to exercise good resource man-
agement skills to solve the problem safely and efficiently.
Traditional pilot-system performance measures of deviations
from a known profile capture only a small part of the impor-
tant behavior.
The second problem occurs because of the extensive num-
ber of preexperimental missions which must be flown before
a complete and refined scenario is developed. This is time
consuming and expensive. The preexperimental testing lnay
be as much as half the total effort. Attempting to shortcut
preexperimental testing, which can be a very great tempta-
tion, is likely to result in many surprises during experimental
testing. The result may be that much of the data collected
has little or no meaning.
Approach
The first problem can be treated by experimentally con>
paring alternative forms of high-fidelity FMSs. For example,
a scenario can be done by starting with a low-activity seg-
ment, and then repeated by beginning with the high-activity
segment that is expected to provide the primary research
data.
The second problem may be approached by using low-
fidelity abstract forms of simulation (perhaps the booklet or
computer form) to implement the detailed scenario for
review by expert flight crews. For example, an entire sce-
nario can be documented in booklet form, and then con>
ments can be collected from SMEs. Revisions can be made to
the booklet, and then more SME data can be collected. It is
possible that refined scenarios could be quickly and inexpen-
sively derived in this way.
Tile booklet approach can provide leads to the measure-
ment issues, but it is unlikely to solve them. Behavioral
measurement issues require continued effort and research in
areas which are under investigation by NASA at this time
(e.g., workload, communications, and performance measure-
ment), and in human-performance model development.
Expected Results
More refined and efficient forms of FMS should result
from this study. The study could lend credibility to FMS
results and give insight into key scenario-design components.
HUMAN PERFORMANCE MODEL DEVELOPMENT
Problem
Full-mission research attacks more complex aspects of
human performance than have been treated extensively in
the past. Included are the domains of human performance
termed supervisory control and cognitive processes. It is
highly probably, that a model reflecting a better
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understanding of human behavior, even though approximate
and incomplete, can be used to improve the design of FMSs.
For example, at the level of simple task analysis, a knowl-
edge of the stimulus and response requirements for a given
task can be used to determine if the simulation would per-
mit behavior as it occurs in the real world. If tire simulation
does not provide tile reformation or pemrit tire response tire
model indicates is needed, then one may conclude that real-
world behavior is not likely to occur. This is an example of
tire classical mixing together of empirical and theoretical
attacks to form a synergistic relationship.
obtained subjectively from expert users. The expert user,
such as the experienced line pilot, is the possessor of detailed
svstenr-specific knowledge and experience a level of knowl-
edge and skill not easily acquired by a task analyst.
Ostensibly. tile expert user can compare the FMS with
prior exl,erience and evaluate the simulator capabilities. A
judgment can be elicited as to the estimated differences
between simulator and flight behavior. An instrument is
required which will do this m a valid and reliable way. No
other approach is as tractable as subjective measurement with
tile expe t user.
Approach
Two areas of model development which appear to promise
inrportant insights into the human performance involved in
FMS are Supervisory Control (Sheridan, 1983) and the area
of artificial intelligence called Expert Systems (Crowe et al.,
1981: Obermayer e t al., 1984). Both are especially important
to the design of FMS, even when the research is directed
toward other specific issues, such as the social interactions
of crew menrbers.
The supervisory control approach can structure and iden-
tify the multi-level control tasks of the crew. Analysis of
cognitive processes in terms of nrodels used for expert sys-
tems will allow extraction of specific rules used by crew
members in making inferences and taking action. Expert
systems have been developed for an array of sophisticated
applications. They have considerable promise for a much
needed representation of decision behavior.
Extraction of data for model development during FMSs.
and then a subsequent testing of the nrodels against human
performance in other FMSs, is the recommended approach.
Expected Results
Tile short-term result expected is a specilic framework
for describing human behavior in FMS. This fi-anrework
would focus attention on the behavior which the crew
exhibits, tile manner in which it is exhibited, and tire result-
ing correspondence to real-world behavior, hnproved under-
standing of this behavior will have many benefits, including
improved analytical tools for the design of full-mission
research studies.
SUBJECTIVE MEASURES OF FIDELITY
Problem
There is a need for a quick and easy test for satisfactory
levels of simulation fidelity. Such information may be
Approach
A stractured questionnaire must be developed which can
ask detailed questions about each of the features involved in
the simrdation across each segment of tire mission. The fidel-
it)' of the simulated task can be compared with a subjective
judgmmtt of the level of fidelity required to perform tire
task, as it is done in the real world. The development and
testing of such an instrunrent is substantial but can be
accomplished.
For example, each question nrust be carefully phrased
and te:s ed for correct interpretation by,' the appropriate pop-
ulation The effect of the order of questions and orientation
of scales can be moderated through randomization (suggest-
ing col=lputer implementation). Data reduction and analysis
software can be developed using algorithms for attitude mea-
surement to improve interpretation of results. Thorough
validitx testing should be accomplished by comparing the
subjeciive measurement with other corroborating data.
Expected Results
Given appropriate development, a reliable and valid
instrument is expected to result. It is an instrument which
can be used easily, and can be expected to achieve wide-
spread use. Therefore, it is important that an appropriately
designed and tested instrument be developed before an
incompletely developed method becomes a defacto standard.
INTEGRATION OF RESEARCH EFFORTS
Although specific areas of research are discussed sepa-
rately in the preceding sections, they need not be studied
sepalately since studies can be designed to address two or
nrore of these topics at the same lime. For exanrple, the vail-
darien and alternative levels of sinrulation problems can be
merged: the LOS research data collection could be used for
comparison with in-flight data as well as with data from
abstJ act simulations.
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Thedatacollectionfi)r comparisonbetweenalternative
levelsof simulationcanbecombinedwithdatacollectionfor
modeldevelopment(with data collection /or both purposes
being derived from the same subjects). The subjective mea-
surement developn_ent can take place with any of the other
simulation studies. Furthermore, an experimental design can
be developed which combines the study of alternative levels
of simulation with alternative factors for optimizing LOS
research.
CONCLUSION
A detailed plan of research depends upon the tradeofl's
between available resources and competing goals. While such
an attenlpt is outside the scope of this study, we believe that
the research recommendations presented here can provide
presenflv unavailable and needed knowledge regarding the
use of FMS in applied behavioral research. We also believe
that these recommendations can improve the utility of LOS
as a research tool.
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APPENDIX A
FIELD INTERVIEW
NASA STUDY OF PREFLIGHT AND POSTFLIGHT OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE
IN SHORT-HAUL OPERATIONS
Dr. H. Clayton Foushee
RESEARCH GOAL
TIre purpose of this study was to examine the effects of
duty-cycle exposure on an airline crew as a function of an
actual line trip. Two groups of subjects were used: those who
went directly to tire simulator at the end of a 3-day trip
(postduty) and those who performed on tile simulator after
3 days at home (preduty). An observer noted critical events
and rated performance during each simulated flight. Video
tape recordings were made so that similar ratings could be
performed by' a panel of experts at a later time. Critical flight
parameters were recorded onto floppy disks from the simu-
lator computer and were time-synchronized with the video
tape recordings.
GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF SCENARIO
flaps cannot be raised fast enough to execute a missed
approact. Additionally, there is reduced effectiveness of
thrust reversing and the anti-skid systems. As a result of the
malfunclion, the crew must modify their normal approach to
City C _nd may declare an emergency condition. The final
destinalion was characterized by' hazardous terrain and a
short _et runway which had additional implications for the
malfunc:ion.
Key decisions designed into this scenario are: 1) request-
ing more fuel during flight planning: 2) requesting a take-off
alterna_,,', since immediate landing at the takeoff location is
not possible; 3) determining that landing at City' B is not
suitable for Category I1 operation, because of the crosswind
comporent: 4) determining that City C is the only suitable
allernat _': and 5) coping with tile System A malfunction.
SPECIFIC SCENARIO CONSIDERATIONS
It was desired to collect data in the context of a realistic
flight rather than what may be judged as a contrived
sequence of emergencies. It was desired to develop a scenario
so there would be no question that the results could have
happened during airline operations. Key decision points were
designed into the scenario. Other conditions were defined so
that generally the same flightpath should be selected by all
crews.
Consistent with the availability of subjects and a simula-
tor, a short-haul flight was planned to start at City' A and end
at City B. The weather was generally bad, and the aircraft
was heavy with minimum legal fuel. Some equipment was
inoperative at the start. At takeoff time the airport would go
below landing minimums. At City B the crew would find that
conditions were not suitable for a Category !I landing and, if
a landing was attempted, they would find that the actual
ceilings were below decision height. The only alternate desti-
nation with acceptable weather conditions, given the fuel
state, would be City C.
A "System A" hydraulic failure would be introduced
while executing the missed approach procedure at City B.
This failure requires manual actuation of the landing gear and
electrical actuation of flaps, which is very, very slow. Also,
the leading-edge flaps and gear cannot be raised once they are
lowered, and a 15°-flaps approach is required because the
Subjects
Amngements had to be made with both labor and man-
agemelt organizations to acquire subjects. This, together
with tlke availability of a suitable simulator, narrowed subject
selection to one airline. The scenario was therefore tailored
to the requirements of that airline. Each subject was
infornled that involvement in the study would be anonymous
and that data would be identified only by a code number.
Otherwise, subjects could fear that they were being given a
checkride which might influence their employnrent.
All of the subjects were volunteers. Because of flight crew
scheduling realities and tile nomadic behavior of pilots, it was
often difficult to schedule full line crews for the simulator
runs, ,tespite a high level of interest and very good coopera-
tion f:'om the pilots. It was considered essential to have a full
line c_ew for each simulator exercise. Scheduling difficulties
have 5rolonged the time required to complete this phase of
the stady.
Ea:h crew was given a preflight briefing which stressed
the importance of their participation. They were told that
the s_udy really' depended on them. They were asked to role
play - to fly' the simulator and make any decisions exactly
as ttl_!y would on a line trip. Full dispatch and all other pre-
flight services would be available, and they would be
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expected to complete all preflighl papers in the same fashion
thev arc filled out for line flights. Care was taken not lo tell
crews how long the exercise would take since this would
indicate that a nornlaJ fight would not occur.
Observer/Ancillary Support Personnel
Individuals trained in weather, and ATC were used to
make communications to the airline crew. A script was used
to provide routine commtmications consistent with the
scenario, as well as to simulate communications to other air-
crews. Background communications tapes were piped into
VItF 1 and 2 to simulate other traffic and ATIS information.
Information was included in communications to other air-
crews which might also be used in decision-making by, the
experimental crew. In addition to script communications, the
support personnel had to provide any inforlnation which the
crew might request. An observer was positioned in the simu-
lator flight cabin, and while this might present a deviation
from realism, this intrusion was considered necessary for
data collection. The observer also provided functions for any
other support personnel, such as passenger-cabin crew
personnel.
Flight Planning
Simulator Equipment
Some equipment was not available in the simulator,
namely, radar, ACARS and the number 3 VHF. The experi-
mental crews were briefed that this equipment was "inopera-
tive." Modifications to the procedures were necessary as a
result. The crew had to be briefed on alternatives to the
number 3 VHF, since it was normally used for the acquisi-
tion of ATIS. The crew had to advise ATC that radar was
inoperative. Simulator malfunctions had to be identified and
fixed during the ground flight-phmning period. Experienced
flight crews were used during pretest to ensure that simulator
procedures and equipment were company specific and con-
sistent with those used by the experimental crews during
normal lin.e flights at the airline in question.
Everything about the flight was made as realistic as possi-
ble. It started with a pushback after the cargo and main
cabin door lights indicated closed and the flight crew
received an appropriate message from the cabin crew and
clearance from the ground. The timing of the pushback with
activation of simulator motion jars the simulator to realisti-
cally suggest a pushback with a tug.
Taxiing in the simulator presented a problem since the
visual system did not have sufficient field-of-view to permit
right turns. The scenario had to be designed so that only left
turns were required for taxiing.
Actual company trip paperwork and preflight planning
were performed as they would be for a normal flight. An
experienced dispatcher was available. The first decision for
the flight crew involved the flight plan. They had close to
mininmm weather, a heavy airplane with a lot of payload,
and planned fuel that was legal but less than they were
normally used to taking. They could add fuel but the dis-
patcher discouraged this because it would reduce their pay-
load. There was a developing front along their route which
was causing rain and generally low ceilings throughout the
area. In addition, the copilot was able to start role playing by
setting up a "cold" aircrafl. +
Weather
Care was taken to ensure thai weather could have been
typical of weather previously experienced in the scenario
area for spring through fall. Experienced weathermen were
consulted. It was desirable to channel the flight to City C so
that experimental flights were controlled to a common
flightpath: also, it was judged by weathermen to be typical
of the area that City C could be "open" when the rest of the
area was below landing minimums. Lightning flashes, turbu-
lence and rain showers were used in the visual scene to alert
the flight crew and corroborate with reports of deteriorating
weather conditions.
High-Low-Workload Periods
The scenario design produced a flight which started with
a low-workload flight and ended with a high-workload flight
se_nent. This permitted an analysis of behavior during both
high. and low-workload conditions. However, the initial low-
workload conditions, typical of most airline flights, provided
a period for the crew to develop a realistic mind set and alle-
viate "simulator syndrome." It was the belief of the investi-
gator, based on past observations, that crews are generally
suspicious upon entering the simulator and abnormalities
introduced early in a scenario tend to reinforce these suspi-
cions. By letting the crew relax, the probability of their
behavior being realistic when a problem does occur is
increased. Such judgments about realism as well as judgments
about the level of workload, were made as the result of
extensive pretesting flights.
Malfunctions
It was desired to inchtde a malfunction which required
high-level decision-making but did not pose a serious hazard
to flight safety. It was desired to end the flight in a safe and
satisfactory manner. The chosen malfunction required time-
consuming manual deployment of gear and electrical exten-
sion of flaps. The malfunction was introduced while
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executingamissedapproachatCityBandtherewasaprob-
lemassociatedwiththetimeof themalfunction.Theywere
clearedfor anapproachbut the controllergavethema
revisedwindthatexceededtheircrosswindlimitations.If the
crew,wlfileflyingthemissedapproach,wereslowin raising
gear and flaps, it was possible that gear and leading-edge
flaps would be irretrievably locked in the down positions.
This would complicate the fuel situation and make it very
dose on fuel to City C. In addition, the malfunction had
additional implications for landing on the short wet runway
at City C.
Ethics
It was considered unethical to expose flight crews to
experiences which could be psychologically damaging. No
flight was allowed to deteriorate to a crash which in the real
world would have killed hundreds of people. Consequently,
the investigators had to be very careful in the design of the
scenario so that such things wouldn't happen. There is no
guarantee, however, that conditions might not deteriorate
badly at the end of the flight at City C. While it might be
necessary in some cases to terminate the simulation early,
this did not occur.
Debriefing
The crews were instructed not to discuss any aspect of the
simulator experience with any other flight crews so that
future stbjects would not be contaminated with such
knowledge.
SCENARIO GENERATION PROCEDURES
The scenario was developed in three iterative steps: First.
scenario; from LOFT were collected from airlines using this
technique, and were reviewed for application to this stud}'.
The inilial scenario adopted was based on these considera-
tions, and was reviewed by various SMEs from the selected
airline.
Second, supporting materials and support personnel duties
were developed. This included development of comnmnica-
tion tapes, procedures, performance assessment techniques
and video recording methods.
Finally, the scenario was flown during extensive pretest
flights. Fifteen full scenarios were flown and revisions were
made as anomalies were noted. The testing, together with
review by SMEs, is the key to developing a realistic scenario.
There is a tremendous amount of detail which can affect
realism, and many pretest flights are required to achieve a
scenario which will not contain unrealistic elements that can
affect the behavior of operational crews.
The amount of work preparing for the study is approxi-
mately equal to the amount of work expended during the
remainder of the study.
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FIELD INTERVIE_
NASA FULL-MISSION SIMULATION STUDY OF CREW COORDINATION
AND DECISION MAKING
Miles R. Murphy
RESEARCH GOAL
The prinrary objective of this study (Murphy et al., 1984;
Murphy and Awe, 1985) was to develop methods of quanti-
fying crew coordination and decision-making factors and
their relationships to flight task performance. A secondary
objective was to develop information about crew process and
performance for application m the development of resource
management training programs. Of special interest was
obtaining inforlnation on how errors evolve in the cockpit,
particularly errors involving interpersonal factors.
Relationships between several crew and systems perfor-
lllance measures and solne personal and crew process varia-
bles were explored m this study. Personal variable categories
include personality and background variables, such as age and
experience. The primary emphasis, however, was on crew
process, or interpersonal interaction. Constructs, or variable
classes of major concern, were: 1) command hierarchy,
2) comlnand style, 3 ) interpersonal communications, 4) crew
coordination, 5) resources management, and 6)group deci-
sion making.
GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF SCENARIO
The scenario represented a flight from Tucson (TUS)to
Los Angeles (LAX) via phoenix (PHX) with a forced diver-
sion to an alternate upon reaching LAX. The crew's enact-
ment of the scenario began with a Captain's briefing in the
simulated operations room at TUS and ended upon deplaning
at the selected alternate - either Palmdale (PMD) or Ontario
(ONT).
The scenario was designed to evoke a series of decisions
about where to proceed following a missed approach at LAX
caused by a nose gear -not,down-and-locked" indication.
This situation was exacerbated by having occurred at a time
when the Los Angeles basin, including Ontario, was experi-
e acing low and deteriorating ceilings and visibilities caused
by coastal fog. Ontario, located inland from Los Angeles, was
lagging Los Angeles in this deterioration. And, just over a
mountain range, out of the basin, Palmdale had clear weather
with good visibility. Upon going through a cotnplete gear
,check procedure taking several minutes, the crews would
discover that the gear was down and locked, and they could
therefo>," assume that the panel light indication was fault)'.
Within this scenario the most critical dimensions of the
decision process involves when to proceed from the LAX
area to m alternate airport, and the choice of the alternate.
Related subsidiary choices involves whether to do a complete
gear check in the LAX area, whether to make a second land-
ing attempt at LAX (ceilings and runway visual range (RVR)
degrade to legal minimums at LAX during this choice "win-
dow" _nd will go below minimums if and when the aircraft
crosses the outcr markerL whether to raise the gear for fuel
conse_xation while flying to the alternate, and whether to
declare an emergency for either the gear problem or a mini-
mum fad problem.
SPECIFIC SCENARIO CONSIDERATIONS
Simulator
A Boeing 720B flight training simulator, a later version of
the Boeing 707, was used in the study. This simulator was an
FAA-approved visual silnulator with a model-board scene and
had _o of freedom in motion: pitch, roll, and heave. The
simulator was operated by tile Airline Training Institute
(ATI), San Carlos, California.
Subjects
The subject crew n_embers were paid volunteers. Their
experience represented a wide range in reference t_) airline of
origin and recency, or currency, on B-707 line operations.
Sonke were current on the B-707. Many had recent B-707 line
experience and were now flying other jet aircraft in line oper-
aticms. Some were retired from the line. This diversity in
experience was considered important as an aid in evaluating
tile sensitivity of the various performance measures. Thus
cre,v composition ranged froln one in which all members
we:e retired from the line to one currently flying the B-707
as ;m intact crew.
This diversity dictated that special-differences training be
adninistered to review knowledge specific to the simulator
operations that might be different from current or previous
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line operations. All crew members received 6 hr of classroom
differences training and 4-8 hr of simulator differences train-
ing. Tile number of hours of simulator differences training
that a crew member received was based on recency. Subjects
were formed into crews prior to this simulator training and
were instructed in coordinated procedures during this train-
ing. Some baseline flight task perfommnce data were
obtained for each of the two pilot crew members at the con>
pletion of the simulator training.
Experimenter Team
A current, professional air traffic controller was used in
the simulation. The controller also participated with another
member of the experimental team (the pilot advisor) in simu-
lating conversations with other aircraft thus providing back-
ground conversations on the ATC network. Two observers
seated in the back of the simulator rated crew performance
and did experimenter tasks required within the simulator.
The air traffic controller and other experimenters were
located in a control room adjacent to the simulator. Monitors
available there were an X-Y plotter showing the aircraft path,
a visual scene display, audio speakers, and video screens
showing views of the crew members and cockpit. The total
experimenter team consisted of nine persons - including two
persons for simulator operation and reconfiguration. (Recon-
figuration of navigation receivers, airport parameters, and so
forth, was required periodically to simulate the complete
flight route.)
The experimenter team had to be prepared to deal with
unexpected events, such as the accidental movement of a
cockpit lever leading the crew to believe that a malfunction
(not a part of the experiment) had occurred. The air traffic
controller had to be prepared to deal with any type of infor-
mation request that the crew might generate. Timing of com-
munications had to coincide with specific events, rather than
at designated times, complicating execution of the scenario
by the experimenter team. The team, in communicating to
the subject crew, had to be extraordinarily careful not to
"lead" the crew in decision making, or to add distracting
reminders of unrealism. The ATC and background conversa.
tions were scripted, although occasional contingency inter-
vention was required. Fuel available at the initiation of the
approach to LAX was standardized by clearing t/re aircraft
from an enroute hold when the fuel level reached 14,000 lb.
Training for the experimenter team consisted of briefing
sessions and rehearsal during the two partial, and one com-
plete, "shakedown" simulator runs. In retrospect, some addi-
tional training and rehearsal may have been appropriate con-
sidering the criticality of effective coordination within the
team during data simulator runs. A further consideration
here was that some projected team members, who had par-
ticipated in scenario development and its adaptation to the
simulator, required replacement shortly before the start of
simulator runs (caused by experiment delays and chan_es in
those team members' situations).
In summary, preparing for a large complex study like this
one can involve more time than planned - particularly wl_n
contract administration issues are involved. Unanticipated
loss of experinaenter team members can be a problem. Con-
tractual time /imitations (e.g., for the simulator use) and
budget limitations can constitute a pressure to do less
"shakedown" and experimenter team training than may be
desirable. Some considerations in training time requirements
may be the extent to which each team member is both
research and operations oriented, and whether multi-
organizations are represented within the team.
42
APPENDIX C
APPLIED BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH
INTRODUCTION
problem domain - or has enough sense to go out and learn
about it before undertaking tile research.
This appendix discusses the nature of applied behavioral
research in general terms. It provides an overview of tile fac-
tors that influence the character and conduct of applied
behavioral research in a contemporary aviation context.
The main topics discussed are tile conditions that affect
tile research process and the scientific and practical goals the
researcher is striving to attain. The research process has two
principal stages: planning and execution. Both stages involve
continual resolution of conflicts between the ideal and the
real - between ultimate goals and means. The discussion will
deal not only with tile fundamental issues and factors
involved in research planning and execution, but also with
tile compromises and tradeoffs that tile behavioral researcher
is bound to encounter.
RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE APPLIED
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCHER
The responsibilities of tile researcher are threefold: 1) to
satisfy the scientific requirements: 2) to satisfy tile practical
requirements, and 3) to manage the research project. The
scientific and practical requirements often conflict, and
many factors affect tile way tile study can be performed.
It is not unconnnon for a researcher to strive for scientifi-
cally credible results without articulating the scientific cri-
teria to be met or the rules to be followed. Both of these
are classic errors. Similarly, it is not uncommon for the
researcher, particularly if one is new to tile applied behav-
ioral research field, to lose sight of tile practical needs and
expectations of the custonrer. It makes little difference
whether the customer is someone in a different department
of the same organization, higher level management, an out-
side agency, the operational community that uses the equip-
ment or the system of concern, or more amorphously,
another discipline such as designers or engineers.
The following paragraphs discuss several frequently under-
estimated real-world considerations as well as the general
scientific and practical requirements that should shape the
character of an applied research project. A basic assumption
is made that any individual responsible for research on
human behavior that is abned at answering a practical (oper-
ational) question understands the accepted scientific method.
A further assumption is that he or she also understands the
Scientific Requirements
Gemral goals and methods- The object of scientific
inquiry is to describe, explain and predict natural phenom-
elra. Science is an activity involving observation, theory and
practice. Its goal is reliable knowledge (Morris, 19551. While
rules change, there are common conventions wilhiII the
broad field of empirical science that make a study accepta-
ble. And beyond that there are special articulations of these
convet:tions that conform to the "established viewpoint"
within each paradigm of normal science (Kuhn, 19701.
The conventional requirelnents for credible empirical
research and results are straightforward and disarmingly
simpk. These requirements include an operational definition
of variables (i e., observable or reducible to obser vaJ°le
event';l, repeatability of findings, and exclusion of alternative
explalations. Desirable characteristics include quantitative
relati.mships, parsimony (i.e., simplicity of explanation), and
generalization of results.
Behavioral goals and methods Although behavioral
reseacch methods have some similarity to those used in the
physical and biological sciences, they are tailored to tile spe-
cial problems of behavioral research, ttuman behavior always
is influenced by multiple factors regardless of the apparent
simt-licity of the task of interest. As Utall (1981) pointed
out, too many things, both external and internal, affect
behavior to expect to find that a single, simple stimulus has a
prominent, predictable influence on an overt act.
tlumans vary in their knowledge, abilities, experience, and
atti.udes. Humans are also adaptable and changeable. That is.
thei¢ can learn quickly to adjust to situational demands, and
theLr performance will change with time as a result of experi-
ence, motivation, fatigue, and other factors. The individual-
ity complexity, and changeability of human behavior all
ha_e important methodological implications that must be
tal, en into account when performing behavioral research.
Behavior usually is thought of as an overt manifestation
of internal processes. The goal of tile scientific study of
behavior is to understand those processes - not merely to
m, derstand the overt act. The same act can be the result of
mmy different internal factors. Behavioral research methods
are necessarily complex and rigorous because assurance of
tie validity of tile results comes more from tile soundness of
the testing methods than from the apparent behavioral
O .ltcoInes.
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Scientific skills of the beharioral researcher- The behav-
ioral researcher applies general and specific scientific, meth-
odological skills to tile study of behavior. Because behavioral
processes are not directly observable, tile researcher's first
requirement is to reduce behavioral problem statements into
operational terms (Carnap, 1955). Here the required skill is
largely, a product of understanding scientific method. This is
most important in applied behavioral research because the
problem questions, which are raised by the people who have
to deal with them in tile real world, are ahnost never stated
in a direct/5 testable form (Cody, 1984).
Knowledge of experimental design and statistical methods
are equally important where measurements are made on
properties in a sample of the members of a population. This
is true whether the measured properties change with time or
whether tile sample population consists of humans or non-
living objects that are not identical in all relevant respects.
Experimental design is a specialized skill that encompasses
selection ,_f testing methods, variables, and subjects in a
manner that permits generalization of results and the applica-
lion of inferential statistics.
Use of descriptive and inferential statistical methods is
required to express data values in terms of the population
sampled in a manner that encourages confidence in the accu-
racy of these values. Within behavioral science there is an
implicit expectation that the relationship found or effects
produced will be probabilistic in nature. There is an equally
explicit understanding that it" action is suggested or required,
an inferential statistical test should demonstrate that the
results or conclusions have less than a 59; probability, of
having occurred by chance alone.
The behavioral researcher also needs the ability, to make
behavioral measurements. Too often researchers /lave been
trained only in the rudimentary aspects of measurement
i.e., those that are chiefly concerned with controlling tile
conditions of measurement, avoiding contaminating effects,
and restricting the range of options available to the test sub-
jeer. Development of meaningful measures is invariably a
significant part of the research problem if the behaviors of
interest and the testing situation are even modestly complex.
Practical Requirements
The principal practical requirement is to secure informa-
tion to answer the problem question. Frequently, the cus-
tomer has expectations about how tile research should be
done, and the form and characteristics of the infomlation
that will be derived from it. A/most always there is an expec-
tation that the research will focus on tile specific problem of
concern and be performed in a context that is a realistic
representation of the actual or expected operational
environment.
For example, tile problem may be to determine the degree
to which certain head-up display (HUD) symbology will
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obscure a pilot's view of a runway during landing approaches.
Ttle researcher might see this as an instance of a more generic
issue, such as the detectability of certain classes of objects as
a function of the percent and distribution of lines on a HUD,
and as one which could be better investigated in the
laboratory.
Tile customer, on tbe other hand, is likely, to have mini-
real interest in the general problem. He or she can insist that
only the HUD configurations of interest at tile moment be
used, and that tile study, be performed in a flight simulator
using experienced pilots. Additional customer expectations
may be that any effects found will be large and obvious;
unambiguous; that any systematic effects will be in the form
of simple, direct relationships, without a long inferential
chain of explanation; and that the results or conclusions will
be expressed in terms of the customers' jargon or expertise.
These are realistic expectations. The customer wants results
that can be understood and reasons to have confidence that
the results will be valid in the real world.
If the customer's background is in engineering, which is
common in organizations dealing with equipment and sys-
tems, proof or validation of hardware and software concepts
is usually tested at each stage of building a prototype system.
Care is exercised to perfimn thorough tests. The outcomes
are usually clear - somthing either works or it does not.
When measurement is involved, a tangible property is
measured.
Such clear outcomes are seldom the case in behavioral
research. The customer may not fully understand tile
required methodology, and may be assured of the validity of
the results only if operational people are the subjects and the
testing situation resembles the real world. Quite simply, the
customer (or the ultimate consumer) frequently requires the
behavioral research to /lave face validity. Face validity, is
easily understood. It is the customer's principal source of
confidence in the credibility of the behavioral research.
Real-World Considerations
Real-world constraints and the resources available are cru-
cial considerations. Time and money are both enabling and
restricting factors. Each is a sensitive area, and together they
largely dictate tile scope of the study. Once the researcher
makes an initial estimate regarding the time and money
required, the estimate becomes a commitment, and an alinost
inevitable constraint. It need not be said that the time and
money required are often underestimated.
Resources- Facilities, equipment, and a variety of
human resources with appropriate skills will be needed to
perform the research. Human resources include the research
team, support personnel, and subjects. The interests and
expertise of the researcher team influence the way the
problem will be framed and approached. Supporting person.
nel include those people who provide services necessary to
theplanningandconductof tileresearchprojectbutarenot
partoftheresearchteam.Thenumberandtypesof supportingpersonnelwillvary
withthescopeoftheprojectandtireresearchvehicle.Equip-
mentechnicians,computer programmers, and usually a data
analyst will be required in virtually all cases. For simulation-
based studies of moderate to large scale, one or more SMEs -
usually experienced operational personnel - will be neces-
sary. Simulation support personnel include simulator facility
managers and technicians, specialized computer programmers
for real-time control, and scenario generation and visual data-
base programmers if a computer-generated linage system is
used.
Other human resources needed are administrative support
personnel and, in many cases, a representative of the cus-
tomer, and finally, the test subjects are a particularly impor-
tant human resource. Their availability and characteristics
affect the scope of the study as well as tile research vehicle
that may be used.
I:acilities and equipment determine the choice of research
vehicle. The reliability of the test and data acquisition equip-
ment should be known or determined in advance. Data acqui-
sition capabilities affect the choice of measurement methods.
Specialized knowledge, which is a critical intellectual
resource, affects both the research plan and its implementa-
tion. At least three kinds of specialized knowledge are
required for behavioral research:
1. Basic knowledge of behavioral processes and the opera-
tional context in which they are used. This knowledge largely
determines the selection of conditions and variables to be
used to answer the research question.
2. Knowledge of experilnental design. First, to properly
use the design selected, avoid or control unwanted effects,
and secure data which is amenable to statistical analysis: and
second, to be familiar with a breadth of different experimen-
tal designs so that the design used is appropriate for the com-
plexity of the research project and its economic constraints.
3. Knowledge of performance measurement. The develop-
ment of such measures can be a significant part of the
research effort. The goal of measurement is to produce infor-
mation that is meaningful at the operational level. To do this,
one needs criteria for determining in operational terms how
a performance is good or bad. For many types of applied
research, such criteria are unknown. The development of
meaningful performance criteria can be a significant part of
the research effort.
Constraints- Real-world constraints also affect the
research project. They' must be taken into account because
behavioral research takes place in organizational and social
contexts that impose their own requirements or restrictions,
These constraints can come from three sources: the custo-
mer: the subjects: and the management of the researcher's
organization.
The constraints imposed by the customer are the cus-
tomer's requirements and expectations. These have already
been disc _ssed. Customer constraints can have serious conse-
quences because they directly affect the complexity of the
research vehicle, the subject population, and the form of
information required for a "successful" research project.
Unless tie customer can be accommodated, or persuaded to
accept a modification of perceived and strongly' held require-
ments, there may be no research project.
A basic subject constraint is imposed by the ethical
requiren_ent to respect the privacy, dignity, and self-esteem
of an ir:dividual. While in some cases it may be desirable to
produce research situations that explore these areas, as well
as others where organizational or social pressures influence
perfornance, these are exactly the circumstances that are
considc red to violate the individual's personal rights.
Subjects can also impose additional constraints when they
are exl 'eft operators of a system. Understandably, they can
be expzcted to have a critical view of the research representa-
tion <f their familiar working environment. When the
research vehicle includes an FMS, expert operators can be
expected to be sensitive to the details of the simulation, even
if certain details have no relevance to the research goal. There
is a c_ nsiderable risk in not accommodating the expectations
of expert operators, because any reservations they may have
about the simulation can affect their motivation and
perfo,mance.
The third set of constraints on behavioral research can
arise from the requirements of the researcher's organization.
Demonstrations or tours for visitors or the press often will be
required for high visibility projects or facilities. They should
be planned for in the research schedule. Priorities among
projects may influence accessibility to research facilities.
Col_iractual obligations may require completion of work
step_, by a certain time or in a particular order, even though
the research schedule might be better served by a different
schedule. Coordination with other organizational units may
be i ecessary, particularly if the behavioral research is a part
of a larger project.
PURPOSES OF APPLIED BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH
Research is a means to acquire knowledge for an etad pur-
pose. It may involve efforts as simple as the searching of a
sit_gle document or as elaborate as a series of experinaents
o_'er several years involving construction of facilities and
ecuipment and the training of a staff. Here we are concerned
c)nty with a particular kind of research scientific investiga-
tions to better understand the behavior of humans interact-
ir g with machines.
Research is not automatically required to solve every
problem. It is needed only when knowledge from other
smrces is suspect or insufficient. Therefore, the first step
when confronted with any problem is to fornrulate a precise
;iescription of the information needed to solve it. The second
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stepisto gatherexistinginfomlationand,it"additionalinfor-
mationonthesubjectisneeded,to considerthealternatives
forobtainingit. Thesestepsareobviousandimportant.They
arestressedherebecauseif thesepreliminarystepsarenot
donecarefully.,theendresultcanbe inappropriate or unnec-
essary research.
The lack of confidence that existing information is satis-
thctory or direct/y applicable to the problem is responsible
for a great deal of research. For example, many applied
studies have been performed on the effect of platform
motion on performance and learning in a flight simulator (see
Waag, 1981 for a review). Yet, it is still impossible to
marshal/ strong support for either a yes or no answer to the
question of whether platform motion is needed for a particu-lar purpose.
Would performing another study be useful? The answer
might be "'yes," if the argument is that conditions in previous
studies were different from those currently of interest, and
therefore the results do not apply to the present problem.
The answer might be "no," if one looks closer and finds that
the difficulty is not differences in the conditions, but in
obtaining definitive performance results. The point is that
early effort in the problem solving process can have signifi-
cant downstream effects on research decisions.
The nature of the problem determines the purpose of the
research and, in general, there are three main purposes of
applied behavioral research: hypothesis testing, problem
exploration, and evaluation. Each is discussed in tile follow-
ing subsections.
Hypothesis Testing
Scientific research is commonly thought to consist mainly
of hypothesis testing, in which predictions are made about
the relationships between variables. Tile object of the
research is to confirm or disprove these predictions. Tile
form of the predictions /nay be correlational or stated as
cause and effect. The principal features of hypothesis testing
are 1) the formulation of the hypothesis at some general
level of description in terms of the variables, and 2) being
able to demonstrate that the predicted relations/lip holds
over a range of specific situations, and is not accounted for
by other factors common to those particular instances.
describe the conditions and states of variables present in sev-
eral instances of the situation of concern, and to describe the
relationships in time of tile associated actions or sequenceof events.
A main distinguishing feature of problem exploration is
that it is atheoretic. This is as it should be, because the
researcher should /lave no firmly preconceived ideas about
the causal or correlational relationships among the variables.
This sometimes is difficult in practice, for in many cases
there will be at least a notion of broad c/asses of variables or
conditions that are thought to be important. More detailed
data are likely to be collected on these factors than on
others. The researcher should be sensitive to the danger of
missing or underestimating tile importance of other factors.
No attempt should be made to control tile operational
situation in problem exploration. The primary objective is
to discover the particular factors that are present or absent
when the event of interest does or does not occur.
Evaluation
Research for evaluation is also atheoretic. Its primary pur-
pose is to answer a question or solve a particular problem.
Evaluative research has several forms, but usually involves
comparisons of systems (or elements in a system) in an
attempt to discover performance differences. Comparative
studies often are done to find out if using one type of equip-
ment, configuration, or procedure results in better perfor-
mance than another.
Evaluation research also may involve comparison of per-
formance against a predetermined criterion. This is usually
done for validation purposes. For example, a study might be
done to confirm that a simulator visual system can support
the performance of all normal and emergency visually guidedf/igh t tasks.
A variant of evaluative research is to obtain baseline per-
formance data, either for an existing system which does not
have adequate baseline data, or for a new system. If a new
system is being evaluated the comparison will be made as a
prediction, based on the development and implementation of
new or different equipment, configurations, or procedures.
Problem Exploration APPLICATION CONTEXT
Problem exploration is research to discover and isolate
factors that contribute to a problem. For example, if the
problem is the occurrence of several incidents of aircraft
descending below g/ideslope during night approaches under
visual meteorological conditions, the purpose of the research
is to discover the factors that lead to these occurrences. The
principal objectives of problem exploration are to precisely
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The nature of systems change with advances in technol-
ogy. At present, the aviation system is undergoing major
changes in the underlying architecture of its control system
as well as the appearance and function of its control and
display mechanisms. Behavioral research topics are deter-
mined by the role of the human in these new or modified
systems and by' the practical problems that arise during their
developmentandemployment.In thenextsections,wewill
briefly'reviewtile natureof olderandnewersystems,the
changingroleof thehumanin thenewersystems,andthe
implicationsthesehaveforappliedbehavioralresearch.
OlderSystems
Anoldersystem,includinganaircraftofpreviousgenera-
tions,isanassemblageofrelatively'discretesubsystems,each
withits ownsetof displaysandcontrols.Eachcontroland
displayisdedicatedto afunctionandhasafixedrelation-
shipto its subsystem.A controlmechanisnlhasasimple.
directeffecton thecontrolledelement.Similarly,adisplay
instrumentpresentselementarydataaboutsomeaspectof
thesubsystem.In oldersystems,thehumanoperatoris responsiblefor
closingthecontroloopbetweenthedisplaysandcontrols
aswellasthecoordinatedoperationof thesubsystemsto
achievetire generalsystemgoal.Thenumberof people
neededto operateanoldersystemis directlyproportional
to thenumberof monitorandcontrolfunctionsrequired.
Forexample,in oldercommercialircraftwhichoperated
overwateror overlarge,desolategeographicalareas,five
crewmemberswererequired(pilot,copilot,flightengineer,
navigatorandradiooperator).
Humanoperatorsof oldersystems(includingaircraft)
fulfill theirrolesbymonitoringandintegratinginformation
fromseveraldiscretesourcesandmakingcontinuousorvery
frequentcontrolactuations.Theoperators'tasks,andhence
theirtraining,arebasicallymanualcontrol,orproceduralin
orientation.Manualcontroltasksrequiretheoperatorsto
learnthesystemdynamicswellenoughtocontrolthesystem
withtheprecisionandstabilityrequired.Aircraftconfigura-
tion andsubsystemoperations(e.g.,electricalhydraulic,
andavionicssystems)areanexampleoftasksthatareessen-
tiallyprocedural.Thatis,operationi normalandabnormal
modesi largelyamatterof followingasetof rulesof the
form,"if x thendoy."
In oldercomplexsystems,tasksoftenaredistributed
amongseveraloperators.Theyfrequentlyrequireamanager
whoalsomayhaveanactiveroleasanoperator,suchasthe
captainof anaircraft,whoreceivesinformationfromthe
otherpersonnel,directsandsupervisestheiractivities,makes
all maior decisions,andis directlyresponsiblefor the
operationoftheaircraft.Dependingontheparticularkindof
system,operators(otherthanthemanager)maynotalways
beawareof thesystem'sgeneralstatus,canhavealimited
spanof authority,andmayhavetheiracticitiesconfinedto
specifictasks.A humanoperatorwillneverbefarremovedfrommoni-
toringandcontrolof thelowestfunctionallevelof anolder
system.Intermediatel velsof controlbetweenthelowest
levelandthesystem anageralsowillbefilledbyhumans.
Thishasadvantagesanddisadvantagesforrespondingtoout-
of.toleranceoremergencyconditions.
A principaladvantageis thathumansareavailableto
detectandrespondto abnormaleventswithintheirspanof
authorit.voratleastcommunicatestatusinformationto the
managerFaultidentificationis relativelyeasysincethe
machinepartsof thesystemaredistributedatasinglel vel.
Problemsatintermediatelevelsofcontrolareusuallyhuman
problemsandeasyto distinguishfromthemachinel vel.
Verbalreportstothemanagercanbesuccinctanddescriptive
ofthee,_actfault.Sore.• seriousdisadvantagesoftheseoldersystemsarethat
anoperatormaynotnoticethesymptomsof animpending
failure,beabletoreactquicklyenough,orbeabletotakea
requiredactionoutof hisorherlocalspanof authority.An
eventaffectingseveralsystems,co-locatedbutseparatedin
controL,mayrequireactionat ahigherlevelof control.In
suchcasestheintermediateorgeneralmanagerwillhaveto
integratetheindividualreportsdiagnosethecommonbasis
of theproblenldecideona courseof action,issueorders,
andf, llowupto becertainthatthecorrectiveactionwas
taken.It isnotalwayseasyto dothisinatimelyandeffec-
tivefashion.
NewerSystems
Thetrendof newdevelopmentsin nrannedsystemsi
twotold,1) functionalintegrationof subsystems,and
2) implementationf automationat multiplelevelswitha
high-order,computer-basedcontrolleroverseeingthe full
ran_'eof systemfunctions.Theroleof tilehumanistoexer-
ciseoverallcontrolof thesystem.Emphasizingtheroleof
thehuman,systemsof thistypearecalledsupervisorycon-
trol systems(SheridanandJohannsen,1976).Thegeneral
cot_trolstructureof suchsystemsinvolvesfour functional
levels.A humanoperatoratthetop,ahumaninterfacesys-
tem.asemi-autonomoustask-interactivesystem,andthetask
or subsystemfunctionat tilebottomlevel(Sheridanetal.,
19_3).
Tirephysicalarchitecturemayinvolveseveralcomputers
anddifferamongvarioustypesof supervisorycontrolsys-
temssuchaspowerplants,chemicalprocessplants,con>
mandandcontrolsystems,aircraft,andunderseavehicles.A
s_pervisorycontrolsystemmayhaveseveralhumanopera-
tc,rs,but thegeneralroleof eachis essentiallythesame.
Multipleoperatorsmaybepresentfor thesakeof redun-
dancy, or because the system is a hybrid of the old and
the new control structure with a single general manager.
Characteristics of a supervisory control system include
aatonomous operation with automatic control being exer-
cized at several levels, filtering and processing of information
presented to the supervisor, and indirect but high-order con-
trol that is goal- or effect-oriented. That is, supervisor com-
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mands are interpreted into sets of specific, coordinated con-
trol inputs to subsystems at the task level. The mechanisms
for information presentation and control inputs are multi-
purpose displays and controls such as CRTs, programmable.
legend and function switches, touch panels, keyboards, andtracking devices.
Automation of the details of subsystem function control
frees humans to extend their range of authority over the
entire system, or at least large segments of it. The tasks of
the operator as system supervisor are to set initial conditions,
monitor overall function, make adjustments, and intervene as
necessary. The supervisor attends to achieving major system
goals instead of the implementation mechanisms. The role
of the human supervisor is largely to provide intelligence and
deal with the unusual or unanticipated. Intervening in the
event of an out-of-tolerance or emergency condition is the
supervisor's primary responsibility.
Contrast of Older and Newer Systems
Older and newer systems differ in the types of tasks which
humans must perform and in the behavioral processes that
are called upon to perform these tasks. Older systems require
assimilation of discrete data on low-level functions of the
system and discrete control of these functions. Older systems
are physical-control oriented. What the operator must know
and do are largely manual control and procedures which are
determined by the physical properties of the subsystems and
the characteristics of the display instruments and control
mechanism.
Newer systems are information-processing oriented.
Supervisors are several levels removed from the subsystem
level of functions. Supervisors see abstracted, summarized,
and selected data of major process functions and issue gen-
eral, goal-oriented orders. Supervisor tasks are to interpret
information, make decisions, and solve problems when they
arise. There is less requirement for procedural knowledge and
actions, and more requirement for rational thinking andjudgment.
Implications for Applied Behavioral Research
Creating a workable supervisory control system is more
than a simple matter of adding automation. Although auto-
mat/on frequently changes the supervisor's workload, it does
not necessarily reduce it. In addition, to the degree that
automation performs functions beyond human capabilities of
speed, precision, or complexity, the supervisor cannot simply
take over if a failure or unanticipated event happens. A dif-
ferent kind of coping strategy (than a take-over) is necessary.
Moreover, if automation is controlling a high-level coordina.
lion of general system functions, its modus operandi may be
so different from what a human would do that the supervisor
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cannot follow what is going on, and therefore could lose the
ability to anticipate or plan ahead.
There is a large number of difficult philosophical and
technical problems which need to be solved to achieve prac-
tical supervisory control systems. For example, at the philo-
sophical level, there are questions about the amount of
authority and responsibility to be given to the computer.
control system. At the technical level, there are questions of
how to afford the supervisor access to information and allow
control at the subsystem level if it becomes necessary, and
how to portray this information and effect control. These
kinds of questions, as well as a host of others, will determine
the nature of applied behavioral research in the future.
Behavioral issues in older systems focus on what people
can do, their capabilities and lhnitations. Tasks in older sys-
tems usually can be divided into discrete units involving a
few sources of information of an elementary kind, and one
or a few control mechanisms. The behavioral concerns center
on how to design the displays and controls to minimize
errors and maximize the speed and accuracy of the operator'sperformance.
Implicit in the legitimate interest in what people can do
are the notions that the person has few or no acceptable
options to do something different. Either system goals or
equipment constraints limit these choices. Either the opera-
tors will simply try to do the best they can, or there is a
criterion of what is to be done. These notions imply that
there is a rule for the behavior.
Because the operator of an older system has a reasonably
immediate control involvement with the subsystems, and the
characteristics of the subsystems are essentially immutable
(i.e., they have fixed mechanical properties or are hard-
wired), the behavioral issues associated with man-machine
interaction in an older system are superficial to some degree.
Concern focuses on the operator interface with the display
instrument and the actuator mechanism.
Operator performance quality in older systems is governed
by these devices and the ability to use them in the prescribed
manner. It has little or nothing to do with the general system
goal or external interactions of one subsystem with another.
The behaviors of interest, therefore, are mainly those needed
to interpret an instrument (vision and perception), operate a
control (motor-control speed, accuracy, and bandwidth) the
linking process of memory, and the enabling process of learn-
ing. In effect the predominant behavioral domain of interest
in n_an-machine integration in older systems is stimulus-
response relationships.
Performance of concurrent tasks and integration of infor-
mation and its interpretation in terms of a general goal have
always been a concern. Sources of information that fre-
quently need to be integrated are placed in close proximity
or incorporated in a single instrument (e.g., in an aircraft
engine performance gauges are grouped together, and the
pitch and roll indicators are combined in the attitude instru-
ment). Applied behavioral researchers have investigated issues
ofdividedattention,vigilance,andcompatibilityofdisplays
andcontrolsin aneffort to mrprovetirehumanfactors
aspectsofsystemoperation.
Providingnewcapabilities,reducingpersonnelrequire-
ments,andreducinghumanerrorareincentivesforimprov-
ingasystem.Solutionstohuman-relatedproblemsinsystems
havebeendirectedtowardautomation.Thishasbeen
approachedlargelyonapiecemealbasisratherthanasapart
ofanintegrateddevelopmentof heentiresystem.
Thepiecemealapproachhashadadverseconsequencesfor
operators,particularlythe crewof aircraft(Wienerand
Curry,1980:NationalResearchCouncil,1982:Sheridanand
Hart,1984).Autonlationdoesnot necessarilyrelievethe
operatorof workload,butsimplymayshifttheburdenfrom
physicalactivityto mentalactivity.Theincreaseduseof
automation,however,isatrendtowardfullyrealizedsuper-
visorycontrolsystems.Theissuesarenolongerwhetheror
not to automate,buthowto integrateautolnationtohave
thehumaneffectivelyactasasystemsupervisor.
The relevantappliedbehavioralissuesextendmuch
furtherinto theinteractionof thehumanwiththesystem.
Humansupervisorsareremovedfromthesubsystemlevel,
andhaveabroadspanofauthorityandresponsibility.Auto-
mationof routinemanipulative-andcontinuous-control
tasks,aswellasthoseforwhichtherearefixedproceduresor
rules,leavesthe humanto performdecisionmakingand
problemsolvingtasks.If morethanonehumanisinvolved
in thesystem,thesupervisor'staskwill beto managethe
humanaswellasthemachiner sources.
Thesupervisorwill operateatthesystemgoalleveland,
in effect,will be interactingwithseverallevelsof system
function.Sinceroutineproblemsarehandledautomatically,
thedifficultproblems,thoseforwhichtherearenopredeter-
minedrules,mustbehandledby thesupervisor.Thiswill
requireagreaterin-depthknowledgeofthesystemfunctions
bythesupervisorthanisnownecessaryforthehumanoper-
aior.Predominanttasksof thesupervisorwillbeknowledge-
basedratherthan rule-basedor skill-based(Rasmussen,
1983).
Thebehavioralfactorsof mostconcernwillbeinforma-
tion seeking,assimilation,i tegrationandinterpretation,
decisionmaking,problemsolving,andresourcemanagement.
Theman-machineterfaceproblemwill involveintegrating
deeperlevelsof thesystemwithhigher-ordercognitivepro-
cesses.Theresearchallengewillbetodiscoverameansto
achievecognitivecompatibilitybetweenanatttomatedcon-
trollerandthehumansupervisorto allowthesupervisort
monitorthestatusof thesystemintermsoffunctionalpur-
pose,andto conveygoal-orientedcommandsto thesystem.
AsSin_eton(1976)haswritten,"Thewholepointofmanas
asupervisorasopposedto anoperatoristhatheneedstobe
ableto makeintelligentresponseswhichinturnimpliesthat
hereactsin termsof concepts and not in terms of stimulus-
response units."
In general, applied behavioral research issues in the newer
systems will shift in emphasis from what operators call do to
what sup,,rvisors will do - or, for existing systems, what they
do do.
In covtrast to older systems, supervisors may have several
options available to deal with a problem or achieve an end.
The criteria for their behavior are not as clear cut, except in
terms of the outcome. Also, the critical aspects of their
behavior, information processing, and decision making will
not be a_ accessible for measurement as a control manipula-
tion. Nune of these changes will make it easier for the
applied behavioral researcher.
In acdition to the shift in the behavioral processes of
interest, there is a trend to expand investigation of the scope
of variables that influence behavior beyond the immediate
situational or equipment characteristics. Perrow 11983)has
pointed out that the organizational context (i.e., the social
structure of the work environment, including management
attitudes, peer pressure, and personal goals) influences the
decisiors people make in the operation of a system. As an
example, Woods (see appendix E) stated that nuclear power
plant o_erators take many more positive actions in a training
simulator than they do in actual operations. He attributes
this difference to the reward and penalty structure operating
in the real work environment that biases operators to n,)t
take any action if there is uncertainty about the need or
outconle.
RESEARCH VEHICLES
A _esearch vehicle is simply the facility used to support
the research. Research vehicles can be classified into three
categ(,ries: the real world, simulation of the real world with
varying degrees of complexity, and the laboTatory. Each has
advantages and limitations.
Real World
E_cept for research on new systems, the real world is the
beginning and the end stage for research. The real world is
appr_.priate for exploratory.studies to determine the factors
associated with a practical problem, and it is the final proving
ground for evaluation of new developments studied in simu-
lation or in the laboratory.
F_ona the viewpoint of the customer interested in practi-
cal applications, it is the ideal vehicle for conducting a study.
It is the only context where all relevant factors operate.
Organizational goals and requirements, stress from real
hazards, peer pressure, self-esteem, and long periods of rou-
tine activity are among the most important conditions that
inflt ence behavior. They occur naturally m the real world,
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andareverydifi'icu/tto createin otherresearchenviron-
ments.The real world is tlle best choice for behavioral
research on what people will do in contrast to what they
can do.
The real world, however, does have several disadvantages
for researcil purposes. There rarely is an opportunity to con-
trol all conditions: rare events are almost impossible to study:
hazardous situations cannot be duplicated; experienced sub-
jects are necessary for a system of any complexity; and data
collection is difficult and can be very expensive, particularly
if systems such as an aircraft are required.
Simulation
Simulation includes a broad category of research vehicles.
It ranges from comprehensive representation of the opera-
tional equipment and environment in support of full-mission
performance to limited simulations involving a single item of
equipment or a short task. The advantage of simulation is
combining real-world hardware, most environmental condi-
tions, and task demands with the ability to control events
and conditions. Rare and hazardous events can be intro-
duced, any required data can be collected, new equipment or
procedures can be incorporated with the old, and usually
data can be collected in a shorter period of time and more
economically than in the real world.
Limited simulation is particularly useful for the testing of
concepts or theory derived from basic laboratory research,
or adopted from contexts unrelated to the one of interest.
It also is well suited for investigation of problems that have
been isolated by exploratory research in the real world or in
FMS.
The disadvantages of simulators as research vehicles are
generally proportional to their complexity. The disadvan-
tages include the effort and difficulty required for setting up
and controlling the simulation process, and the latitude of
the alternative courses of action available to the test subjects.
This latitude tends to make each run unique in some respects
and, therefore, can create data analysis problems.
Either experienced or trained subjects will be required for
sinrulation-based research that involves anything more than
the most simple task. The subject training problem becomes
difficult and takes on another dimension if the research
addresses new equipment or procedures and requires the per-
formance of complex tasks approaching a full-mission con-
text (Sheridan and Hennessy 1984). By definition, there are
no experienced subjects for new developments; training of
naive people can require days to accomplish, and can be very
costly. If personnel experienced in an existing system with
some similarity to the new configuration are used as subjects,
they also will require a certain amount of training. With
experienced subjects, there is great concern that old habits or
preferences will influence their behavior, and there may be a
negative transfer of learning.
Measurement is a problem in complex simulation studies.
Although the type and amount of data that can be collected
are large, considerable effort is required for the development
of measures. Complex simulation is used for behavioral
research only when high-order, complex, or subtle behavior is
of interest and requires detailed examination. For example,
the effects of fatigue on performance, decision making in
unexpected or emergency situations, and supervisory control
of automated systems are typical applied behavioral studies
that could require complex FMS as a research vehicle.
Because of the nature of these problems, performance must
be measured in terms other than simple, overt acts or psycho-
nrotor control if meaningful aspects of behavior are to be
captured.
Labora tory
The laboratory is best for initial test or elaboration of
theoretical ideas about basic behavioral processes, prelimi-
nary research on equipment characteristics such as display
coding and formatting, control methods and, to some degree,
measurement methods. Its main advantage is the ability to
isolate and study a particular behavioral process. Subject
training needs usually are minor, and no special experi-
ence is required. The set-up of equipment is short and easy
compared to configuring a simulator, and data can be col-
lected quickly. The disadvantage of laboratory research for
applied behavioral studies is its remoteness from the realistic
context from which most practical problems arise. It is more
suitable for study of generic issues than for specific applica-
tion problems.
Comment
The levels of research vehicle described above are really
points on a continuum. Even the real world and simulation
overlap when some aspects of both are present. For example,
the Total In-Flight Simulator (TIFS) at the Naval Air Devel-
opment Center is an aircraft with two cockpits, one for
research on control and displays, and a customary one for
safety of flight. Moreover, the research cockpit can operate
us a ground-based simulator. The military air combat maneu-
vering ranges are another example. Here weapons delivery
and their effects are simulated, but the aircraft and air
defenses operate in the real world.
Limited simulation and laboratory settings also blend
together. New systems frequently consist of electronic dis-
plays (usually CRTs) and controls linked by computer to the
actual hardware. In a sense, simulator technology has been
incorporated into real systems. Since CRTs and computers
have become principal tools in the behavioral laboratory,
many features of real systems and simulators can be created
there.
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FIDELITYAND VALIDITY OF RESEARCH
SIMULATORS
The required characteristics and features of tire research
vehicle are prominent issues when planning applied behav-
ioral research. If a simulator is the research vehicle of choice,
these issues will be considered in terms of fidelity require-
ments. In this section fidelity and the closely' related con-
cept validity' are discussed as they relate to the determina-
tion of the requirements for research simulators.
The two principal factors that should determine the
choice of research vehicle for an applied behavioral study
are:l. The type of research required by the problem (i.e.,
exploratory, hypothesis testing, or one of the varieties of
evaluation), and
2. Knowledge of the factors that influence the behavioral
processes of interest.
The ty'pe of research dictates the specificity of represen-
tation that the research vehicle must have. Knowledge of the
factors which influence the behavioral processes determine
how comprehensively the research vehicle must represent an
operational system and its associated situational conditions.
Together, these features are commonly thought of as the
fidelity' of the research vehicle.
Fidelity
Definitions- Fidelity is a confusing term. Much of the
confusion is due to the tendency to talk in qualitative gener-
alities about fidelity as if it is a single-dimensional character-
istic and independent of a specific simulation and applica-
tion. Although there is a lack of consensus on a definition
of fidelity of simulation (Hays, 1981), it has generally been
discussed from two major viewpoints.
The first viewpoint treats fidelity as a physical character-
istic of simulator equipment. For example, Huff and Nagel
(1975) define physical fidelity as the objectively measurable
correspondence between the operational system and the
simulator equipment in form and function.
The second viewpoint treats fidelity in terms of behav-
ioral effects such as psychological fidelity or perceptual fidel-
ity (Matheney, 1975), cognitive fidelity (Spears, 1983), or
behavioral outcome (Jones et al., 1985). As stated by the
National Research Council's Working Group on Simulation
(Jones et al., 1985), "Certain difficulties in simulator design
can be avoided if fidelity is defined in terms of potential
effectiveness for a planned use rather than in terms of physi-
cal correspondence."
A similar view was expressed by Semple et al. (1981):
"Aircrew Training Device fidelity is the degree to which cue
and response capabilities in a simulator allow for learning and
practice of specific tasks so that what is learned in the device
will enhance performance of these tasks in the operational
environment." Obermayer (1964), Semple et al. (1981), and
Hays (19bl), as well as many others, have pointed out that
fidelity is a multifaceted concept.
One facet of fidelity is abstraction. A simulator may
consist (f real-world equipment driven by a computer,
devices that externally appear to be real equipment but are
internalb very different or nonfunctional, or devices that
have no external resemblance to the actual system but
correspond functionally in terms of a mathematical model.
Often it is assumed that departures from fidelity by
abstraction are detrimental to effective use of simulation:
however, abstractions are not always detrimental, particu-
larly in training. There are several cases, such as cockpit pro-
cedures trainers in aviation, that portray some instruments
with pictures because this level of abstraction is sufficient to
fulfill the intended training purpose. STEAMER (see
National Research Council (Jones et al., 1985) for a descrip-
tion) is a simulated propulsion plant of a Navy frigate repre-
sented schematically on a dynamic color graphics display and
driven by a computer model of the plant. The simulation
functionally corresponds to the real system, but is in no
other way a physical representation of the propulsion plant.
Another facet of fidelity is accuracy. Real-world charac-
teristics may be included at various degrees of precision. In
some instances, reduced precision can be an advantage for
some purposes, such as training. For example, there are cases
where a full engineering mathematical model of actual flight
dynamics produced a perceptually unacceptable control task,
but the dynamics produced by simplified or adjusted models
were perceived to respond more like the aircraft (NATO
AGARD, 1980).
h': these cases, the mathematical model had to be simpli-
fied by removing terms from the equation or reducing gains
on some terms (by as much as 60%) to create handling quali-
ties which were acceptable to pilots. "Tweeking," or modify-
ing, of simulators to fly "like the real aircraft" is common,
and is suspected to be needed because all the visual and
molion cues of the real world are not fully or faithfully
rep:'esented.
X third facet is completeness: some real equipment, envi-
ronmental conditions, or agents may not be represented in a
shr_ulation because they do not affect the behavior of inter-
est. For example a study by Brown et al. (1958) used a cen-
trifuge as a motion platform for a flight simulator and
concluded that a fixed-base simulator would be as good for
prediction of the simple tracking task performance they
studied.
Fidelity in the choice of a research vehicle- It often is
a,_smned that high fidelity is never a disadvantage, but there
aye research as well as practical reasons not always to strive
for maximum fidelity. In general, high fidelity implies a con>
prehensive representation of the real world. The problem for
the researcher is that in real-world situations, many factors
acting in variable ways can influence behavior. In a great
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manyof them,thereare a number of optional ways for anindividual to behave.
Two basic principles of behavioral research are to main-
lain control of the research situation and to account for the
factors which influenced the observed behavior. High fidelity
simulation complicates the task of maintaining control. It
provides an opportunity for unknown, extraneous factors to
influence behavior, and gives subjects an opportunity to
choose behavioral alternatives that may be beyond the
research scope of interest. These effects show up as variabil-
ity in the data and reduce the sensitivity of the performance
measures as well as the reliability of their values.
From a practical viewpoint, high fidelity representations
of real-world situations incur costs that are proportional to
the comprehensiveness and complexity of the research proj-
ect. The direct costs are for support personnel required,
installation and maintenance of the equipment, and for the
computational power necessary for real-time control of the
situatio_. Indirect costs accrue from the time and effort
needed to plan and execute the study, subject recruitment
and training, the number and duration of the test trials, and
the data collection and analysis procedures.
Often high fidelity representations can be undesirable
because of the specific purpose of" the research. If the pur-
pose is to discover what people can do instead of what they
will do, the research may ,-equire the elimination of features
that can only degrade performance. For example, Fitts et al.
(1958) commented about the ATC studies they conducted at
Ohio State University: "One of the major tenets that we have
followed is that human capabilities should first be deter-
mined under optimal system conditions (e.g., with 'idealized'
displays and reliable information) and then be determined
for suboptimal or degraded systems. Only data obtained
under idealized conditions permit an estimate to be made of
the upper limits of system performance that could result
from future improvements in the machine aspect of the man-
machine system."
In other cases, it may be desirable to depart from high
fidelity by enhancing or augmenting real-world features for
specific purposes. For example, computer-generated flight
imagery may include supplementary cues such as a highway
in the sky (Lintern, 1980), to increase the precision or con-
sistency of performance leading up to an event that is the
subject of research interest.
The extent that fidelity is an issue of concern depends on
the general character of the research vehicle. Fidelity is less
of an issue for laboratory research than for simulation-based
research. Laboratory research is primarily used as a research
vehicle when there is no great concern that the behavior be
identical to what would occur in a particular operational con-
text. The purpose is frequently to test general behavioral
principles or to determine the effects of a limited number of
factors on a specific behavioral process, regardless of whether
other factors will also have an effect. The conditions created
in the laboratory can be abstract, limited or both, and the
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points of correspondence with an operational system often
are irrelevant.
Simulation usually is chosen as the research vehicle when
complexes of behavioral processes are of concern, or when
the factors influencing the behavior are not well known and
it is desired to elicit behavior equivalent to what would occur
in the operational context. Uncertainty about what factors
affect behavior is the primary reason to strive for high fidel-ity of simulation.
Early in research planning, the researcher should think
about each potential factor that affects behavior, and deter-
mine the characteristics of the simulator necessary to pro-
dt, ce the desired effects. There are several good reasons forthis exercise:
1. The exercise will make explicit what is known and
not known about factors influencing the behavior of interest.
2. The exercise will focus its attention to specific char-
aceristics of the simulation for a particular purpose, instead
of the vague notion of general fidelity. Producing a simula-
tion that is comprehensive, precise, and a concrete (i.e., not
abstract) representation of an operational situation is costly.
To ignore the details of the simulation reqt, irements is to
ignore major cost factors.
3. The exercise will establish a set of criteria for the
researcher to later assess how the final configuration of the
simulator meets the research need.
Once the project is under way, it is easy for the
researcher to rationalize why features of the simulation
thought to be important at the outset of the project (but
which could not be included) become unimportant when a
practical impediment is encountered. It is better to docu-
ment initially what the needs are thought to be, so as not to
become self-deluded later. If a characteristic thought to be
necessary cannot be attained, the researcher should think
hard about its potential consequences, and of the alternatives
ranging from restructuring the research plan to explicitly
noting the potential implications for the validity and inter-
pretation of the data.
Practical, as well as scientific, considerations will deter-
mine the characteristics of a simulator used for research.
Simulators are expensive devices; they are seldom con-
structed for a special project and disassembled when it is
done. There may be several simulators with differing features
available for use and, apart from slight modifications, the
researcher's options may be restricted to selecting a
particular device with a relatively fixed set of characteristics.
Typically, the simulators that are available determine what
can be used.
It is worth mentioning at this point that although a si,nu-
lator is a tool to support research, use of the tool rather than
the research need can easily become the motivating force.
There is a strong temptation to let the availability of a device
dictate what research is performed. If a large simulator is
available, researchers often will find a justification for its
use. This is another reason the researcher should formally
establisht echaracteristicsof thesimulatorrequiredtosup-
porttheresearchproject.It helpsto keeptiresimulatorcart
behindtheresearchhorse.
However,it oversimplifiestheissueto saythatasimula-
tionshouldhaveall,butnomorethan,thosecharacteristics
thatdirectlyaffectthebehaviorbeingexamined.Thisisan
idealgoal,butonethatrarelycanbeachieved.Forreasons
whichhavebeendiscussed,thecustomerf equentlywill
requirecharacteristicsof the simulationthat arestated
vaguelyin termsof fidelity.Althoughresearchersfrequently
will acquiesceto thisrequirement,theyshouldalwayseval-
uatetheimplicationsfor controlof thesituation,andthe
variabilityof perRmnancethatmightresultbecauseofthe
presenceofextraneousfactors.
Experiencedoperationalpersonnelusedastestsubjects
will alsohavexpectationsabouthefidelityof thesimula-
tion. Thiscanbebothgoodandbad.Experiencedoperators,
in voicingconcernsaboutthefidelityof simulation,may
identifyfactorsthataffecthebehaviorof interestinways
that the researcherhadnotconceived.Thisis obviously
good.
It isbad,however,if thesubjectsdevelopanegativeatti-
tudebecausetheirexpectationsof fidelityarenotmet.This
will inevitablyaffecttheirbehavior.Fortunately,thereare
otherwaysto dealwiththisproblemif it isimpracticalto
meethesubjects'expectationsof fidelity.Thealternatives
areto educatethesubjectsabouthereasonsforthesimula-
tioncharacteristics,motivatethemthroughinstruction,and
trainthemin thesinmlatorconfigurationused.
In short, the concept of simulation fidelity, although
intuitively compelling and in widespread use, is difficult to
quantify. It is equally difficult to determine the level of
fidelity necessary for a specific application.
Validity
Including all factors believed to influence the behavior of
interest is no guarantee that the behavior in the simulated
situation will be identical to that which would be exhibited
in the real world. It always is desirable to empirically deter-
mine that equivalent behavior does occur in the real world
and in simulated contexts. This involves the validity of the
simulation. It should be established whenever possible.
Definition ofvalMiO'- Validity is defined as the statistical
correlation between two sets of measures collected under dif-
fering circumstances. Depending on when and where the two
sets are collected, differing types of validity can be defined
(McCoy, 1963). The principal concern is predictive validity,
the degree to which measurements made in simulation corre-
late with the same measurements made in the real world. If
the two sets of measures agree, the simulation is considered
valid for the conditions under which the measures were
made.
Establishing tire validity of a simulator is recognized as an
essential requirement. Recently, a committee of the National
ReseaJch Council was asked to assess means for improving
the value of the Computer Aided Operations Research Facil-
ity (CAORF) as a research tool. CAORF is essentially a ship
bridge simulator used for maritime research (National
Research Council, 1983). The committee concluded, "The
single greatest deficiency of CAORF is the lack of validation
for its uses. Specifically, CAORF's mathematical ship models
and data on training and other human performance charac-
teristics need to be compared to actual ship behavior and
human performance in the real world (underlined in the
original). Validated models and studies would be CAORF's
single contribution to maritime research and development,
and n zed to be given top priority."
Verification of validiO,- The concept of validity is well
defined, and verification is considered essential for simulators
used for research intended to elicit real-world behavior.
However, the testing which is implied rarely can be done
easily, and often cannot be done.
Frequently, research is done in the simulator because it
would be too dangerous or too expensive to do in the real
world, or because the real system does not exist. Under these
circu nstances, validity testing is either extremely difficult or
impossible. Practical constraints also minimize opportunities
to p,.'rfimn validation studies. Applied behavioral research
that is part of a system development program usually has a
restrictive schedule and budget. There is rarely time or
money to collect data "twice" to test validity. Consequently,
few t'ormal behavioral tests of simulator validity have been
perf_,rmed.
h the absence of direct measurement of behavior in real
and _imulated situations to verify the validity of a simulator,
effc,_ts often are made to establish validity indirectly by veri-
fyin!_ the physical fidelity of the simulator. The rationale is
that if the simulator is a comprehensive, concrete, precise,
and accurate representation of an operational system, then
the behavior produced should be equivalent to the behavior
pro( uced in the real world.
Fhis point was made by the National Research Council,
Working Group on Simulation (Jones et al., 1985): "...pilots
nou may be certified in a simulator that meets rigorous
fideiity standards established by the Federal Aviation Admin-
istr__,tion. Such a simulator must faithfully duplicate physical
and functional characteristics of an aircraft as welt as the
conJitions of flight. Similarly, in engineering design, where
critical and expensive design decisions may be based on per-
formance in a simulator, high fidelity is the best insurance
fol obtaining valid performance data. For these applications,
some lesser degree of fidelity may also produce valid perfor-
mance data but it is usually not worth the cost or the risk to
make the determinations experimentally."
Matheney (1978), in a discussion of the need for behav-
ioral fidelity of simulators used for research purposes, intro-
duced the concept of performance equivalence. Research of
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thehtnnanpilotin vehiclecontrolhasadvancedtothepoint
wheregoodmodelscanbedeterminedfor the pilot control
function (a process called system identifcation), allowing
mathematical analysis and prediction for the overall control
system. He concludes that we may be able to establish the
behavioral fidelity of a simulator for tile control aspects of a
task through application of system identification procedures.
Caro (1977) proposed that flight simulator fidelity be
assessed using a backward transfer paradigm in which experi-
enced pilots are tested on their ability' to fly the simulator.
Significant deficiencies in performance would then be taken
as indicators of simulator fidelity deficiencies. He states,
"While backward transfer should not be the sole justification
tk_r sinmlator procurement, one would be hesitant to use a
simulator which could not be operated by competent pilots."
Applied behavioral research is intended to gain new
knowledge about human performance to answer a practical
problem qt,estion. The "bottom line" is that without specific
validation studies, or without specific theoretical knowledge
about what factors influence the behavior of interest and
how, the researcher is forced toward high fidelity of simula-
tion to ensure that valid data will result, and to achieve
acceptance by users of the data outside of the research
conlnlUnity.
There is a lesson for research to be gained from experience
with training simulators. It is evident, when considering
transfer of training and training effectiveness, that much
depends on how tire training device is used. Although the
characteristics of tile training device (i.e., fidelity) can enable
good training, it is tip to the instructor and automated train-
ing features to produce a high transfer of training. Similarly,
high fidelity may be an enabling factor for a research simu-
lator, but the manner of use is a prime determinant of the
validity' of the data. More is involved than the physical and
functional characteristics of the simulator.
This is especially true /{'or full-mission aviation research
which requires simulation of many real-world features in
addition to those of the vehicle cockpit, visual system,
motion platform, and equations of motion. Considerations
of the fidelity of simulation must include the total environ-
ment, e.g., ATC, ground facilities, cabin crew, weather, and
other aircraft.
Moreover, consideration must be given to establishing the
framework of regulations, procedures, and preplanning which
can have a significant effect on human performance. If
behavior that skilled people exhibit in the real world is to be
elicited, then tile conditions that would exist in the real
world rnust be established, including familiar missions and
procedures. If the research is concerned with crew coordina-
tion and decision making, it must be recognized that tile
extended team includes ground team members in addition to
those in the cockpit, along with all of the briefing and plan-
ning preflight activities.
CONCLUSION
All of the factors discussed in this appendix are part of
the process of determining how a study is to be conducted
and how the research vehicle is to be used. If the study is to
be done in a real-world context, these factors should be
addressed in the processes of study planning and experimen-
tal and scenario design. The experimental design, procedures,
and scenario emerge from an iterative consideration of scien-
tific and practical goals of the research, the available
resources, and the constraints which are imposed. In this dis-
cussion, considerable attention was given to the issues of
simulator fidelity and use of the term "validity" because an
understanding of these concepts is central to the planning
and execution of applied behavioral research studies.
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Tom Hammell (TH) is the vice-president for research and
development of the Eclectech Division of Ship Analytics.
ttis research using bridge simulators, including the Computer
Aided Operations Research Facility (CAORF), primarily has
been concerned with the fidelity and curriculum require-
ments necessary to use these devices for the training and
licensing of mariners. Myriam Smith (MS) is a research
psychologist in the same division who has been using their
in-house bridge simulator for studies sponsored by the Coast
Guard to evaluate a variety of aids to navigation. The follow-
ing are their comments on the process of scenario construc-
tion, fidelity requirements, and related topics.
sCENARIO CONSTRUCTION
TIt began by discussing tile process of scenario construc-
tion and several factors which influence the character of sce-
narios for simulator-based experimentation, ldeally, con-
structing scenarios should be a formal deterministic process.
However. at some stage, there will be unknowns. By adopting
a set procedure, at least the points at which unknowns occur
will be identifiable, lte agreed that tile principal factors that
influence the scenario design include:
1. The program objective (the research question).
2. The simulator characteristics and availability.
3. The participants' characteristics and availability.
4. The characteristics of the real-world context.
5. The performance measurement methods.
6. Ensurance of performance differences among
conditions.
7. User acceptance (making the scenario credible}.
8. Known or previously determined variables that
affect behavior.
A great deal of time is necessary to develop the scenario.
First, the experimenter develops a skeleton scenario which
takes into account nlost of the factors listed above. Next,
the scripting of the scenario requires working with an SME to
ensure that the conditions are credible to the participants
and to achieve the al_pr oximate level of difficulty desired. A
run-through of the scenario(s) is essential. No matter how
well the script is planned, unanticipated effects will become
apparent such as conflicts between scheduled events, inap-
propriate tinting of events, errors in the programming and
unexpectt'd or undesirable actions by the participants.
He stud that the experimental objectives and performance
lneasuren_ent considerations, i.e., what can we measure, are
probably tile two most obvious and most important factors.
The mmTber of independent variables that can be tested or
must be tested also affect the character of the scenario. In
most ext eri nents it would be desirable to test more variables
than it i; possible to access given the practical constraints of
time, money and subject availability. An attempt is made to
determine if the scenario can be arranged to squeeze in one
or mole extra variables without incurring more work, i.e.,
requiring the development of additional performance mea-
sures, _,r excessively lengthening or otheTwise complicating
the conduct of the experimental runs. The number of depen-
dent v_riables that can be measured also influences tile
scenari,) design.
Oth_'r factors that influence tile nature of the scenario are
the creative-cognitive processes (CCP) of the experimenter
which come into play after the formal, analytical part of the
scenar:o development is completed. The formal analysis pro-
vides you with the basic elements that go into the experi-
ment, including the experimental goals and the knowledge of
tile naritime environnlent you have or have gained from
exper enced mariners. Tile CCP comes in bringing the two
together, choosing the particular embodiments and arranging
their "&he, spatial, and contingent relationships.
Rtgardless of the number of factors involved, the scenario
devel,_pment process is iterative, not serial, in nature. MS said
that the process can be diagrammed as a converging spiral
path on polar-coordinate graph paper where the spokes on
the _:iraph are the various factors and the center of the graph
is fine goal of complete scenario specification. Thus, in the
scenario-design process, you iteratively consider the factors
inv,qved and the trade-offs among them but at the same
time you are converging toward the design goal, i.e., develop-
ing greater specificity as you go along. MS found this apt
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analogy in a book on ship desiin (Taggart bert, ed., Ship
Design and Construction, New York, SNAME, 1980).
MS said she had not really thought of creating scenarios as
anything other than determining a matrix of variable and
constant conditions for an experiment. If this is done in suf-
ficient detail tile choices that are left are inconsequential to
the purpose of tile study. Normally when a full-mission
experiment is planned properly, the SMEs who are asked to
review the planned scenario will usually suggest changes that
do not affect the experimental purpose, or significantly
affect planned circumstances and events. However, it does
sometimes occur that an SME will make an important sugges-
tion that does influence some major aspect of the experiment
and does require a significant change in tile plan. TH agreed,
saying that it is relatively easy to come up with several
detailed scenarios that fit the experimental design.
REALISM OF SIMULATION AND SCENARIOS
How artificial or realistic you make a scenario depends on
several factors: the attitudes of the participants, the need for
control, /low performance will be measured and the purpose
of the study. Rea//sm in maritime simulation is a real con-
cern. Mariners used for experiments tend to be very opera-
tionaJly oriented; they do not have much tolerance for situa-
tions that are not realistic. On the other hand the experi-
menter would generally prefer to create an artificial situa-
tion, albeit with complexity similar to a real harbor or
coastal area because it affords greater opportunity for con-
trol of the experimental situation and creating just the right
conditions, a combination of currents, geography, ship
traffic, weather and events to elicit the behaviors of interest
to answer the experimental questions. However, it is difficult
to convince the mariners that it is the same as duplicating an
actual harbor or coastal area. The attitudes of the mariners
are very different when a real location is simulated. They
take the exercise much more seriously. This helps with their
acceptance of the simu/ation but brings on the problem of
the mariners pointing out every discrepancy between the
simulation and the real-world setting. As MS said, "they tell
you what's wrong with all the little irrelevant details."
Another reason for using realistic simulation and scenarios
is that the customer who sponsors the work, e.g., the Coast
Guard, usually expects a great deal of face validity. In one
case, a study of the rules of the road, the face validity
requirement would have meant a 4-hr scenario. Moreover, the
mariners and the Coast Guard, for the studies it sponsors,
want geographical realism, i.e., using an actual setting rather
than an artificially constructed one. (The counterparts in the
aviation community, e.g., the airlines, the FAA, and the air-
frame manufacturers, to say nothing of the engineering side
of NASA, ahnost a/ways have had the same attitude, and it
is a real-world concern that should not be ignored.)
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SUBJECTS
Experienced mariners do not like to be tested. They have
no performance-based test initially and no recertification
requirement. So it is hard to get them to participate in an
experiment that is essentially a test. The strategy used by TH
is to present the experiment as a training scenario and ask
the mariner to run through it so they can discuss its training
merits when it is over.
PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT
In regard to performance measurement, TH said that you
prefer to rely on automatically recorded data, but these
measures tend to be very microscopic relative to the kinds of
questions you are trying to answer, i.e., quality of decisions
and ship handling. Invariably, you must include observational
data by SMEs. TH felt it was important to obtain analysts'
(psychologists') observations as well because they can look at
performance in a more generalized way. They can view par-
ticular actions as examples of classes of behaviors, e.g.,
classes of errors such as commissions or omissions.
MS pointed out that if the nonobservational data support
your hypothesis or are consistent and unequivocal, you have
no incentive to closely examine or analyze the observational
data. However, the nonobservational data are rarely so reveal-
ing or clean in MOS experiments that you do not need to
resort to the observational data. Also regardless of the type
of data, you always collect as much as you can because you
never know for certain what to expect. Consequently, you
record all the data that are feasible to collect. This does not
refer just to automatically recorded data. Video taping is
ahnost essential for any complex simulation experiment. If
nothing else, you often need it to make sense of data from
other sources when something unanticipated or unusualhappens.
REDUCED SIMULATION VS. FMS
Using a reduced simulation situation is useful because it
economically focuses on the particular behavior of concern.
Reduced fidelity or limited simulation is good for examining
in detail a phenomenon that occurred in an FMS exercise.
However, it often requires greater effort on the part of the
experimenter to do all that is possible to ensure the perfor-
mance of the participants will be valid. When limited simula.
lion is used to explore preliminary concepts, it can also be
very economical, particularly if many iterations are expected
to be necessary, to evaluate several alternatives or sharpen a
particular concept. In most cases where practical decisions
mustbemade,tileresultsobtainedinlimitedsimulationwill
requirevalidationi ahighfidelityFMS.
USING SMEs
One problem with using SMEs is the uncertainty of the
attitudes they are likely to adopt. That is, some mariners are
very concrete in their thinking and are greatly influenced by
ally details of the simulation that are different from the real
counterpart. Others are more adaptable and are able to look
at a situation from the experimenter's viewpoint. There are
pros and cons to both of these attitude styles.
The rigid, concrete-thinking mariner will give you unlim-
ited advice on tile realism of the simulation, the scenario and
the quality of the actions of the bridge crew performing the
exercise. Sometimes this can go too far, however, when the
details being criticized are irrelevant to the experiment. For
exa nple, a mariner may say a houselight on tile shore sur-
rounding a harbor is missing or doesn't exist in the real situa-
tion. Depending on the importance of that light, the SME's
opinion is either helpful or annoying. Another example,
which actually happened, involved asking a number of
experienced mariners to evaluate the potential training value
of a particular bridge simulator. On the day the simulator
was demonstrated a number of minor problems occurred.
The simulator froze a couple of times, and a bridge instru-
ment did not work. The mariners were asked to ignore these
problems and assume that for future training purposes every-
thing would work properly. Some individuals were unable to
do this and their evaluations were greatly affected by the
problenrs they experienced in the demonstration.
Subject matter experts who are able to understand the
simulation from the experimenter's viewpoint are helpful
initially. However, they also adopt the biases of the experi-
menter and become advocates rather than objective evalua-
tors, of a simulator, scenario or training practice. In effect,
they become "used up."
TECHNIQUES FOR CONTROLLING FMSs
in complex FMSs, it is very difficult to control tire uni-
formity of a scenario when the participants' actions influence
the course of events, which is most connnonly the case, How-
ever, it is possible, within limits, to control the evolution of
the scenario in various ways. Obviously, initial conditions can
be the sanre. Other means of control are the assigned mission
and contingency orders, and/or actions of other agents
invoked to force the participant(s) to perform a desired
action or choose a particular course. There is a trade-off
between maintaining the reality of the scenario and having
events occur which channel the behavior of the participant.
Two tactics for controlling the scenario used by Ttt in
maritime s_mulation are worth describing because of their
implications for aviation simulation. Tile first is creating a
subtle infl,_ence, essentially a conceptual barrier, that the
participant will avoid. Ttt wanted tile bridge crews to navi-
gate through a cluster of other ships. To do this at some
point the mariner had to choose to maneuver to the left. At
the decisim_ point the choice to go left or right was fairly
arbitrary, although there were more reasons to go left rather
than right. The mariner was not yet aware of the cluster of
ships. Because the choice was not arbitrary some mariners
would ch)ose to go right and thereby unknowingly circum-
vent tile eventual encounter with the cluster of ships later on.
In the original scenario there was open water to the right.
To induce a left turn without being obvious, a sea wall or
reef or Tie like was placed several miles away to tile right.
Because ,)f the ship's location the scenario did not physically
constrai_ the participant from maneuvering to the right,
there was plenty of clearance nor did the influence compli-
cate the mariner's current situation. However, by moving in
that direction, the mariner would eventually have to keep the
barrier i_ mind during future maneuvering. So to avoid ever
having to deal with the barrier, the mariners would consis-
tently g_ to the left and eventually encounter the cluster of
ships as desired by the experimenter.
Thus, the subtle influence of a potential problem or addi-
tion of another factor to contend with shaped the behavior
of the mariner while still preserving the participant's freedom
of choice. The important point is that the influence was of
no immediate consequence nor would the influence be a sig-
nifican, factor even if the choice had been to go in the
nonde.qred direction.
The second means TH employed to control the navigation
of tile ship was the more conventional artifice of creating
conflkting traffic. However tile particular technique for
implmaenting it is worth noting. The conflicting traffic was a
fast moving ship that would force a predictable, desired
chang," of course. Normally in simulation, forcing events, i.e.,
actiors by external agents or changes in tile environment,
must be preprogrammed to trigger under particular circum-
stances or at a specific time. In the case of the fast moving
ship, it was programmed to maintain a constant relative bear-
ing aad heading to the maneuvering vessel and was located
just out of radar range. That is, the ship was always lurking
in the wings, waiting only for a cue from the experimenter to
ente, into the immediate gaming area. If it was not needed it
was never called into play. However, if the experimenter saw
thai the mariner was not choosing the desired course, tile fast
moving ship could be brought on stage. Note that the experi-
menter did not have to enter course, range, and bearing infor-
mat-on, which could be somewhat awkward during an experi-
mert, but simply had to evoke a preplanned event that was
dynamically tracking the vessel of interest.
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COMPARABILITY OF STUDIES
MS mentioned that the scenarios she uses for the evalua.
tion of navigational aids remain essentially, the same for the
important reason that it is necessary to be able to relate the
results of" past evaluations to current and future tests. That is,
the need for compatibility forces the use of the same sce-
nario repetitively. The lesson here perhaps is that a choice of
scenarios that may be used more than once should be done
with great care or else at some future time a change in the
fundamental character of the scenarios may imply losing
comparability with a large body of accumulated data, or
reluctantly accepting what is known to be a deficient set of
scenarios for the sake of maintaining comparabihty.
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APPENDIX E
FIELD INTERVIEW
NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SIMULATION-BASED RESEARCH
David Woods
Senior Psychologist
Westinghouse R and D (?enter
Pittsburgh, PA
David Woods has conducted two studies on the design and
utility of safety parameter display systems (SPDS) for
nuclear power plant (NPP) operators. Tile purpose of his
research, sponsored by the Electric Power Research Institute
(EPRI), has been to evaluate SPDS design characteristics.
His approach to this problem was first to determine how NPP
operators would use an SPDS, e.g., as a diagnostic aid, as a
planning aid, or as a control aid. That is, for what tasks and
circumstances would an SPDS be an improvement over the
conventional control room instrumentation?
For his research he used an NPP training simulator with
the trainees, who were experienced operators, as subjects.
The NPP simulator used is heavily scheduled six days a week.
The experimental work was piggy-backed on the training
exercises. This can be a very cost-effective means for MOR, if
the experimental goals can be adapted to the on-going
training situation. In the present case this was accomplished
by using test events devised by Dave Woods instead of some
of the training events. The trainees had no way of knowing
the difference except for the fact that several additional
observers appeared at odd times and for about half of tile
events the SPDS was turned on - a giveaway that an experi-
mental trial was being conducted. The instructors were
cooperative in allowing the experimental events to be used
because they were very similar to the training events (thus
fulfilling both the training and the research objectives) and
because there was no grading of the trainees involved.
Nuclear power plant operators are required to undergo a
week of training every year. The training consists of a mix of
classroom work and simulator practicums. These are essen-
tially problmns involving a variety of emergency and out-of-
tolerance conditions. The trainees are not required to pass a
test or meet some performance standard. The requirement
is simply to undergo the training. At the end of the simulator
exercises, the instructor does debrief the trainees on their
performance.
One of the principal problems in evaluating the utility of
SPDS to NPP operators is gaining access to their perfor-
mance. Their tasks are primarily monitoring and decision
making. The overt behaviors associated with these tasks are
frequently few and furtive. Information for commonly
occurring or familiar simulations can be assimilated rapidly
and a decision about what to do, if anything, arrived at
quickly.
Dave Woods used a clever method to reveal more about
the information seeking and decision processes and also to
improve the tractability of measuring performance. Several
of the experimental events were designed to be slowly emerg-
ing situations. That is, even after the operator detected
abnormal readings on some indicator, it took quite a while to
get other information and formulate a tentative hypothesis
of what was causing the problem and what to do about it.
Even after some actions are taken, significant time is required
to gain feedback information to confirm that the problem
has been properly identified and the correct actions
per fen led.
In addition to using slowly evolving events to reveal more
about the behavior of interest, Dave Woods constructed
events that superficially appeared to be a common failure to
mask an unusual failure. This was most easily achieved by
devising nmltiple-failure events. For example, a scenario
event would include the failure of an instrument that, if
operating, would signify that the event was an unusual and
serious problem. The failed "leading indicator," however, led
the o:gerators to believe a minor, common problem was
occurring, thus complicating and stretching out the process
of identifying the problem. What would otherwise be a 2- or
3.min exercise would now run from 10-20 rain or more.
Choosing scenario events of this sort is a device for expand-
ing the information seeking and decision time so that many
more behavioral activities can be observed in detail. It is
clearly a technique applicable to aircraft simulation research.
Subject matter experts (experienced NPP operators)were
used to develop the experimental event scenarios, as well as
to collect observational data during the tests and to interpret
and evaluate the performance data. It usually took several
iterations of refinement to get a satisfactory event scenario.
For Lhe two studies performed by Dave Woods. 12-event
scenarios initially were developed. After preliminary testing
by several groups of operators, he settled on seven events for
the formal experimentation.
The primary data for the experiment were descriptions of
the actions of the operators by other experienced operators.
Dave Woods said it would be very difficult to obtain useful
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automatically recorded data on the type of behavior involved
in process control. In effect, the performance measurement
system would have to be almost as smart as a human expert.
In this case it was a lot cheaper to use a human expert. The
automatically recorded data that were collected were in the
form of a time record of the state of the NPP. The experi-
mental events were also video taped for use during the per-
formance assessment stage. Dave Woods refers to observa-
tional data collection as the ethnological approach to perfor-
mance measurement, known as "watching the wolves mate."
During the first experiment there was no information on
how the operators would react to the test events. After some
experience of observing the responses of the operator, it was
possible to develop a rating sheet for the SME observers to
use in the second study. The rating form allowed for the fact
that not all teams of operators would follow the same steps
in dealing with the event. It included the full range of poten-
tial operator behavior. The observational and recorded data
were collected and then assessed by other individuals. Dave
Woods believes it is important to separate the collection of
observational data from its assessment to minimize the loss
of information from interpretive filtering at the collection
phase.
EPRI originally suggested that observing the performance
of operators in a high-fidelity simulation with the SPDS
available, or not available, along with a few simple measures,
would be sufficient to evaluate the SPDS. This, of course, is
the common attitude of sponsors who assume that studies
involving substantial behavioral components can be per-
formed in a manner analogous to a shake-down test of equip-
ment functions. A by-product of this expectation on the
sponsor's part was that Dave Woods had considerable latitude
in the approach taken in the first study. In effect, it was an
exploratory investigation that served several purposes. Candi-
date experimental events could be tried out. The range of
responses by the operators to the event scenarios was discov-
ered as well as their apparent difficulty. Also, interesting
leads could be picked out for more focused and more effi-
cient investigation in the subsequent study. The first study
also served to educate the researcher about how to conduct
experiments in the NPP training simulator context. One of
the most valuable lessons was on measuring performance.
The first experiment was fairly vague in purpose and
simple in form. Dave Woods talked to several experienced
operators to gain some ideas about how the SPDS might be
useful. The events chosen for the experiment were typical of
events used in other studies and thus could serve as a refer-
ence point to tie the results to other work. The operators
were trained for only about 2 hr on the use of the SPDS
prior to the study, so if anything the results would be biased
for the conventional instrumentation conditions.
The conflict between the desires for face validity and
experimental control in NPP simulator experiments is no dif-
ferent from any other simulator-based research. Dave Woods
believes that any compromise should be in the direction of
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gaining better control. He is willing to sacrifice some realism
if the result is to drive or nudge the operators to the situation
where the performance of interest occurs.
If the purpose of the experimentation is to derive infor-
mation that is generalizable to other situations, there must be
some concept that a condition in the simulated context was
chosen to represent. A restricted or reduced simulation, per-
haps with less physical fidelity, may have greater concept
validity than an FMS. The reason for this. of course, is that a
reduced simulation is designed to include only those charac-
teristics that are essential to the concept. That is. the level of
abstraction of the simulation approximates that of the
concept.
Concept validity is very important in behavioral research:
therefore less than FMS would be desirable for behavioral
research in cases where the concept validity is improved by
reducing the simulation scope. Although high fidelity FMS
may have low concept validity, concepts must be finally
tested in this context to prove they are robust and valid
under near real-world circumstances. Most sponsors will
expect research with some practical implications or impor-
tance to use FMS.
It is often very hard to convince sponsors or research
result users that FMS is not necessarily the best way to do
the research. Unfortunately, they are unlikely to get face-
validity and convincing data out of a reduced research con-
text. Dave Woods also stressed that it is important to be cer-
tain that the sponsor or user community has an answerable
question. Frequently, they think an issue is clear-cut (e.g., is
an SPDS useful); but, from an experimental point of view, it
is only a vague notion. It is usually necessary to refine the
question to some tractable form.
Realism in NPP simulators in terms of user acceptance is
not as serious a concern as in many other forms of simula-
tion. The training simulator used by Dave Woods is a high-
fidelity physical and functional representation of an NPP
control room. Any issue of fidelity or realism would occur
only if the simulator did not respond as a real NPP does or if
the scenario events did not have a plausible basis in reality.
As Dave Woods pointed out, most experienced operators
have never been involved in a real abnormal event and,
because of the large number of possible failures, the opera-
tors have no idea before or during the course of an event
whether or not it is realistic. After the exercise is over and
the precipitating cause of the event is explained_ then and
only then are the operators able to comment on the realism
of the event and its chain of effects. This is obviously of
great benefit to the experimenter. The researcher has wide
latitude for composing event scenarios to serve the experi-
mental purpose. Incidentally, the operators become very
involved in the scenarios and at the end are very interested to
find out what the "cause" of a simulated event was. Dave
Woods pointed out an outstanding issue about use of reduced
fidelity simulation for NPP research', no one knows what the
attitudeof experiencedNPPoperatorswouldbetoreduce
fidelitysimulationbecauseit hasnotbeentried.
Similarly,theinabilityto assesswhatisrealcouldbethe
caseforpilotsof futurecommercialaircraft.Newgeneration
aircraftandNPParebothexamplesof supervisorycontrol
systemsin whichongoingprocessesareautomaticallycon-
trolled.Theoperatoronlymonitorstheprocessandusually
onlyintervenesunderabnormalcircumstances.Like the NPP
operators, there is no way that a pilot can know all of the
possible ways the automated systems in future aircraft might
fail, or know all of the possible indications and consequences
of its failures.
There was one realism problem in the experimental event
scenarios used on the training simulator. All desired effects
such as failures have to be scheduled by time, and not by
contingency on some specified set of conditions. One event
involved the failure of a valve. In the real world it is plausible
for a valve to fail under pressure or when it is being opened
or closed: it is not realistic for it to fail while in some benign,
quiescent state. Yet, in the simulation, because the valve
failure had to be scheduled by time, it would appear to the
operators that the failure was capricious if there were no cir-
cumstances at the time of failure which would plausibly be
associated with the failure. This obviously detracts from the
realism of the simulation.
Valve failure on time alone also had a detrimental conse-
quence lor the experimental control. Because the valve fail-
ure occurred on a time basis and was unrelated to whatever
the plant or the operators were doing, it would happen at a
different point in the chain of actions for each group of
operator_. Thus the conditions were not exactly comparable
from one group to the next. It is a relatively small point, but
any reselrch simulator should have the capability to permit
scheduhng of experimental events contingent on circum-
stances and subject actions rather than time alone.
Dave Woods believes that there are some marked differ-
ences in the behavior of NPP operators in simulators and real
plants. In simulators, operators are much more action
oriented: that is, they are more willing to take some positive
step in an abnormal situation in the simulator than in the
real world. He attributes this difference to the fact that in
the real world operators are very concerned about repercus-
sions from any actions they may take. The same sort of stress
does no:: arise in training simulator exercises, ttowever, he
did say that there appear to be no obvious differences
between actions taken in the two settings.
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APPENDIX F
FIELD INTERVIEW
THE BOEING COMPANY
Thomas C. Way'
Avionics, Crew Systems Departnlent
The Boeing Co.
Seattle, Washington
Dr. Richard E. Edwards
Managing Consultant, Human Performance Analysis
The Consulting Division, Boeing Computer Services Co.
Renton, Washingtov
Thomas C. Way and Richard E. Edwards have been
involved in the development of sinrulator scenarios for eval-
uation of cockpit equipment. Tom Way did the simulator
evaluations of the Boeing-proposed version of the C-14
intended to replace the C-130. The principal issue in the eval-
uation was workload since the C-14 concept featured a two-
person cockpit crew instead of four persons as in the C-130
(pilot, copilot, flight engineer and navigator). Tom noted
that the C-14 concept development was the first major pro-
grant that included human factors members as part of the
design team rather than as part of logistics support.
Richard Edwards until recently worked in the crew sys-
tems divisions and has conducted a number of simulator-
based developmental and FAA certification evaluations for
military and commercial aircraft and systems, including the
B-757/767.
Boeing has three types of aircraft simulator facilities,
1) flight crew training: 2) developnrental, which range in
quality front rudimentary to near flight-training fidelity; and
3) engineering, which are readily reconfigurable but have
reliability problems.
Analysis, simulator-based performance tests, and ques-
tionnaires given to experienced pilots are the three main
ways of evaluating new equipment or systems. These
methods are applied extensively for workload determina-
tions. It is one of the principal concerns in commercial and
military aircraft development.
The C-14 workload evaluation started with an analysis of
imposed workload (task load) for various situations. The
focus was on the crew's ability to perform navigational tasks
as well as piloting tasks. Eliminating the flight engineer was
never considered to be a problem. The flight sinrulation
scenarios were 35-45 rain segments, and the locale repre-
sented was in the vicinity of the Rein-Main AFB, Germany.
Ten C-130 crews were used for the evaluation; each crew was
available for only 2 days. The first day was devoted to train-
ing, primarily on the use of a control and display unit (CDU)
for navigation, since its use would be a critical factor in the
simulation evaluations. The second day was devoted to
testing.
The simulator was a fixed-base cockpit with a mono-
chrome projection visual display on a 16-ft screen, 12 ft from
the cockpit. Tlre visual system was used only for takeoff and
landing. On takeoff the aircraft would enter weather, and the
remainder of the fli_]t would be on instruments. A fixed-
base simulator was considered to be appropriate because the
flight-control stabilization system made aircraft control rela-
tively easy. In military cargo aircraft such as tlre C-130, a
nomrally difficult flight task is low-level cargo extraction
becatL'e there are sudden significant changes in the center of
gravity as the cargo is discharged. The proposed stabilization
system would automatically compensate for these types of
chang:s, so the extraction task was not included in the sce-
nario. Aircraft handling was not considered to be an issue.
Also, a Boeing test pilot working on the C-14 project said a
fixed-base cockpit would do just fine since the motion base
gives the wrong cues anyway.
A very good model of the aircraft dynamics was included
in the simulation. Most of the cockpit instrunrents, which
were of conventional electromechanical design {other than
the navigational CDU), were functional.
The scenarios centered on creating navigation problems.
The crews were required to accept in-flight diversions and do
such tasks as estimate fuel states and insert way-points using
the _]avigation CDU. The object of the study was not to com-
pare alternatives but to confirm that the crew size and
cockpit-design concepts were practical.
"Ihe operational question was whether the crews could
perlorm the tasks without feeling excessively burdened. A
modified Cooper-Harper rating was used to assess workload.
The test scenario would be frozen at a natural task break-
point and the crew asked to rate the segment just conrpleted.
A qatural breakpoint was considered to occur when the
diversion or sinrilar problem requirements had been com-
pleted and the aircraft was beginning a cruise segment. 11was
cm_sidered more desirable to disrupt the continuity of the
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scenario to get immediate ratings than to rely on memory
after tile scenario was completed.
Tom commented that the evaluation tests were planned
and executed very quickly after the preliminary design con-
cepts were formulated. The object was to have results in
sufficient time to influence the final design proposal. He said,
also. that a considerable amount of part-task simulation
work was performed in the development of the navigation
CDU. Therefore the mission simulations were not to evaluate
the navigation instrument per se, but to evaluate its effect on
the overa]t mission workload.
At this point, Tom Way was called out of the office to be
told he had to travel to Wichita, Kansas the next morning.
Since he had several matters to attend to, the interview was
cut short before he had an opportunity to make some general
observations on the construction of simulation scenarios.
Richard Edwards, having heard Tom describe the C-14 eval-
uation, did not describe in detail any of the particular simu-
lation efforts he had directed but offered several observations
on the use of MOS at Boeing for human factors develop-
ments and evaluations. His comments are as follows.
APPROPRIATE LEVELS OF SIMULATION FOR
RESEARCH AND EVALUATION
However, sometimes a simulation requirement can
become so complex that it is better for overall efficiency to
subdivide the effort. For example, in the DAIS project, there
were five separate laboratories working on separate parts of
the instrumentation problem. Each had a model or computer
simulation for their particular function which was fed to a
single simulator cockpit. Problems with the individual com-
ponents resulted in an overall Mean Time Between Failure
(MTBF) of less than 1 hr. They eventually gave up the pur-
suit of an early, integrated evaluation of the new displays
and functions.
Part-task simulation is appropriate for research or evalua-
tions when there is no reason to suspect behavior will be
influenced by secondary contextual circumstances. Gener-
ally, studies intended to determine what the best perfor-
mance can be in specific conditions, or to discover whether
or not inherent functional problems occur, are the proper
domain for part-task simulation. In addition, if research is
focused on a particular problem, do not add extraneous
things.
The appropriate level of simulation realism and compre-
hensiveness for a particular problem is usually obvious. There
are few instances of gray areas where the characteristics
necessary for the investigation are uncertain.
When a new full-mission simulator is installed, there is
initially, low demand for its use: consequently, everything is
done in the simulator even though a part-task or laboratory
study may /lave been more appropriate. Later when the
simulator is in heavy, demand, tile issue of what studies
should be done in the simulator becomes one of more
concern.
There are four principal reasons for doing FMS:
1. To resolve a collection of related problems. If there is
a series of part-task evaluations called for that are related,
for example, evaluations of several different instruments and
controls for the same aircraft, it can be more economical to
gang them together in a comprehensive study.
2. When the focus of interest is on long duration or infre-
quent effects and events. Behavior under fatigue and
responses to rare emergencies as a function of time-on-duty
are obvious examples.
3. Subtle interactions may influence the behavior of
interest. Results of crew coordination studies are likely to be
adversely affected if the simulation is not physically compre-
hensive and realistic or if the scenario is too short.
4. To evaluate performance of people and/or equipment
that occurs during a series of transitions from one flight
phase or mode of operation to another. For example, MOS
would be appropriate to evaluate performance when display
formats change during the phases of a descent to landing.
SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT
Stock scenarios tailored to the particular study are often
used at Boeing. The experiment or evaluation is first designed
at the conceptual level and then SMEs are used to help
develop specific scenarios that embody the concept and also
appear realistic to the experienced participants. Subject
matter experts are very valuable sources of detail for sce-
narios. For example, in one study an approach was to be
flown to an airport using a particular runway for day and
night landings. The expert pilot consulted about the scenario
pointed out that the selected runway was not used at night
because the winds always change from day to night,
The procedure for scenario development should start with
a time.line description of the tasks to be performed by phase
of mission, and the hardware, software, or system events that
will be the conditions of interest or of the experimental
variables. The scenario should avoid any cascading effects.
That is, a test event should not occur too soon after a pre.
vious one to avoid interaction effects unless they are desired.
Pilots or other crew members will worry about the last event
for periods of time, particularly if it resulted in an unresolved
problem. If tttis is likely, there should be a period of stable
operation or settling down before the next event is encoun-
tered. SubJect matter experts, experienced pilots, can be
helpful in determining the appropriate sequence and timing
of the critical events.
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CONTROL OF SCENARIO
Scenarios can be designed so that the subject's behavior
is eithcr tightly controlled or allowed considerable latitude
depending on the purpose of the study. In most evaluations
adherence to a desired sequence of performance is sought
because the intent of the evaluation is well defined. More
open.ended scenarios are useful for exploring for problems or
seeking the range of possible alternative actions. The latter
is less likely to occur in systems development in industry. It
is more likely to be a goal in government or other research
facilities.
In industry applications of simulator-based evaluations, it
is generally desirable to gain as much control of the study as
possible because of the few subjects that are likely to be
available. Most studies involve 10 or fewer test subjects or
crews. Therefore, every effort is made to preclude deviations
from the desired course of events and reduce the perfor-
mance variability among the subjects or crews so that differ-
enccs in the conditions of interest can be detected. Compli-
ance to the desired scenario profile is attained by briefing the
pilots or other test subjects on what is expected, and sub-
ject variability is reduced through pretraining in some
circumstances.
Pretraining should not involve the experimental task
directly but should develop the basic skills required and
familiarity with the equipment operation. Training should
proceed to solne predeternained criteria to minimize perfor-
mance differences in the experimental task. Pretraining is
not always possible when complex behaviors are involved but
it is feasible for procedural and skill-type tasks. Foe example,
a study was conducted to evaluate several alternatives for
locating certain buttons and switches on the hand controls
for an aerial refueling boom. The same subjects were used to
test the various configurations. The simulator test involved
nraking contact with a receiver aircraft that was prepro-
grammed in flight profile. To minimize inherent skill differ-
ences and dissipate proactive interference effects among the
configurations, the subjects would practice before each trial
with another set of controls. The practice task was touching
the boom tip to designated squares of a checkerboard. The
practice would continue until the subject could perform this
task to specified criteria of time and accuracy. Only then
would they enter the simulator to perform the experimental
task.
DATA COLLECTION
Automate data collection and analysis as extensivcly as
possible. It results in a rapid output of information, and
avoids errors common in manual collection and transcription
of data. It is common practice to use multiple redundant
data recording for particularly critical data: that is, two digi-
tal data :-ecorders are routinely used to log data. In the
Boeing simulators, it is possible to get a full time/event his-
tory. lnit:al switch settings and system states are logged and
changes are identified and time marked.
Also, data are collected in several forms. Video recording
is used whenever possible. In the B-757/767 evaluations,
audio and video recordings were time marked for comparison
with the event record to determine differences from the
desired profile. The video tapes are particularly helpful dur-
ing the debriefing of the pilots. A situation can be replayed
to refre:h their memory and prepare them to answer ques-
tions or make evaluation ratings. In some cases the several
forms oi data collection are different transformations of the
data. For example, a ground track plot and a time to perform
record was made in a study comparing manual vs. automatic
VOR tuning. The time plots showed no differcnces, but there
were d_amatic differences in the ground tracks (automatic
tuning was better).
Observational data from experts are used only rarely
becaus( of concerns about differences in interpretation.
Howev,:r, postflight questionnaires, rating scales and debrief-
ing interviews ate used regularly. One problem with prefer-
ence r_ tings is that a less-preferred condition will sometimes
result in better objective performance.
Preliminary testing of data acquisition and analysis rou-
tines is essential. Performance measurement requires a good
deal of software development and intentions are frequently
misinterpreted. Checking of these routines must be intensive:
tnan_ surprises are usually found. The performance measure-
merit and analysis testing involves testing it yourself with
know1 data, running in-house subjects, and running prelimi-
nary _.ubjects from the population of interest.
ATTITUDES OF PARTICIPANTS
Pilots, both military and civilian, are very tolerant of
shor'_comings in simulators as far as the physical characteris-
tics visual scenes and aircraft dynamics are concerned
because most pilots today have had long experience with
simt lators and undcrstand their shortcomings. However, they
are cery intolerant of unrealistic procedures, events, and con-
ditions. Some pilots, probably because they have engineering
backgrounds, are troubled by equipment evaluations foe
technologies that do not exist. For example, a study of dis-
play formatting and other characteristics for information
from a sensor or processor that does not exist gives them a
great deal of trouble, even though the issue is the informa-
tion presentation, not the source.
Pilots also are generally very accepting of the purpose of a
simulation exercise, and what is expected from them. hater-
estingly, the lnost difficulties occur with Boeing pilots who
pa:ticipate in many simulation studies. It may be that they
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viewparticipatingin simulationsa secondaryto theirpri-
marydutiesof flighttesting.Also,thesimulationstudiesare
oftenscheduledatnight,andtheirparticipationamountso
unpaidovertime.
Tile pilots are always asked to comment on the simula-
tion and scenario to find out if they feel the simulation was
appropriate to the purpose. Sometimes the structuring of the
scenario can go too far. In one case, a script for the pilot to
read as a passenger briefing was provided. Many pilots felt
this was a bit much. particularly since most said it was not
exactly what they would say in an announcement.
EDUCATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE
SIMULATOR RESEARCHER
In complex simulator-based experimentation and research
there is both an experimenter learning curve and an experi-
menter teaching curve. Tile learning involves gaining an
appreciation of how difficult it is to plan and execute a
major simulator study and how meticulous you must be.
Most of the effort occurs before and after the actual data
collection, i.e., while running subjects. About 60% of the
effort is in preparation, 30% in data analysis and interpreta-
tion. Only about 105> of the effort is the execution of the
simulation runs. There is no apparent procedure for deter-
mining how difficult a particular study will be.
The teaching curve is manifested by experienced research-
ers imparting to less experienced or novice researchers the
many problems to be aware of, and the relative importance
and effort required for, various aspects of preparing for and
executing simulator experiments and evaluations. Every
large-scale simulation facility should have a cadre of experi-
enced researchers to assist in the conduct of studies by col-
leagues from other divisions who may be responsible for con-
ducting a simulator study. Some of the points, "already
mentioned earlier, that are not fully appreciated by naive
researchers is the need for detailed planning, a great deal of
continued consultation with experienced pilots, extensive
shakedown testing, verification of the data acquisition and
performance measurement system, and tile absolute necessity
for comprehensive preliminary testing.
Probably one of the most difficult problems of the first-
time experimenter is becoming familiar with the physical
design and operation of the simulator and the role of the
facility support personnel, The last is especially important
because the experimenter may have expectations that these
personnel understand the intent of the study, what it implies
in terms of preparation of the simulator, and what they must
do to support the study. This is not likely to be tile case.
Requirements, down to what the initial switch settings in the
cockpit must be, and who is to set them, must be stated
explicitly. No one but the experimenter is going to worry
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about details, and he or she must be certain that none have
been missed.
An occurrence at Boeing is a good illustration of what can
happen if tile experimenter is not thoroughly familiar with
the simulator facility and personnel. An evaluation of display
concepts using experienced pilots was scheduled for several
nights running. The results were needed urgently. The prelim-
inary preparations were made and the display hardware and
software installed in the simulator. The evaluation was to be
based on observational data and the opinions of the pilots.
Shortly after the test began, the computer locked up. This
occurred repeatedly, but never at the same time or during the
sanle events. Several hours were spent, on several successive
nights, looking for the programming error that seemed to be
the most likely cause of the lock-up. Of course, much valua-
ble time was wasted and there was a loss of the scarce pilot
resources.
It was eventually discovered that the cause of the failures
was a tape-drive write-error. The simulator had a built-in data
logging system but it was not being used in this particular
experiment. The support personnel knew that a tape was
supposed to be mounted onto the drive to log the data, but
this particular experimenter did not provide one, contrary to
normal practice and the expectations of the support person-
nel. Therefore one of the facility people put a discarded tape
on the drive so the simulator would run. The researcher was
unaware of all this, and the well-intentioned support person
had no idea the tape was the source of the problem. It turned
out, of course, that the tape was discarded because it was
bad, and when it was used on the drive a write-error would
occur at some random point.
The researcher is equivalent to a general building Contrac-
tor. He or she must know the simulator operation and capa-
bilities, and the facility management and support personnel.
The researcher must take all responsibilities for the planning
issuing of instructions, coordinating of support requirements
and checking and verifying of software, hardware, and proce-
dures prior to tile study, as well as conducting the data col-
lection and performing the analyses.
ATTITUDES OF CUSTOMERS AND USERS OF
INFORMATION FROM SIMULATOR STUDIES
The custon]er's expectations, whether the customer is an
in-house user or an external organization, have a marked
influence on the form of the simulator.based tests and
evaluations. They tend to overly stress face validity as a
requirement, and often expect more to result from the tests
than is possible. Engineers especially have expectations that
behavioral information should be readily available, or can be
quickly acquired to answer their questions. Engineers fre-
quently confuse experimentation with demonstration, and
they do not fully appreciate the importance of good
experimentalcontrolasafactorinthevalidityandreliability
of tiledata.Accolnmodatingthebiasesof thecustomerand
usertosomedegreeisnecessary.It isalsopossiblesometimes
to explainwhycertainmethodsareimportanttothegoalof
thetestandWilycertainfeaturesof thesimulationarenot
veryimportant.
PLANNING FOR DEMONSTRATIONS
Outsiders, particularly, managers, marketing representa-
tives, senior personnel from the client organization, and
other VIPs do not accept the importance of not interfering
with th_ conduct of an experiment. They expect to see
demonst_ations and think little of entering a cockpit during a
run. Un!ortunately there is little that can be done to dis-
courage this practice. The wisest policy is to recognize that
demonstration is an important part of any development pro-
gram and serves legitimate needs even if it is inconvenient
and sometimes seriously detrimental to the experimental
plan. One of the best means to avoid interference to the
extent possible is to plan for delnonstrations before and after
the dala collection period, allow for it in tilne and budget
plans, and be sure key people are made aware of the availa-
bility' tt_r demonstration well in advance. This will not stop
interfer,.'nce but it will help.
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APPENDIX G
S1MU LATION
FIELD INTERVIEW
STUDIES OF VISUAL ILLUSIONS DURING NIGHT APPROACHES
Dr. Conrad L. Kralt
Bellevue, Washington
Dr. Kraft retired from the Boeing Company in 1983.
During his long tenure with the company he performed
numerous studies of pilot vision and performance, safety,
and simulator visual characteristics. He received numerous
awards for his simulator-based research relating illusions of
altitude during night visual approaches to the visual and
geographical characteristics of tile airport and surrounding
area. His basic finding was that an illusion of excessively
high altitude was manifested when an airport is situated at
the edge of a city and there is an upward tilt of the city from
l°-3 ° from the airport to the horizon. The pilot of an air-
craft making a straight-in, night, visual descent from a high
altitude over water or otherwise dark terrain toward the air-
port with the tilted city in the background will misperceive
tile aircraft altitude to be much higher than it is. The conse-
quence of this illusion is the aircraft will contact tire ground
5-8 miles before the threshold of tile runway.
Tire research was prompted by a series of crashes of
B-727s within a few years of the introduction of the aircraft
into commercial service. Dr. Kraft was asked to determine if
there were any characteristics of the aircraft that could be
contributing to the accidents. He discovered through looking
at the descriptions of accidents involving the B-727 and other
commercial aircraft, that many of the accidents occurred
under conditions of approaches at night over dark areas to
airports near cities with an upward tilt.
Dr. Kraft was struck by tile common circumstances sur-
rounding this large proportion of accidents and the strong
suggestion that vision was involved. He began a series of
investigations on the visual perception of altitude. He began
by photographing maps of some of the cities where the acci-
dents occurred, tie placed glue on the maps outlining the
runway and airport and roads of tile city plus random spots
in built-up areas. He then sprinkled fluorescent chalk dust on
the maps. The maps were photographed under black light
from various distances and angles, corresponding to a long
descent path to the airport. The set of photographs appeared
as night scenes of an approach to an airport. Three groups of
pilots, current airline pilots, noncurrent airline pilots, and
noncurrent small aircraft (low altitude) pilots were asked to
sort the photographs into altitude bins. The result was tile
first group was reasonably consistent in their judgments but
the last two groups showed high variability. The lesson from
this study was that only current airline pilots would be
appropriate subjects for future studies.
The next study also involved judgment of altitude based
on viewing 16-mnr moving films of a model city. The camera
moved down tracks set to represent two high and two low
approaches. The judgment data from the airline pilots was
inconsistent. The fihn resolution was not high enough to give
an adequate representation of point light sources as seen in
the real world.
For the third study, a large model city mounted on a mov-
ing table was constructed. The budget limit for tile equip-
ment was $12,000. The model was made by puncturing pin
holes through a large print of an aerial photograph of a city
and aiEport. An important detail was to puncture the holes
with a soft wood backing under tile photograph so that each
light point was dimpled. This was necessary to preclude tile
whole scene from suddenly going black if the simulated air-
craft went below the plane of the table. The slightly raised
holes were in effect small spherical light sources.
Prior to construction of the city model, an analysis was
made to determine if tile model moving toward the pilot in a
mock_'d-up cockpit would provide any monocular cues to its
true distance. The vision literature indicated that accommo-
dation, the only available cue because the pilots viewed the
scene with one eye occluded, would not be effective until
the table came within 28 in. of the observer. In effect, the
city _ould simulate an approach from 20 miles out, to within
4.5 miles of the runway over altitudes in excess of 20,000 ft
to b{low ground level. The city could be inclined up to 3 °.
Tire _unway remained horizontal. The cockpit first used was
a lett-over, single-seat fighter mock-up. The aerodynamic
nrodd was a nonspecific representation of an aircraft weigh-
ing :_pproximately 100,000 lb. The only instruments availa-
ble Io the pilots were airspeed and vertical speed indica-
tors. The aircraft did not have horizontal, yaw or roll
nlo w.'nlent.
"[he Boeing pilots objected to the absence of an altimeter,
believing they could not make a proper descent and approach
without it. They were told the object was not to evaluate
thei: performance but to detcrnrine if the city simulation was
adequate. This allayed the pilots' concer,rs. As it turned out,
the pilots could fly the descent very well with only the two
inst:uments and the visual scene. After tile experiment, tile
pilots were all very surprised to find that the city moved
toward them rather than vice versa. It was a good confirma-
tim of the absence of extraneous visual cues.
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Additional flmds provided to the project because of a
need to move the laboratory allowed the simulator to be
upgraded. A cockpit resembling a transport aircraft was con-
structed, and the aerodynamic equations were improved to
represent an aircraft with a gross weight of approximately
150,000 lb - somewhere in the weight range between a
B-737 and a B-727. The pilots had been extremely critical of
tile handling characteristics of the earlier simulator. With the
improved aerodynamics, there was a marked reduction in the
variance of the glidepath for each pilot.
Pilot acceptance of the simulator helped the study
because word was passed around that it was a good simula-
tor. This considerably eased the problem of recruiting pilots
to participate in the study. Another factor which prompted
cooperation by the pilots was that ahnost all of them had
had a close call descending below the glideslope at night.
The enthusiasm of the pilots about the importance of the
study also influenced management to continue support of
the study.
Because of the limited task requirements, control of air-
speed and descent rate, Dr. Kraft was concerned that the
imposed workload was so low compared to actual flight that
the pilots may be concentrating far more on altitude judg-
ment than they would be in actual operations. To increase
workload other air traffic was added to the sinmlation. That
is, the pilots saw aircraft beacons flying over the city (the
beacons were actually small lights mounted on a few rotat-
ing disks ganged together). Because of the radii of the disks
and their slow movement they appeared to the pilots to
move in a straight line. The pilots were asked from time to
time to report on the azimuth, heading and relative altitude
of the other aircraft (via a request from an air traffic con-
troller). This side task both increased workload and drew
their vision away from the approach task as a normal scan-
ning of the airspace would do. The pilots were also asked for
their estimated altitude at precise points m the approach.
This was accomplished by computer control of a tape
recorder. A nice touch was that the voice on the tape was
that of the person playing the role of the air traffic con-
troller who asked for the information on the other aircraft.
Thus, it was not apparent to the pilots that a tape recorder
was making the requests.
Reflecting on the series of experiments, Dr. Kraft made
several noteworthy comments. Maximum effort was placed
on visual-scene fidelity because of the suspected perceptual
nature of the problem. Fidelity of other features were of
minimal concern because they were judged to be of little
consequence to the characteristic of the performance of
interest - going below the glideslope. The very limited fund-
ing for the study forced concentration on the most critical
feature of the simulation. Had a fuU'-mission simulator been
made available for the study, Dr. Kraft said they probably
would have not discovered the basic problem. Conventional
model-board systems simply could not portray the charac-
teristics of point light sources and thus cues responsible for
the illusion would be absent. This study evolved through.a
number of stages deliberately. Dr. Kraft said that pilot
experiments are really very necessary to help you think
about a problem. He ventured that anyone who attempts to
perform an FMS experiment without having conducted
several preliminary studies of more modest scope would be
very lucky to have a successful outcome the first time.
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APPENDIX H
FIELD INTER VIEV_
SIMULATION AT THE UNITED AIRLINES FLIGHT TRAINING CENTER
Dave Shroyer 4
United Airlines Flight Training Center
Stapleton International Airport
Denver, Colorado
Dave Shroyer has been involved in United's training pro-
grants since tile 1950s, when they had fixed-base instrument
trainers in Chicago. His primary thrust since 1952 has been
to advocate recurrent proficiency training. United started
line-oriented flight training (LOFT) in 1976, and more
recently has developed command, leadership, and resources
(CLR) training. Dave has a group of about 35 people includ-
ing Flight Standards instructors and analysts to develop and
execute training programs for all six aircraft that United
operates.
LOFT TRAINING
Flight simulator currency training (recurrent proficiency
checks - PCs) can be divided into "batting practice" and
LOFT. Batting practice represents the traditional approach -
successive approaches, departures, failure modes and the like,
not in a trip context. Dave emphasized that they do not slew
o_ restart the simulator at initial conditions (the beginning of
an approach), but fly it around the pattern. Flying large jet
aixcraft requires staying ahead of the aircraft and anticipating
future events. He felt that pilots lose the context and pacing
of normal operations if they are slewed around to the start of
an approach. [Note this is a different position than was taken
in the initial B-767 Computer-Based Training system by
others at United, but the atttomated B-767 training program
did not materialize, primarily because of a last-minute change
from three-man to two-man operations and the impact on
the simulator redesign, delivery schedule, and costs.]
LOFT is well known as training in the context of a line
trip from point A to point B. LOFT objectives are to provide
training that combines the aircraft, the route, and crew inter-
ac:tions within cockpit and between cockpit and all external
sy!stems such as dispatch, ground crew, and ATC. LOFT pro-
vides all normal trip activities, including trip paperwork, for
the whole crew. It permits crew interactions and exposure to
pa st and recent line operational problems. Given the proper
selection of valid United line trips, many of the problems
which really occur can be built into the scenario. Dave claims
4Now retired from United Airlines.
that if tl_ey are given more time, they could work all of the
batting practice drills into a LOFT in certain areas, such as
Southerr, California, Chicago-Cleveland-Pittsburgh, and
Boston-New York-Washington. Current proficiency checks
have two segments of LOFT in addition to the customary
Batting Practice.
CLR TRAINING
There is heavy emphasis on CLR training because 80'/'} of
the accidents have nothing to do with the aircraft, but with
"human factors," which also used to be called "pilot error."
Dave stated it was common knowledge that prior to CLR,
First OTicers would become Captains on the basis of time
alone (_eniority) and flying proficiency (being able to pass
the checkride). They were thrust into command and
decision-making jobs without the benefit of command and
leadership training. He also observed that the need for such
training' was not limited to Captains, because the whole crew
operates the aircraft, and must function efficiently and
safely.
CLR training is composcd of academics (learning the
theory from text and workbooks), seminar discussions, and
specially designed and debriefed LOFT exercises. CLR
emphasizes the concepts of a) Inquiry, b) Advocacy, c) Con-
flict Resolution, d) Decision-Making, and e) Critique as ele-
ments in the identification and resolution of operational
problems in the cockpit. The approach uses the Blake and
Mouton (1978) Grid to identify individual pilot styles. Blake
and Mouton classify individual behavior in terms of either a
basic ",ask or people orientation. They quantify these two
attributes in an x-y matrix scaled from 1 to 9 on each axis.
Pilot _,tyles can be identified and scaled along these dimen-
sions. Dave commented that the military (or "captain is
king") style does not promote the best use of cockpit
resources; actually, Dave was more emphatic when he said,
"It doesn't work."
The key elements of CLR training are as follows: a) there
is no single solution to the problems given, b) there is no
interference by instructors, and c) there is no performance
assessment by instructors. In a typical LOFT exercise for
71
OF POIJ_ _,..i, LITY
CLR training, a major problem, which has a cascading effect,
will be introduced early in the flight; problems such as major
hydraulic system failures are used. Minor "mosquito bite"
type problems such as light bulb failures are avoided.
There may be more than one problem, but they typically
do not make the scenario too complicated; the normal con-
straints of flight and the ways crews interact to solve prob-
lems create a fertile environment for CLR training. The flight
is permitted to develop naturally. No one interferes, stops
the flight or tells the crews what to do. All scenarios are
possible to execute safely, but if the crew makes too many
mistakes, or a critical mistake at a wrong time, a crash could
result. A crash is permitted, but Dave said they have never
had one.
United a/ways provides at least two viable courses of
action, so that the crew will be forced to make decisions,
and will be able to use innovative problem solving techniques
instead of being led down the path of least resistance by the
constraints of the scenario. This echoes concerns that some
scientists have had to permit truly emergent behavior to
unt\)ld in team training situations (Crowe et al., 1981).
The crew is video taped, and all conversation and con>
munications are recorded. At the conclusion of the flight, the
video tape is taken to a closed room for crew review and
debriefing. The instructor serves as a facilitator only ; he does
not evaluate or offer comments. He leads the discussion and
focuses it to particular parts of the flight that the crew
should review and critique for themselves. At the conclusion
of the debriefing, the video tape is erased.
COMMENTS
,m
,b
• Weather and effects o]1 takeoff, enroute, fuel, and
landing requirements.
United derives data from accident reports, from irregular-
ity reports within the company, and there is a "network"
among the airlines and equipment manufacturers to share
operating problems and solutions. United trains about 6,000
pilots a 3'ear. Their instructors receive constant feedback on
what happens on the line and, of course, they gain informa- "'---
tion on potential operating problems in the simulator train-
ing sessions. In addition, there are line-check pilot reports
and quarterly flight standardization meetings. In short, there
is a constant flow of information on equipment, mainte-
nance, ATC, airport, dispatch, route, and czew difficulties.
The severity and implications of problems (most of which
actually have occurred in line operations) along with a
judgment of the ability of training to mitigate the problems
drives the selection of problems for LOFT or CLR training.
Using these data, Dave Shroyer, who has more than 30 yr
of experience with what does and does not work in training,
collaborates with an aircraft fleet representative and assis-
tant. United has six aircraft types. A fleet representative and
assistant represent the technical expertise on each aircraft.
Dave frames the problem generally, the fleet representative
and assistant write the training objectives, and Dave reviews
their work as a quality control check. Thus, three people are
directly involved in problem selection and scenario definition
at the level of the training objectives. It must be remem-
bered, however, that problem selection is based on a cafeteria
of data and information which has been derived from all the
sources which were described above.
Problem Selection
For LOFT and CLR, United looks for problems which are
realistic, solvable, and have multiple implications for the
remainder of the flight. As said before, they avoid "mosquito
bite" problems, and look for those which will tax the team-
work, system knowledge and decision making capability of
the crew. They choose problems which will cause the crew
to think ahead, perhaps to the approach and landing, and to
plan what they would do if there are further problems, such
as other failures, a change in weather, or a change in the
landing runway. Problems can include but are not limited to
the following types:
• Electrical, hydraulic, and mechanical system failures.
• Flight paperwork errors, dispatch procedures, weight
and balance.
• Crew or passenger problems (including bomb and
hijack threats).
• Problem ATC, noise abatement, or obstacle clearance
procedures.
• Problem airports, landing runways, and traffic delays.
Scenario Construction
About 4 wk is allocated to the construction of a new
scenario and three or four people are involved. This time
allocation assumes that the scenario analyst knows the air-
craft and systems very well, the normal and emergency pro-
cedures for the aircraft, the flight operations procedures used
by United from dispatch to arrival at the gate, and the details
of the specific departure airport, the route, and all possible
terminal areas and airports.
The estimated level of effort assumes that all the required
data for frequencies, facility locations, terrain and airport
models reside in the simulator data base. It also assumes a
knowledge of candidate problems to give the crew, and the
training objectives that are addressed by those problems.,
Dave is hesitant to guess what level of effort would be
required to build a scenario from scratch without all this
institutional memory, tie believes at least 6-8 person months
would be required, and possibly more, depending on the
experience of the scenario development team.
Once the departure airport, route, and nominal destina-
tion are determined, the actual line route is observed by one
of the scenario designers (in the jump seat), and all radio and
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intercomcommunicationsarerecordedfrompre-pushback
to arrivalat the gate.Air traffic controlpersonnelat
departure,nroute,andarrivallocationsareconsulted.This
is doneto ensurethattheactuallanguage,procedures,and
flowof eventsof eachrouteareasrealisticaspossible,and
upto date.Thescenariois thenbuiltandreviewedbyDave
to ensureconsistency,sufficientpacingofevents,meetingof
trainingobjectives,andrealism.If thetrainingis tobecerti-
fied,theFAAhastoapproveit.
Scenario Testing
About a week is devoted to preliminary scenario-testing
to be sure that it works in the simulator. Flight Standards
instructors at the training center review the scenario, both
from an execution viewpoint in the simulator and to test the
utility of the scenario for its training purpose. After prelimi-
nary testing, the scenario is modified as necessary during
initial instructor training. Scenario testing continues and it
may be revised further after the first crews fly it. Flight
crews often point out improvelnents in young scenarios.
Scenarios are not considered to be debugged well or rela-
tively stable until they have been used for about 6 too. Even
after that time, they have to be changed if there are any
changes in the routes, frequencies, facilities, or procedures.
Instructor Training
Instructor training to administer a scenario requires about
as much time as building the scenario initially. The nominal
time is about 4 wk. United instructors maintain currency in
all positions on the aircraft they are training, and maintain
currency on more than one aircraft. They have a reservoir of
institutional memory of prior scenarios and the general prin-
ciples of LOFT and CLR training. Instructor training time
could easily quadruple the current time allocated if this level
of currency and institutional memory were not available.
Cabin-Crew/Flight-Crew Interactions
Communications with the cabin crew can be simulated
easily, as can communications with the ground crew. If
necessary, United will simulate sending a crew member "out
of the cockpit" if the problem dictates. The rationale is that,
for the training problem (and in reality), that person is
simply not in the cockpit during that time. He or she will
return and make a report.
For the crew remaining in the cockpit, the illusion of
flight is preserved. For the person who "leaves" the cockpit,
the illusion may be interrupted, but he or she is doing what
they would normally do - leave the cockpit to do something
and report back. The overt behavior is consistent with
reality. United doesn't seem to be concerned with whether or
not the illusion is maintained for the person who "leaves"
the cockpit. The problem itself is real, and the solution
provides crews with the experience of dealing with it, which
meets United's training objectives.
Stress and Peer Pressure
As for stress created by peer pressure, it was observed that
most professional pilots are quite sensitive about their perfor-
mance. It was doubtful that being in a simulator with other
crew members and an instructor would change this source of
stress from what normally exists in the real world. Since
United is dealing with proficiency checks which have a direct
bearing on continued enrployment, it is possible that there is
more stress in their simulators than on a normal line flight.
Organizational Pressure
As one approaches LOFT-type scenarios and is investigat-
ing "he crew interactions and decision making that might
occ_tr in the real world, there are organizational pressures
that might influence behavior in the real world, but may or
may not influence behavior in the sinrulator.
For example, if one declares an emergency, a report has to
be written, and the problem becomes known to many people
in ti_e company hierarchy. Some pilots may not want the
hassle of the report, being "second guessed" by someone
whc, was not there to see the whole situation unfold, or
having their name associated with an operational problem,
however mundane. As another example, there are difficulties
for the company and the passengers if an aircraft does not
land at the intended airport, or one which can handle the
flight, maintenance, or passenger requirements.
Pilots are trained throughout their careers to maintain a
rea_,onable margin of safety; but it is seldom that an aircraft
is dispatched in perfect working order, that all facilities along
the route are operational, or that the weather is certain.
Pih_ts have to make judgments. There is pressure to make
each flight as economical as possible, and there are relatively
few absolute criteria. Pilot behaviors, and especially their
decisions, will be conditioned by organizational pressure in
thc real world. The extent to which this behavior is exhibited
in a simulator is unknown, but probably varies from pilot to
pilot.
Dave Shroyer commented that United has not begun to
address pilot judgment and decision making directly. Instead,
they develop scenarios which will challenge the flight crew
teamwork and decision process, let the flight unfold without
in,erference, and guide the flight crew in their own critique.
No judgments of the goodness or badness of the performance
a>.' made by the flight instructors during CLR training.
ORIGINAL PAGE tS
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Nonpiiot Observers
We asked Dave if a researcher could see what a skilled and
experienced pilot would see while observing a simulator
flight. He commented that one designs a simulator flight with
some purpose in mind, and it doesn't take a skilled and expe-
rienced pilot to determine whether or not the desired behav-
iors resulted. Observers have to be trained what to look for,
and they may need training to increase their observational
skill for a given environment and situation. Undoubtedly,
flight training and experience would help the observer under-
stand the environment and what to look for, but, given some
training, it was not essential. Dave commented that one of
his scenario analysts is a psychology major, but he designs
very good scenarios and understands the cockpit environ-
ment very well.
Fidelity
We had to ask the obvious question: Can some or much of
this training be done without expensive, high fidelity simu-
lators with visual and motion systems? Dave thought that
much training could be done with lower fidelity devices. He
pointed to successes in training during the 1950s with much
less simulator capability and fidelity, and to their whole
training program, which includes all media. He commented,
though, that the airlines are driven by requirements of the
regulatory agencies, and by the legal implications of what
they do. ttaving achieved zero-time (flight time) training and
its cost benefits, it is unlikely that any airline would change
anything that might jeopardize the benefits of the whole
approach. This includes using the maximum state of the art
in flight simulators.
Validity of Behavior in Simulators
We asked another point-blank question: Is the behavior
you have observed of pilots in a simulator any different from
what you would expect in the real world? Dave seemed sur-
prised that anyone would ask this question. For him, there
is no question that the behavior in their simulators is valid.
He cited an example from the days before modern simula-
tors, visual, and motion systems, where there was an inten-
tional gear-up landing in Los Angeles caused by a system
failure. The pilot did everything perfectly, and commented
that it was "a piece of cake" because he had just practiced
that problem m the simulator.
This view probably is connnon in a commercial airline
training environment, where there is high motivation to learn
and maintain proficiency. We do not know if the same moti-
vation would operate in a research simulator setting, but cer-
tainly elements of professional pride in proficiency and
previously mentioned aspects of peer pressures would be
operating. Together they might create motivational levels
which are equivalent to those found in conamercial airline
training.
LOFT Guidelines
We asked if there was anything in the LOFT guidelines
report (Lauber and Foushee, 1981) that is no longer true, or
is out of date. Dave said the principles are just as valid today
as they were then. He knew of nothing that needed to be
changed, and assured us that if there was anything controver-
sial in that report, he would certainly be aware of it. He was
most pleased that the Air Force Military Airlift Command
has pursued the development of LOFT exercises under the
rubric of MOS training (MOST) based on the LOFT guide.
lines report.
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FIELD INTERVIEW
McDONNELL DOUGLAS CORPORATION MILITARY MISSION-ORIENTED
SIMULATION RESEARCH
Dr. William J. Cody
Lead Engineer, Life Sciences Division
McDonnell Douglas Corp., St. Louis, Missouri
Dr. Cody directed three major studies for the Air Force
involving use of tile McDonnell Douglas flight simulator
facility. Two studies had the purpose of quantifying the
effects of chemical defense (CD) stressors on pilot perfor-
mance. Tile third was an evaluation of the mission effective-
ness of an F-15 Dual Role Fighter (DRF) crew system con-
cept for a pilot and weapons systems officer. All three
studies involved air-to-ground attack scenarios.
CUSTOMER RELATIONS
The customer imposed difficult constraints on the CD
studies. Only six pilots were to be tested because of cost, and
the collection of baseline, i.e., normal operation, data was
not included because this was in effect a test of the pilots'
competence.
Discussions with the customer to translate the customer's
requirements to testable propositions is an important part of
the initial work. The customer ahnost always formulates the
study question in a general or practical way. It is not always
clear what the research questions should be to answer the
practical question. The researcher should be careful not to
undertake the project without a clear understanding with the
customer of what will be done in specific terms.
SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT
The main issue in the chemical defense study was how
body heating equivalent to wearing individual protective
equipment (IPE) would affect attack-mission performance.
The heat load was imposed by an undergarment with tubing
woven in for circulation of hot water. It was difficult to
know how long the segments should be. The customer pro-
vided data on what the expected body heat change should
be with time wearing the IPE, but it was not possible to
determine experimentally ahead of time what temperature
profile for heating the suit would produce the desired body
temperature, or how long the mission segments should be.
In the first CD study the mission profiles originally con-
ceived urned out in preliminary testing to be far too diffi-
cult. They had to be made less demanding to be practical.
(Notice that this problem is common to the predisposition
to overcomplicate LOFT or LOS scenarios.) Six different
profiles were developed for the first CD study. These profiles
were considered initially to be equally difficult based on the
total distance flown, the number of waypoints and the num-
ber of heading changes. It turned out, however, that pilots
found lhem to be very different in difficult.,,, because of dif-
fering demands associated with angles to the target, distance
and the weapon used. Cody said that his lack of familiarity
with the details of the attack mission led him to initially
oversin;plify the equal-difficulty problem.
In the second CD study a different approach was taken to
develop equivalent profiles. A single mission that had several
legs, x_aypoints and two target locations was designed. A
templa:e of this profile was drawn and other profiles were
generaled by rotating the template with respect to the simu-
lated t,'rrain. Thus the specific headings, terrain path and tar-
get lo¢ations all changed, but the fundamental profile did
not. Since the pilots think and perform in terms of the spe-
cific headings and ground references, they did not realize
that the different missions were fundamentally the same.
This _as a successful means for creating differences in the
appearances of the scenario, while maintaining the similari-
ties necessary for data analysis. A similar technique was used
in the DRF study.
In flae DRF study, relatively short mission segments were
used. The scenario began approaching the forward edge of
the battle area (FEBA) and ended on the return crossing.
Cody found that his experiences performing the CD studies
were a great help in performing the DRF study. Length and
character of the scenario were dictated by a consideration of
the number of observations, i.e., data collection segments
necessary and the crew functions to be performed. Tasks
were segmented and approximate performance times were
associated with each task segment. Laying out the segments
on a time line and taking data collection needs into account
produced an estimate of the length and composition of the
scenario.
The simulation for the CD and DRF study were not full
mission in the sense of including every aspect of the mission.
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Compromises were made in the interest of economy of effort
and experimental control. For instance, the mission planning
phase, which can require 2-3 hr for a 1-hr mission, was not
included. Also, communications were restricted because it
was not clear how they could be controlled and manipulated
in a way advantageous to the study. They would be a con-
founding factor only, and not essential to the flying of tile
mission. Only the systems essential to the mission were oper-
ational. This saved training time and removed additional
sources of variability. Also, cockpit checklists were abbre-
viated to include only those systems that were essential to
performing the mission. These were all acceptable reductions
in nrission fidelity, because the purpose of the studies was to
determine how well the pilots could perform specific tasks
with particular equipment and procedures.
For the CD studies, four different models were used to
predict what behavioral functions related to mission perfor-
mance would likely be sensitive to heat stress. The predic-
tions from these models were used as a basis for the scenario
design, i.e., to emphasize aspects of the mission that are most
likely to show effects. For example, tracking performance
was one of the functions predicted to be sensitive to thermal
stress. Consequently, the scenario was designed to include
tracking segments with wind-gust disturbances. Pilots
thought these relatively long straight segments were unrealis-
tic, but realism was compromised for the sake of obtaining
useful data.
F-15 pilots were used in the preliminary testing of the
DRF missions. Several changes to the scenario were made
based on their comments. This reinforces the point that pre-
liminary testing is a critical part of any simulation-based
research.
To keep the scenarios simple, Cody had originally planned
to use a single weapon type. The pilots objected because they
said that would never be done. So to satisfy the pilots in the
DRF study, appropriate weapons were paired with different
targets although it was not a factor of interest in the
research.
SIMULATOR ISSUES
The sinmlator facility is essentially modular in hardware
and software. Developing the simulation thus involved link-
ing the hardware units necessary, e.g., the cockpit and terrain
board, and then assembling the proper software elements.
Problems in the development of the simulation configuration
included taking real-time computational demands into
account. The number and type of events, as well as the data
logging needs, had to be assessed to ensure the computer
would not be overloaded. The parameter definitions and for-
matting also had to be done with care. Great detail of specifi-
cation was necessary to communicate to the programmers
exactly what the investigator's intentions were.
In both studies a constraint was inrposed by the simulator
visual system 60 ° field of view and the amount of terrain
available on the terrain board. It took quite a bit of effort
to develop a profile that would keep the target in the field of
view long enought to perform the attack run, and still keep
the visually guided flight portions of the mission within the
limits of the terrain board.
Shortcomings of the sinmlation for the purpose of the
studies included the inability to program event-versus-time-
contingent occurrences, the relative inflexibility of the code
(it takes a great deal of programming effort to change a pro-
file), and the lack of real-time data reduction to provide sum-
maries of a run shortly after they occurred. It was vital to
keep a test director's log to record the time of start and end-
ing of segments of interest for data analysis, and to note
when some problem or other produced bad or contaminated
data.
SUBJECT ISSUES
Selection and training
Three types of aircrew members were used in the DRF
study. Three crews had experience in the two-seat F-15B2
aircraft. The other three crews were composed of three F-15
(single seat) pilots and three F-111 weapons systems officers.
The experience of three different types of aircrew personnel
affected the comprehensiveness of the simulation and the
choice of tasks. A practical by-product of using the F-15B2
pilots was their exposure to the system configuration devel- -
oped by the company. To the degree that their experiences
in the simulator gave them an appreciation of the merit of
this configuration, they would become positive advocates for
it in the operational connnunity. It, of course, made sense to
use these pilots for the study because it minimized the train-
ing problem.
Issues about the interaction of subject characteristics,
mission task requirements, and simulator fidelity became
apparent in the CD studies. Two types of pilots were used,
F-15 pilots and Air Guard A-7 pilots. An F-15 simulator was
used, and the task was air-to-ground weapon delivery. F-15
pilots are familiar with the F-15 cockpit, but because this
aircraft has an air-combat mission, the pilots were not profi-
cient in ground-attack maneuvering. The A-7 pilots were
unfamiliar with the F-15 cockpit, but knew ground-attack
procedures very well. The trade-offs were to teach F-15
pilots to do ground attack, and familiarize the A-7 pilots
with the F-I 5 cockpit since both types of pilots were used,
the F-15 pilots in the initial study and A-7 pilots in the sec-
ond. When the results of the two studies were compared, it
turned out that the A-7 pilots were about twice as good in
their bombing scores as the F-15 pilots.
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Normally,subjectsarechosenbecauseoftheirfamiliarity
withboththespecificaircraftandthemission.In thiscase
onegroupwasfamiliarwiththeaircraftandtheotherwith
themission.Tileexperienceh rewasthat,in termsof ntis-
sionperfornlance,it waseasierto teachtheA-7pilotstofly
the17-15thanto teachthe17-15pilotsto performthemis-
sion.ttowever,hadthemissiondependedheavilyonuseof
alltheaircraftsystems,it islikelythatthe["-15pilotswould
havedonebetter.Thelessonis that choosing the subject
population is not always a simple decision. Specific experi-
ences must be weighed against mission requirements as well
as the configuration of the simulation equipment.
In training the pilots for the attack mission, a profile that
was one of the variants of the general mission profile was
used. The criterion for completion of training was three suc-
cessful weapons delivery runs.
Physical and Psychological Well-Being
When research involves physical stressing of the subject,
the performing organization should not accept responsibility
for the well-being of the subjects. In this case, the Air Force
provided a medical doctor to monitor the tests and accept
responsibility for the Air Force pilots. Understandably, in
.studies where behavioral changes or physiological effects are
expected to occur, it is difficult to get informed consent
from pilots.
Surface-to-air missile (SAM) threats were included in the
mission profile. An issue was whether to allow the aircraft
to be hit by, a SAM and, if so, would the mission stop. It was
_;ssentially a realism vs. research practicality issue. If the
aircraft was never hit, the pilots would soon learn that the
h_issites were really not a significant threat. Since these are
eperational pilots, there was a danger that altering their
_xpectations of the real threat could have lethal implications.
On the other hand, it would disrupt the research if the simu-
lation ternrinated when the aircraft was struck by a missile.
The compromise was to allow the aircraft to be hit if the
pilot did not counter the threat by ECM or maneuvering,
but only cue the pilot that he was hit and not stop the mis-
sion. Unlike civilian air operations, military pilots are used
to disasters, i.e., dying in mock combat. They do not like it,
but do see it as a valuable training experience. Because this
is routine in military training, it does not have the ethical
inrplication of possible psychological harm to the pilot,
which would be the case in simulations of civil:air operations.
Subject Attitudes
17-15 pilots were reluctant to participate in the CD study
because they did not want to give up aircraft flight time. The
Air Guard pilots were more willing to participate because of
the opportunity to get some 17-15 experience, if only in a
simulator.
lixperienced pilots were used in the CD and DRF studies,
and are used in inost of the simulation work McDonnell
Dot:glas does. The cockpits are comprehensive and realistic
representations of the actual aircraft, and the aircraft dynam-
ics are accurate. (The 17-15 and t-'-18 design was basically
derived from simulation developments rather than the
reverse.) Physical fidelity is not an issue in the simulation
studies. Pilots do express some concerns about the lack of
cockpit motion because the main simulators are all fixed
base. The pilots had no concerns about the low luminance of
the visual simulation, but were unhappy with the limited
resolution and field of view. Early target detection and side
vie,aing are important to air-to-ground attack missions and
are, therefore, the likely basis of the concerns about resolu-
tion and field of view.
I he main concern of the subjects is mission or scenario
fide ity. Pilots do not readily accept deviations from opera-
tional practice unless the study is clearly to try new equip-
ment and procedures. Part of the concern about scenario
fideity stems from the fact that a simulation that is essen-
tially a duplication of an actual mission is a test of the pilots'
cap: bilities. If the pilots are to submit to such testing, they
want everything right to maximize their opportunity to prot>
erly perform. They do not want a shortcoming in the simula-
tion to be interpreted as a lack of their ability. Conversely,
the pilots are much more faw)rably disposed to trying new
equipment and procedures because they cannot be held
accc untable for the outcome.
(ody commented that the pilots are very skeptical that a
non)ilot psychologist can measure expert pilot behavior. It
is important to include a pilot on the research team to work
witl the researcher and interact together with the subject
pilo s. The subjects then have some assurance that somebody
who knows the operational world is revolved, and can discuss
the reasons for the characteristics of the simulation study in
credible terms.
PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT
Multiple means of performance measurement were used
by Cody on the CD and DRF studies. Expert opinion of
experienced pilots was used heavily during the scenario devel-
• opment and checkout phases. Informal dialogue between the
exp_rts and the investigator were the primary means used in
these stages. The Subjective Workload Assessment Technique
(SWAT) was administered routinely to the subjects since
workload was a major consideration in both studies.
"[he subjects also were given questionnaires before and
aftel the test sessions. The preliminary questionnaires collect
biographical and experience information. The post-test ques-
timmaires were another source of expert-opinion information
Of: ?('.,c:,_ QU._Lrry
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abouthesilnulatedsystemandprocedures,aswellasthe
simulationandscenario.Thepilotsalsowereaskedto rate
theirownperformance.
Automaticrecordingof system-statedatawasusedexten-
sively.It wastheprimarysourceof objectivedata,andwas
reliedonforfinalanalysesa muchaspossible.Thegeneral
philosophywasto collectasmuchof thistypeof dataas
possible:it mayturnoutto beusefullater.Videoandaudio
tapeswerevaluablesourcesof reformation.Crewactions,
communications,cockpitdisplaysandmissiontrackwereall
recorded.Thesewerelatereditedtogetherinatime-linked,
split-screenformatto simplifyinterpretation.Thesetapes
wereusedforlink-analysis,classificationfcrewcommunica-
tionsandobserverscoringofperformance.
SCHEDULING
Cody noted that scheduling of simulator time was a prob-
lem and they usually worked off-hours. An informal priority
of simulator use is followed. First priority is marketing,
second is engineering development of specific aircraft sys-
tems, third is training company pilots, and fourth is con-
tracted research.
The initial schedule for data collection was too tight. He
tried running three pilots or crews per week, but simulator
failures and subjects not showing up on time created severe, .
sometimes impossible, problems for completing the planned *i
runs. Cody said that during the period of actual data collec- J
tion, the investigator should plan on having about 50_2_ of!
the scheduled simulator use time being used for the runs. i
That is. if the simulator is scheduled for 8 hr/day, no more
than 4 hr/day of actual running time should be planned..i
J
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